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Preface
My husband and I began our lives together in a symbiotic alcoholic-enabler relationship in the
late 70's. With our family on the edge of self-destruction in 1987, my husband, an enrolled
member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, born and raised on the Leech Lake reservation, had a
transformational experience which changed his worldview and led him to take our family in a
new direction.
Having watched many of his relatives suffer within the reservation system, he began to
see reservation violence and crime as an outcome of current federal Indian policy more than it
was about past policy. This led us to forming an advocacy in the late 90’s for families hurt by
federal Indian policy. We did our best to share hope and life, as inadequate as we were, by
assisting extended family in our home, neighbors in our community, and strangers across the
nation. We never did it for money; there was never any money. Everything we did came from
passion for the lives of our children, nieces and nephews, and extended communities.
Unfortunately, reservation crime, corruption, drug abuse and violence have continued to
increase over the years. My husband has since passed away and I am a widow, continuing the
work we had begun in 1996.
This thesis compiles some of the documented history, philosophy, and consequences of
federal Indian policy. It also includes a preliminary quantitative causal comparative survey with
1351 participants – 551 of whom identify tribal heritage – and explores the relationship between
differences.
We serve a powerful God with whom all things are possible. Our job is to serve in the
capacity He has given us, even if we do not understand why, and then enjoy watching what He
does next.
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Abstract

This paper will examine the philosophical underpinnings of current federal Indian policy and its
physical, emotional, and economic consequences on individuals and communities.
The U.S. Civil Rights Commission found in 1990 that “[T]he Government of the United
States has failed to provide civil rights protection for Native Americans living on reservations”
(W. B. Allen 1990, 2). As Regan (2014) observes, individuals have been denied full title to their
property – and thus use of the property as leverage to improve their economic condition (Regan
2014). Tribal executive and judicial branches have been accused of illegal search and seizures,
denial of right to counsel or jury, ex parte hearings and violations of due process and equal
protection (W. B. Allen 1990, 3). Violence, criminal activity, child abuse and trafficking are
rampant on many reservations (DOJ 2018). Largely because of crime and corruption, many have
left the reservation system. The last two U.S. censuses’ report 75% of tribal members do not live
in Indian Country (US Census Bureau 2010).
Research suggests current federal Indian policy and the reservation system are built on
philosophies destructive to the physical, emotional and economic health of individual tribal
members. This paper contends that allowing property rights for individual tribal members,
enforcing rule of law within reservation systems, supporting law enforcement, and upholding full
constitutional rights and protections of all citizens would secure the lives, liberties and properties
of affected individuals and families.
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Introduction
For almost 200 years the U.S. federal government has claimed wardship over members of
federally recognized Indian tribes. Yet, despite the nineteenth century U.S. federal court rulings
that propagated this view, disagreement continues as to whether tribes located within the United
States are sovereign, whether Congress has plenary power over them, and whether individual
tribal members have U.S. Constitutional rights:
•
•
•

•
•

Some say the nineteenth century U.S. Supreme Court cases known as the
‘Marshall Trilogy’ contradict tribal sovereignty. Others say they uphold it.
Some say treaties promise a permanent trust relationship. Others point out that
most treaties have clearly specified final payments of federal funds and benefits
and were written and signed with clear intent for gradual assimilation.
Some say the Constitution never gave Congress anything more than the power
to regulate trade with tribes. Others claim the Constitution not only gave
Congress total and exclusive plenary power to decide every aspect of life in
Indian Country – but by unstated extension, gave the executive branch this
power as well.
Some argue that the Constitution never had authority over tribes or tribal
members. Others cite the Constitution when seeking judicial redress.
Some tribal officials argue that international law should not have been forced
upon non-European cultures that had no say in it. Others point to natural law
and international law - the grounds for treaties between nations - as basis for
uninterrupted tribal sovereignty.

Inherent, retained tribal sovereignty was reality for tribal governments prior to the
formation of the United States and in the immediate years following its birth, but is not reflected
in case law from the 1800s and much of the 1900s. By the time of Andrew Jackson, the United
States had taken a position of control. Further, over the last two centuries, the vast majority of
tribal leaders accepted large payments for land, accepted federal trust benefits, and submitted to
federal government's de facto power over them.
Throughout history and every heritage, various men have coveted power over others.
Today, tribal governments, while accepting and playing into Congress’ claim of plenary power,
have themselves, also, claimed exclusive jurisdiction and authority over unwilling citizens.
1

Tribal governments regularly lobby and petition both Congress and the White House to codify
tribal jurisdiction over the lives, liberty and property of everyone within reservation boundaries
as well as some outside reservation boundaries. While claiming exclusive jurisdiction, tribal
governments have requested and given blessing for the federal government to manage children
of tribal heritage – asking Congress to write the Indian Child Welfare Act and the executive
branch to write federal rules governing the placement of every enrollable child in need of care.
Some tribal governments and supportive entities have gone further - asking even governors and
state legislators to expand on and strengthen control over children with heritage.
Often cited as justification for the ICWA is a 1998 pilot study by Carol Locust, a training
director at the Native American Research and Training Center at the University of Arizona
College of Medicine. Locust’s study is said to have shown that “every Indian child placed in a
non-Indian home for either foster care or adoption is placed at great risk of long-term
psychological damage as an adult” (Locust, Split Feather Study 1998). Referring to the
condition as the “Split-feather Syndrome,” Locust claims to have identified “unique factors of
Indian children placed in non-Indian homes that created damaging effects” (Locust, Split Feather
Study 1998). The Minnesota Department of Human Services noted “an astonishing 19 out of 20
Native adult adoptees showed signs of “Split-feather syndrome” during Locust’s limited study
(DHS 2005).
“Unfortunately,” according to Bonnie Cleaveland, PhD ABPP, “the study was implemented
so poorly that we cannot draw conclusions from it.” Only twenty adoptees with tribal heritage total - were interviewed. All were removed from their biological families and placed with nonnative families. There were no control groups to address other variables.
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According to Cleaveland:
Locust asserts that out-of-culture removal causes substance abuse and psychiatric
problems. However, she uses no control group. She doesn’t acknowledge the high
rates of trauma, psychiatric and substance abuse among AI/AN people who remain
in their culture and among the population of foster children. These high rates of
psychosocial problems could easily account for all of the symptoms Locust found
in her subjects (Cleaveland 2015).
Cleaveland concluded, “Sadly, because many judges and attorneys, and even some
caseworkers and other professionals, are not familiar with the research, results that may be very
wrong are leading to the wrong outcomes for children” (Cleaveland 2015). While supporters of
ICWA cite “Split-feather Syndrome” as proof the ICWA is in the best interest of children, many
children have been hurt by application of the law.
Questions that need more extensive study include whether children who were adopted
into non-Indian families as children show greater problems with self-identity, self-esteem, and
inter-personal relationships than do their peers. Are the ties between children who have tribal
heritage and their birth families and culture stronger than that of their peers, no matter the age at
adoption? Other considerations include whether all tribal members support federal policies that
mandate their cases be heard only in tribal courts and whether a percentage of persons of tribal
heritage believe federal Indian policy infringes on their life, liberty and property.
The central concern of this paper is how current federal Indian policy has affected the
lives, liberty and property of those who have tribal heritage – most specifically the Indian Child
Welfare Act. Through research of the historical foundations of federal Indian policy and a
nation-wide comparative survey of family dynamics, this paper will attempt to answer these and
other questions.

3

PART I
Background

4

Chapter 1
Select Literature Review

Research of the historical foundations of federal Indian policy and the effect these foundations
have had on the lives, liberty and property of those who have tribal heritage includes literature
concerning political philosophy and American history and literature concerning sociological and
psychological issues. Included within political philosophy and American history is natural law in
relation to Indian affairs, historical research and legal research. Included within sociological and
psychological concerns are child abuse and neglect prior to foster care, as well as alcohol abuse,
drug abuse, and fetal alcohol spectrum disorder.

Political Philosophy and American History
Can a nomadic people group legitimately hold claim to a vast territory when they physically
occupy only a portion of it? While a North American tribal member might answer this
differently than a sixteenth century European explorer would, 500 years ago a specific answer
was needed. People had begun crossing oceans and exploring previously unknown territories.
Diverse populations were meeting each other for the first time. Men who owned firepower could
potentially harm those that did not. In order to reign in those that might take advantage of the
lives, liberties and properties of others, a set of ethics and standards needed to be established.
European scholars, having previously encountered the difficulties of diverse cultures
stumbling upon each other, attempted to develop a solid, acceptable rule of law to make these
encounters viable. For people to co-exist, a primary, accepted, enduring rule of law was, and
remains, crucial. Obviously and unavoidably, Europeans wrote from their own point of
experience.
5

One man attempting this massive task was Spanish philosopher, theologian, and jurist
Franciscus de Victoria, (also known as Francisco de Vitoria, 1483-1546). Victoria has been said
to be at the root of International laws that informed United States federal Indian policy (Cohen
[1942] 1971). Another scholar who took the challenge was 18th century international lawyer
Emer (Emmerich) de Vattel. He proposed that naturally and morally, the earth belonged to all
mankind, but when man puts personal labor into a particular portion, he gains exclusive rights to
that portion. Initially nomadic, as populations grew and men began working the immediate
surroundings, investing their effort and sweat into drawing sustenance from the land, the concept
of private property developed. He said of the world and the populations within it:
…destined by the creator to be their common habitation, and to supply them with
food, they all possess a natural right to inhabit it, and to derive from it whatever is
necessary for their subsistence, and suitable to their wants. But when the human
race became extremely multiplied, the earth was no longer capable of furnishing
spontaneously, and without culture [agriculture], sufficient support for its
inhabitants; neither could it have received proper cultivation from wandering tribes
of men continuing to possess it in common. It therefore became necessary that those
tribes should fix themselves somewhere, and appropriate to themselves portions of
land, in order that they might, without being disturbed in their labour, or
disappointed of the fruits of their industry, apply themselves to render those lands
fertile, and thence derive their subsistence. Such must have been the origin of the
rights of property and dominion: and it was a sufficient ground to justify their
establishment. ...The country which a nation inhabits, whether that nation has
emigrated thither in a body, or that the different families of which it consists were
previously scattered over the country, and there uniting, formed themselves into a
political society,—that country, I say, is the settlement of the nation, and it has a
peculiar and exclusive right to it (Vattel [1758,1773] 1844, 98 §203).
According to natural law as described by Vattel, tribal members had an exclusive right to
land within North America. But Vattel’s analysis questions exclusive right to the portions of land
tribal members did not cultivate. While originally a European construct and “Eurocentric,” today
international law is accepted and applied globally. Tribal nations around the world seek justice
through the United Nations, which relies on international law.
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However, Professor Kent McNeil of Osgoode Hall Law School at York University does
not believe international law should apply to communities that had not created it.
He states:
Although leading seventeenth and eighteenth-century jurists, such as Hugo Grotius,
Samuel Pufendorf, and Emmerich de Vattel, tried to make the law of nations
universal by appealing to natural law, by the nineteenth-century most jurists
acknowledged the positive sources and limited scope of international law: it was
made by and applied only to states recognized as such by the existing circle of
European states. For these legal positivists, sovereignty could not be vested in
political entities, such as Indigenous peoples, that were not states as defined and
acknowledged by international law” (McNeil 2016, 94).
According to Vattel, as communities grew, the need for security in one’s labor grew.
Laws were established to protect the significant time and effort individuals spent cultivating their
property for harvests; the need for protection of life, liberty and property as natural rights was
acknowledged. Further, it was understood that because the earth had been created for the
sustenance of all, uninhabited or underused land should be available for that use.
English common law had developed from natural law over a period of more than 500
years (McWilliams 2010). Monsieur Vattel reflected that the natural laws, rights and
responsibilities that apply to a mother country apply to her colonies as well.
…[a] nation which establishes dominion over a distant country and sets up colonies
in it, that country, although distant from the mother country, constitutes a natural
part of the latter, entirely like its ancient territories. Whenever the political laws or
treaties make no explicit difference between them, all that one may say about the
nation’s own territory must also apply to its colonies (Vattel [1758,1773] 1844, 100
§210).
Dr. William B. Allen, Emeritus Professor of Political Philosophy, MSU, and former
Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, notes, “Interestingly, these seventeenth century
views were directly echoed in the American Revolution (and also in McIntosh and Worcester,
though later commentators have misunderstood this relation), while the sixteenth century views
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of [Jurist Franciscus de] Victoria played no role at all, Felix Cohen1 to the contrary
notwithstanding” (W. B. Allen 1990, 12).
American forefathers embraced natural law and with that, a sense of justice. They
realized that if natural law applied to them, it applied to the land’s indigenous communities as
well. This sense of justice that the authors of the Constitution embraced viewed North American
tribes as the owners of the land and was influenced by the Christian Bible, St. Augustine,
Blackstone, Vattel’s “The Law of Nations,” and others.
According to Allen, Vattel “recognized in the principal American settlers a disposition to
deal with the Indians as ‘owners’ despite any liberty nature may have accorded them.” Jurist
Franciscus de Victoria’s work cited by Cohen, on the other hand, “dealt with a different
question2…namely, ‘what relations could legitimately subsist between the Spanish and the
Indians in the new world?’” (W. B. Allen 1990, 12).
Cohen’s citation of Victoria as the source of colonial and constitutional policy toward
North American tribes, however, has driven resentment against and mischaracterization of the
European Christians who settled America - as illustrated in a 2018 Amicus brief by the Yakama
tribe of Washington State.
The brief states “[t]he ‘doctrine of Christian discovery’ is the legal fiction that Christian
Europeans immediately and automatically acquired legally recognized property rights in our
lands upon reaching the Americas, thereby diminishing our sovereignty. Courts have used the
doctrine to build a false legal framework to attack Native sovereignty” (Yakama 2018, 3). The
brief elaborates:

(Cf., “Original Indian Title,” in The Legal Conscience, ed. by Lucy Kramer Cohen [New Haven: Yale U. Press,
1960], p. 289)
2
[See, The First Relection of the Reverend Father, Brother Franciscus de Victoria, On the Indians Lately
Discovered in The Classics of International Law, ed. by Ernest Nys (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1917)]
1
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This doctrine was propagated by the Roman Catholic Church through a series of
papal bulls in the 15th century, including Pope Nicholas’ 1455 papal bull
authorizing Portugal to ‘invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all
Saracens and pagans’ and to place them into perpetual slavery and take their
property. Id. at 11. The Roman Catholic Church then implemented a framework
where the right to subjugate the Americas was split between Spain and Portugal,
although they were later joined by other European states. Id. at 12. The doctrine
was therefore one of domination and dehumanization of Native Peoples and was
used to perpetuate the most widespread genocide in human history. Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought 317 (1990). The
United States relies on this genocidal religious doctrine to diminish Native
sovereignty to this day (Yakama 2018, 7-8).
The brief concludes, “Where a centuries-old doctrine no longer comports with the morals
of the time, the use of that doctrine should no longer withstand the Court’s scrutiny” (Yakama
2018, 20). Yakama has not only accepted Cohen’s assertion that Victoria and other Spanish
Christians were responsible for the colonists and Founding Fathers, but also overlooked
statements Victoria made refuting the doctrines Yakama cites.
With the amount of historical data available, some can be easily overlooked. The
American Indian Policy Review Commission noted in its final report that it has been the “fortune
of this Commission to be the first in the long history of this Nation to listen attentively to the
voice of the Indian rather than the Indian ‘expert’” (AIPRC 1977, 10). While few tribal members
wrote academic articles in the last few centuries, documentation of meetings between varied
officials and tribal members abound. We can hear diverse voices through speeches made or
letters written. Not all tribal members were in agreement with present day experts. For example,
tribal member Samson Occom described his view of the world in his 18th century account,
“Short, Plain, and Honest Account of my Self” which is preserved in the Dartmouth College
Archives. Despite abuses by mentors, Occum embraced Jesus Christ throughout his life and
ministered to many tribal members. In Pushmataha’s “Response to Chief Tecumseh on War
Against the Americans,” archived in the American Rhetoric, Online Speech Bank, he resolves to
9

continue stand in battle with the Americans, whom he considers his friends. Unfortunately,
Pushmataha was later betrayed by Andrew Jackson. Chief Seattle, in his speech “Cautioning
Americans to Deal Justly with His People,” concedes defeat to the United States and warns the
Americans to treat his people well.
To understand current federal Indian policy, the centuries of events that led up to it need
to be appreciated. While many academic articles written in the last 60 years have been done with
the understanding that the Marshall Trilogy and Cohen’s Handbook on Federal Indian Law have
correctly construed the U.S. Constitution as well as historical events, it is interesting to note the
research that does not.
Tribal member and publisher William J. Lawrence, J.D., in his work, “In Defense of
Indian Rights” (2002), stated that the Indian Citizenship Act “should have made Indians equal to
all other citizens of the United States, with the same Constitutional protections, rights, and
responsibilities. But the federal government has continued to treat Indians separately from other
citizens, especially if they live on reservations” (395).
Tribal member and historian Billie J. Kingfisher Jr., in his dissertation, “Dogma: Felix S.
Cohen, The Indian Law Survey and the Spanish Model,” notes that Cohen “had never given the
‘Indian Problem’ a shred of thought, much less met an Indian before he came to work for the
government” (Kingfisher 2016, 3). Commenting on a 1995 article by Quinnipiac University’s Jill
E. Martin titled “A Year and a Spring of My Existence: Felix S. Cohen and The Handbook of
Federal Indian Law,” Kingfisher states that while Martin’s descriptions of historic events in her
article “are, for the most part, factual,… her work is like so many others in that she is still
convinced that the Handbook is ‘the bible of Indian law.’…that Cohen ‘analyzes all issues of
American-Indian Law’ and that his conclusions are sound” (2016, 137). Martin’s article was
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reprinted in the forward of the 2012 edition of Cohen’s Handbook and has been a source for
other scholars concerning the genesis of the Handbook (Kingfisher 2016, 137).
Allen, in his 2010 “Review of Federal Indian Policy,” agrees with Kingfisher concerning
Spanish origins and explores the work of Victoria (1580) and Vattel (1758) as he researches the
genesis of American federal Indian policy. Allen maintains that land ownership in colonial times
was not title by conquest as Victoria suggests, but a form of title by discovery as suggested by
18th century international lawyer Emer (Emmerich) de Vattel. Further, Allen shows how
President Washington viewed tribes as separate, sovereign nations.
The important point to this is that not every historical researcher, whether a tribal
member or not, agrees with the premises given by Cohen and Marshall, and if these foundational
premises are questionable, then federal Indian policy is as well.
Contemporary law papers also tend to follow the lead of Marshall and Cohen. A 2016
study, “American Indian Children and U.S. Indian Policy,” published in the Tribal Law Journal
by Angelique Eaglewoman and William Rice reiterates the accepted “Indian Industry”
perspective on children but also has good historical research, legal explanations and statistical
support (2016). Nonetheless, it continues with the false premise that all children of tribal
heritage have the same wants and needs and does not recognize that some individuals choose to
separate themselves from the tribal community.
Professor Sarah Krakoff, in her 2017 paper titled “They Were Here First: American
Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional Minimum,” claims that equal protection is not
applicable to members of federally recognized tribes because their status “predates” the
Constitution and sets them apart as a people group. Krakoff strangely argues in favor of racism
when she states “Native nations’ governmental status situates them differently from other
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minority groups for many legal purposes, including equal protection analysis" and “…using
equal protection doctrine to demand a highly formalized and acontextual race neutrality with
respect to tribes and their members today would, ironically, perpetuate the settler/colonial project
of elimination” (Krakoff 2017, 496).
Another paper in defense of current federal Indian policy is “A Call for an Assessment of
the Welfare of Indian Children in South Dakota” by Patrice H. Kunesh (2007). Kunesh’s article
claims there is an “overrepresentation of minorities in South Dakota’s juvenile justice system”
and that the state is not in “compliance with the procedural mandates of the Indian Child Welfare
Act.” Some details of Kunesh’s research are not accurate. For example, she claims the
Mashantucket Pequot is the oldest "continually occupied" reservation, and that the Pequot have
reestablished as a tribe (Kunesh, A Call for an assessment of the Welfare of Indian Children in
South Dakota 2007, 10). However, the reservation was uninhabited for several years, and the
current tribe is made up primarily of persons with no Mashantucket heritage who were adopted
into the tribe - a tribe recreated for the express purpose of establishing a casino (Benedict 2000).
More importantly, when citing population numbers for tribal members, Kunesh uses figures from
the U.S. census, which reflects those who self-report tribal heritage (Kunesh, A Call for an
assessment of the Welfare of Indian Children in South Dakota 2007, 7). The actual number of
citizens enrolled in federally recognized tribes and use tribal services is about half the 4 million
noted in the 2010 U.S. census (US Census Bureau 2010).
Nevertheless, there is a growing body of work that construes federal Indian law and
policy from a constitutional perspective and is finding current policy wrong-headed. Tribal
member and attorney Mark Fiddler, in his article “Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, State ICWA
Laws, and Constitutional Avoidance,” explains the constitutional ramifications of Adoptive
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Couple v. Baby Girl and various State ICWA laws. He explains that one of the questions asked
in Adoptive Couple was “if a birth father has no rights under state law, what specifically is it in
ICWA that accords him greater federal rights?” (2014, 3)
Law professor Robert G. Natelson, in “The Original Understanding of the Indian
Commerce Clause,” researched the original meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause and
concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act is an unconstitutional use of the clause. Several
studies have found that “‘commerce’ meant mercantile trade.” Thus, “‘commerce’ did not
include manufacturing, agriculture, hunting, fishing, other land use, property ownership, religion,
education, or domestic family life” (R. Natelson 2007, 214-215). Attorney James A. Poore, in his
research titled “The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes,” also questioned
the conclusions of Justice Marshall.

Sociological and Psychological Research
Many claim sociological and psychological research supports and justifies the necessity of the
Indian Child Welfare Act. In the late 1990’s, Training Director Carol Locust, of the Native
American Research and Training Center at the University of Arizona, conducted a pilot study
concerning outcomes for children who had experienced foster care or adoption in a non-tribal
home. After advertising for Native American’s who had been adopted and interviewing 20 young
adults, Locust concluded that "there are unique factors of Indian children being placed in nonIndian homes that create damaging effects in the later lives of the children." According to
Locust, “The pilot study conducted by this investigator indicated that every Indian child placed
in a non-Indian home for either foster care or adoption is placed at great risk of long-term
psychological damage as an adult” (Locust 1998). An early publication of the study was a
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posting on a non-academic blog, the "American Indian Adoptees Split Feathers Study.” The
posting does not include necessary details that would allow for a repeat of the study. Along with
the omission of criteria used to choose participants, weaknesses to the study included the small
number of participants, use of field notes rather than an audio recording, and lack of control
groups.
A later publication of the study, “Split Feathers: Adult American Indians Who Were
Placed In Non-Indian Families As Children,” notes the challenges of finding persons of heritage
who are no longer associated with tribal government and the lack of sufficient study on the
matter. There has been no subsequent study following the pilot stage. Despite this, a spate of
articles published in the ensuing years cite the “Split-feather” pilot study as documentation of the
consequences of non-tribal members raising children who have heritage.
While there has been no scientific study concerning the Split-feather hypothesis, other
qualitative studies have addressed foster care, health and historical trauma. Student researcher
Shanley Swanson Nicolai explains historical trauma refers to “past histories of injustice”
(Swanson 2012, viii), or “…cumulative emotional and psychological wounding, over the lifespan
and across generations, emanating from massive group trauma experiences” (2012, 2).
Explaining in her thesis, “Acknowledging the Past while Looking to the Future: Exploring
indigenous child trauma,” Swanson states:
The concept of intergenerational trauma states that individuals who have not
directly experienced the traumatic events of historical loss may still be affected by
these traumas on multiple and complex levels; that the effects of trauma can be
passed down through generations (Yellow Horse Brave Heart & DeBruyn 1998:
64). Historical trauma response refers to “the pattern of diverse responses that may
result from exposure to historical trauma,” (Denham, 2008: 391).(Swanson 2012,
2).
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In 2010, “American Indian Grand Families: A Qualitative Study Conducted with
Grandmothers and Grandfathers Who Provide Sole Care for Their Grandchildren,” was
published in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology. This study conducted by Suzanne L.
Cross, Angelique G. Day, and Lisa G. Byers interviewed 31 Native American grandparents
selected non-randomly by several tribal outreach workers, community health professionals, and
tribal community leaders. Recording responses in field notes, the researchers interviewed the
grandparents to discover their reasons for raising grandchildren, the impact of historical trauma –
meaning generalized distress assumed to affect the emotional make-up of persons with heritage
in a historically marginalized group - and whether the Indian Child Welfare Act was
implemented. Researchers determined these grandparents cared for their grandchildren for
reasons identical to non-tribal grandparents but claimed they were less likely to use state and
federal programs due to fears and mistrust related to historical trauma, preferring to instead seek
help from tribal or Indian urban agencies. Nevertheless, the study admitted 23 of the participants
had accessed state and federal services and only nine accessed tribal services (2010). This
suggests participants may have given answers they thought were desired. Other weaknesses to
the study include the small number of participants, use of field notes and not audio recordings,
and omission of criteria used by tribal leaders and outreach workers to choose participants.
In 2012, in a qualitative study called, “Acknowledging the Past while Looking to the
Future: Conceptualizing Indigenous Child Trauma,” 17 social service providers in Montana and
Norway were interviewed concerning whether current trauma experienced by indigenous
children is linked to historical trauma, and whether the trauma is unique. All those interviewed
agreed that "…trauma experiences of indigenous youth are influenced by historical and
intergenerational trauma relating to colonization, assimilation and oppression" and is "unique"
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from trauma of other heritages. However, participants were not randomly chosen. Using
‘Snowball Sampling,’ the researcher interviewed three personal school friends, which led to her
"best friend’s aunt, another friend’s mother," one of the researcher’s psychology professors, and
"a number of women…referred to by other interviewees…" (Nicolai and Saus 2012). While this
sample related valid personal experience, the small size and non-random survey method, which
constrained selection to friends and family, limited generalizability.
Neither study specifically interviewed persons who had been children in need of care, but
a larger study published in 2017 did. Purposing to discover whether violence affected those
"marginalized" by society in the same manner it does others and whether close attachments made
a difference, researchers Jillian J. Turanovic and Travis C. Pratt conducted a study that focused
on youth assumed to be "socialized in a unique structural and cultural context." Titled
“Consequences of Violent Victimization for Native American Youth in Early Adulthood,” the
study used data from a national study to find and physically interview 558 tribal youth.
Turanovic and Pratt asserted that although subjects were diverse and lived "from urban to
suburban to Reservation" communities, they had commonality in historical "racial and ethnic
subjugation"(Turanovic and Pratt 2017). Further, while admitting inability to gain trust,
Turanovic and Pratt concluded that the diverse youth had a higher risk for victimization, poor
health, financial hardship, criminal behavior, and chemical abuse.
Variables that were not examined but could have affected results include lack of rapport
from lack of trust, biased questioning due to expectation of past marginalization and a preconceived belief that heritage was a decisive commonality, and a lack of controls for familial or
physical variables that could affect behavior. Two other possible independent variables
concerning observed psychological damage to foster children include child abuse and neglect
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prior to foster care placement and Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder. The researchers did,
however, acknowledge more quantitative and qualitative research is needed.

Child Abuse and Neglect Prior to Foster Care
There are many quantitative studies concerning child abuse and trauma for children of all
heritages prior to foster care. One such study is the “National Study of the Impact of Outpatient
Mental Health Services for Children in Long Term Foster Care” in 2010. This study evaluated
439 foster-care children of diverse heritage and found that children in foster homes that have
been abused in the past have more behavioral issues than other children. The study admitted
weakness in not knowing whether professionals addressed actual needs of individuals or
assumed needs of a demographic (Bellamy, Gopalan and Traube 2010).
Nevertheless, according to a 2017 study by Colleen C. Katz, Mark E. Courtney, and
Elizabeth Novotny, titled, “Pre-foster Care Maltreatment Class as a Predictor of Maltreatment in
Foster Care,” youth of all heritages abused by relatives are at increased risk of abuse when
placed in foster care (Katz, Courtney and Novotny 2017). Further, a 2013 study, the
“Sociodemographic risk, developmental competence, and PTSD symptoms in young children
exposed to interpersonal trauma in early life,” examined racially diverse children exposed to
physical and sexual abuse or neglect. In this study, researchers showed that the greater exposure
to trauma, the greater PTSD and sociodemographic risk and lower developmental competence
(Enlow, Blood and Egeland 2013).
A 2014 report titled “Health Outcomes in Young Adults from Foster Care and
Economically Diverse Backgrounds” compared risk between young adults who were foster
children, young adults from low income homes, and young adults from economically secure
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homes. Researchers found that former foster children of all heritages are at greater risk for
multiple health issues (Ahrens, Garrison and Courtney 2014).
The 2015 study, “Childhood Trauma and Its Effects: Implications for Police” discusses
current understanding of the effects of ongoing trauma on young children, how these effects
impair adolescent and young adult functioning, and the possible implications for policing (R. G.
Dudley 2015). The report acknowledges that a combination of repeated childhood trauma and
absence of parental nurture and protection can result in multiple psychiatric and neuropsychiatric
disorders, including:
(1) trauma-related neurological symptoms,
(2) trauma-related psychological symptoms,
(3) developmental difficulties brought on by poor parenting, and
(4) other associated difficulties
Dudley warns that each of these four sets of difficulties “cause children considerable
emotional distress and impair their ability to function,” and are hard to “cure” (R. G. Dudley
2015, 4-5). However, as observed by Perry et al, without treatment, “trauma-related difficulties
and their effects tend to persist into adolescence and adulthood and become difficult to reverse
(Perry et al., 1995; Schore, 2001)” (2015, 5). According to Dudley:
…it is estimated that 35 percent of children exposed to domestic violence will
develop trauma-related difficulties …Similarly, it is estimated that between 42
percent and 90 percent of child victims of sexual abuse will develop trauma-related
difficulties…statistics related to both these issues are thought to be
underestimates… More difficult to estimate is the number of children repeatedly
exposed to or even directly threatened by various forms of neighborhood violence”
(R. G. Dudley 2015, 9).
One of the most important studies concerning the effect trauma has on children was in the
late 1990’s. In the “Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to many of
the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study,”
almost 10,000 diverse adults responded to a questionnaire concerning childhood abuse and later
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illnesses. Researchers found that those who experienced more than four categories of abuse had
up to 12 times the risk for substance abuse, depression and suicide, and were more likely to have
multiple health issues, indicating tribal children are not unique in trauma response (Felitti VJ,
ACE Study 1998). This study birthed the “Adverse Childhood Experiences test.”
Following this, a 2013 study, “The relationship between adverse childhood experiences
and mental health in adulthood. A systematic literature review” examined 65 relevant
publications related to trauma in childhood and adult depression. Researchers M. De Venter, K.
Demyttenaere, and R. Bruffaerts found that anxiety and drug/alcohol abuse also showed
correlation, regardless of heritage (De Venter, Demyttenaere and Bruffaerts 2013).

Alcohol Abuse, Drug Abuse, and Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder
Examining the effect that parental drug and alcohol abuse has on children, a 2016 quantitative
study titled “Worldwide Prevalence of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders: A Systematic
Literature Review Including Meta-Analysis” researched multiple databases to gain an overview
of global Fetal Alcohol estimates. In the United States, “native populations showed higher
prevalence estimates for FAS" than the general population (Roozen, et al. 2016).
The 2007 study, “Perceptions of Methamphetamine Use in Three Western
Tribal Communities: Implications for Child Abuse in Indian Country,” published
by the Tribal Law and Policy Institute, found the likely reason for the high
incidence of violence, child sexual abuse, and child maltreatment within Indian
Country revolves around the high incidence of drug and alcohol abuse found on
many reservations” (Roe Bubar 2007, 13 (9)).
The authors cite various studies reporting “American Indian and Alaska Native
populations have seen a 164% increase in the number of drug-related deaths from 3.9% in 19791981 to 10.3% 1998.” A 2002 North Dakota report “concluded that meth use and distribution
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was a problem in all reservations within the state, including Turtle Mountain, Standing Rock
Nation, Fort Berthold, Spirit Lake Nation, and Lake Traverse.” The authors state:
U.S. and tribal law enforcement agencies have witnessed a large increase in violent
crimes stemming from meth use. Furthermore, there have been reports of tribal
elders and family members being involved with meth distribution…According to
media reports coming out of the Wind River reservation in Wyoming, the tribal
community had been targeted by Mexican drug cartels in an attempt to create a
market for meth that dwarfs the demand for alcohol and marijuana. As a result,
…social services agencies have seen a large increase in child neglect cases. The
addition of meth-exposed children to an already strained network of social services
in tribal communities almost guarantees additional complications in educational,
social, and medical services on the reservation. Requests through the Indian Health
Service (IHS) for drug rehabilitation services for meth addicts increased from 137
in 1997 to 4,946 in 2004 (Roe Bubar 2007, 15-17).
Further, officials report increases in child abuse and neglect, domestic violence, sexual
assault and prostituting one’s own children due to methamphetamine. Meth use also “increases
the difficulty of family reunification.” The perceptions by tribal professionals in this survey “are
supported by recent data gathered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Office of Justice Services
from 96 Indian country law enforcement agencies that suggests meth is the greatest threat in their
communities.” (Roe Bubar 2007, 10). They warn, however, that “a systematic examination into
the impact of the meth crisis on emergency services, social services, law enforcement, and
schools has not taken place on a tribal basis, much less on a pan-tribal level” (Roe Bubar 2007,
7).
While none of these works in themselves comprehensively address the varied facets
underlying the philosophies of federal Indian policy and negative consequences of the Indian
Child Welfare Act, each provides a vital piece to the puzzle. Taken together, the level of research
pointing to present day causes– shared by all heritages – rather than solely racism and historical
trauma as genesis of psychological trauma for tribal members, is overwhelming. For full
understanding, these works need to be brought together and explored.
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Chapter 2
Philosophical Underpinnings of Federal Indian Policy

Natural Law
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. — That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed. (General Congress 1776).
Professor of American Institutions & Jurisprudence, Hadley Arkes notes in the Harvard Journal
of Law & Public Policy that Man’s intrinsic understanding of right and wrong has long been the
foundation for European rule of law. That shared understanding is what many have called
‘natural law,’ ‘the laws or canons of reason,’ or “what Blackstone called ‘the laws of Nature and
reason.’” (Arkes 2013, 962). Alexander Hamilton had described it in Federalist No. 31 (Publius
1787) as "primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend"
and explained that these truths contain "an internal evidence which antecedent to all reflection or
combination commands the assent of the mind.” This ‘natural law’ formed the basis of
‘international law,’ which governed procedures for the colonists and is at the heart of treatymaking between nations.
Some Tribal officials have cited natural law as the foundation for their sovereignty. The
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon proclaimed in 1992,
We declare the existence of this inherent sovereign authority—the absolute right to
govern, to determine our destiny, and to control all persons, land, water, resources
and activities, free of all outside interference—throughout our homeland and over
all our rights, property, and people, wherever located…Our sovereignty is based,
not on the laws of human beings, but on natural laws given to us by our Creator;
these natural laws are as they are, not as human beings may define them (CTWS
2016).
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Similar sentiments were expressed by the authors of the U.S. Declaration of
Independence. Founding Father and Supreme Court Justice, James Wilson, wrote of the primary
purpose of government: “Was it,” he asked, “…to acquire new rights by a human establishment?
Or was it, by a human establishment, to acquire a new security for the possession or recovery” of
rights previously entitled to by our Creator? (Wilson 1790-91)
The founders of the United States federal government were well-read in many of the
pivotal tomes concerning history, philosophy, and law. Many embraced natural laws and
deliberately wrote the constitution to embody its principles (George 2001). The 15th Article of
the Virginia Bill of Rights, drafted by Patrick Henry states, “That no free government, or the
blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice,
moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles” (Vaughan 1997, 103). British legal philosopher Herbert L.A. Hart agreed, notes
“…human beings are equally devoted to and united in their conception of aims (the pursuit of
knowledge, justice to their fellow men) …” (Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals 1958), and thus have natural tendency to require and understand certain prime societal
rules. While many today believe ‘law’ is set apart from the Creator God, that was not the
understanding of most European colonists or Tribal communities.
Many philosophers through the centuries believed that human law is based on a “natural
law” created outside of humans (George 2001). St. Augustine believed that while men have the
“capacity to know which precedes the faith” (Strauss and Cropsey 1987, 177), man’s ability to
‘reason’ is a gift from God. Thomas Aquinas also believed natural law was obtained only
through God’s ‘Revealed Law’ (Vieru 2010) and William Penn wrote to the Tzar of Russia in
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1698, "If thou wouldst rule well, thou must rule for God, and to do that, thou must be ruled by
him... Those who will not be governed by God will be ruled by tyrants" (Janney 1852).
In the 18th century, professor William Blackstone wrote “the laws of God are superior in
obligation to all other laws…and all valid laws derive their force from that Divine original” (Hart
1958). President George Washington agreed. Emphasizing the importance of a sense for God in
the application of law, he asked, “Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the
sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts
of justice?” (Washington, 1796).
In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson justified the American Revolution
through an appeal to ‘the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God.’ The natural rights specified
within the document were said to be self-evident: “That all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; and to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed” (General Congress 1776). Arkes states that
some of the genius of the Founding Fathers3 was their ability to explain the application of the
principles of natural right and reason (Arkes 2013, 964). The Declaration of Independence
carried six principles in its message: A Creator exists; the Creator gave men inalienable rights;
government exists to protect those rights; moral law is transcendent law; there is a social
compact in the consent of the governed; and if Government does not meet those standards, it can
be abolished and a new one created.

“That first generation of jurists in this country showed a remarkable knack for tracing their judgments back to
those anchoring axioms of the law” (Arkes 2013, 962).
3
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America has attempted to correct and re-correct federal Indian policy numerous times,
resulting in the confusion of contradictory laws and policies we have today. Dr. William B.
Allen, Emeritus Professor of Political Philosophy, MSU, and former Chair of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, believes it is essential for America to go back to the beginning and
understand the historical foundation of Indian law before current federal Indian policy can be
meaningfully addressed. Economic and legal analysis are both insufficient without historical
context (W. B. Allen 1990, 6).
To this end, Allen, while working with the Civil Rights Commission, examined Felix
Cohen’s “Handbook of Federal Indian Law.” Cohen’s handbook, which has become the primary
text for federal Indian policy, asserts that Spanish philosopher, theologian, and jurist Franciscus
de Victoria was the root of International laws that informed United States federal Indian policy.
Allen compared evidence of colonial reliance on Victoria’s work with that of international
lawyer Emer (Emmerich) de Vattel and came to a different conclusion.

Theories Suggested for Colonization in the Americas

Victoria
In 1580, the Reverend Father, Brother Franciscus De Victoria, had given several justifications
for colonization of distant lands under the jus gentium, or international law. He wrote in his First
Relectio, On The Indians Lately Discovered, “It being premised, then, that the Indian aborigines
are or were true owners, it remains to inquire by what title the Spaniards could have come into
possession of them and their country” (Victoria 1580, Sec. 2).
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Victoria’s list of possible justifications for Spanish ownership, most of which he declared
illegitimate, included:
1. The Spanish Emperor is lord of the whole world and therefore of the America’s
as well
2. The Pope has full jurisdiction in temporal matters over the whole earth
3. Right of Discovery
4. The tribes refused to accept faith in Christ, although they have been advised to
accept it
5. The sins of these Indian aborigines. Though their rejection of the Christian faith
is not a good reason for making war on them, they may be attacked for other
mortal sins
6. Consent of the majority of natives. - by voluntary choice
7. Right of Conquest by grant from God
8. Natural right to assume control over others for their own good
The first title to property that Victoria explores is that “the Emperor is lord of the whole
world…” (Victoria 1580, Sec. 2). Victoria lays out the origin of that belief - then refutes it,
saying “no one by natural law has dominion over the world.” He refutes the presumption of this
title by citing Aristotle’s Politics, bk. 1 and St. Thomas’ De regimine principium, bk. 1, ch. 2, as
well as Scripture, pointing out the proof that God did not ordain a ruler over the entire world is in
the fact the Jewish nation was forbidden to have a foreigner as their lord (Deuteronomy, ch. 17).
Further, “… the Empire was divided into Eastern and Western, first among the sons of
Constantine the Great and then, later, by Pope Stephen, who conferred the Empire of the West on
the Germans, as is held in X, 1, 6, 34?” (Victoria 1580).
The second potential title was one given through the Pope. “For it is claimed that the
Pope is temporal monarch, too, over all the world and that he could consequently make the Kings
of Spain sovereign over the aborigines in question…” (Victoria 1580, Sec. 2). A Scriptural
citation that seems to support this is "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof," followed by
the doctrine that “the Pope is the vicar of God and of Christ.” However, Victoria points out
Scripture that states Jesus is not a temporal king, and “if Christ the Lord had not temporal power,
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as has been shown in the foregoing discussion to be more probable and as is also the opinion of
St. Thomas, much less has the Pope it, he being Christ's vicar” (Victoria 1580).
The third title, the “right of discovery,” was quickly dismissed by Victoria. He states that
although Columbus set sail with a mission of discovery and uninhabited regions, by natural and
international law, can become the property of the first occupant, “the barbarians were true
owners, both from the public and from the private standpoint” (Victoria 1580, Sec. 2).
The fourth suggested title involves a population that refuses to accept Jesus Christ. The
reasoning for this lies in Scripture, which states:
“No one has ever gone into heaven except the one who came from heaven-the Son
of Man. Just as Moses lifted up the snake in the wilderness, so the Son of Man must
be lifted up, that everyone who believes may have eternal life in him." For God so
loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him
shall not perish but have eternal life. For God did not send his Son into the world
to condemn the world, but to save the world through him. Whoever believes in him
is not condemned, but whoever does not believe stands condemned already because
they have not believed in the name of God's one and only Son. This is the verdict:
Light has come into the world, but people loved darkness instead of light because
their deeds were evil. Everyone who does evil hates the light and will not come into
the light for fear that their deeds will be exposed” (John 3:20).
The precept here is not that God wants people to be condemned or to die – but that due to
the evil in the world and everyone’s propensity to act in it, everyone is already doomed to die.
God is reaching out to save everyone from it the only way possible - by sending his Son to take
their sins on himself and be their ‘scapegoat.’ Willingness to recognize and accept his Son Jesus
is the evidence that separates those who welcome this gift of love from those who do not.
However, Victoria concluded that unwillingness of aboriginals to respond to the Gospel
message was not a legitimate excuse to take control of their land. He pointed out that in the first
place, Romans 10:14b states, “‘How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard, and
how shall they hear without a preacher?” Victoria said, “Therefore, if the faith has not been
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preached to them, their ignorance is invincible, for it was impossible for them to know”
(Victoria 1580, Sec. 2).
Hence, Victoria, citing Cajetan as well as St. Thomas, explains:
…if before hearing anything of the Christian religion they were excused, they are
put under no fresh obligation by a simple declaration and announcement of this
kind, for such announcement is no proof or incentive to belief. Nay, as it would be
rash and imprudent for anyone to believe anything, especially in matters which
concern salvation, unless he knows that this is asserted by a man worthy of
credence, a thing which the aboriginal Indians do not know, seeing that they do not
know who or what manner of men they are who are announcing the new religion to
them (Victoria 1580, Sec. 2).
Victoria maintains that if there are no signs worthy of belief to indicate to the nonbeliever what the truth is, there is no sin.
He elaborates:
There is no doubt about the doctrine of the Council of Toledo, that threats and fears
should not be employed against the Jews in order to make them receive the faith.
And Gregory expressly says the same in the canon qui sincera (can. 3, Dist. 45):
"Who with sincerity of purpose," says he, "desires to bring into the perfect faith
those who are outside the Christian religion should labor in a manner that will
attract and not with severity; ... for whosoever does otherwise and under cover of
the latter would turn them from their accustomed worship and ritual is
demonstrably furthering his own end thereby and not God's end.
Our proposition receives further proof from the use and custom of the
Church. For never have Christian Emperors, who had as advisors the most holy and
wise Pontiffs, made war on unbelievers for their refusal to accept the Christian
religion. Further, war is no argument for the truth of the Christian faith. Therefore
the Indians cannot be induced by war to believe, but rather to feign belief and
reception of the Christian faith, which is monstrous and a sacrilege…It is clear,
then, that the title which we are now discussing is not adequate and lawful for the
seizure of the lands… (Victoria 1580, Sec 2).
Victoria then suggests a fifth title which involves the sins of the population in question.
“For it is alleged that, though their unbelief or their rejection of the Christian faith is not a good
reason for making war on them…they may be attacked for other mortal sins which (so it is said)
they have in numbers, and those very heinous” (Victoria 1580, Sec. 2).
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Again, Victoria refutes this reasoning. In the first place, non-Christians aside:
…the Pope cannot make war on Christians on the ground of their being fornicators
or thieves or, indeed, because they are sodomites; nor can he on that ground
confiscate their land and give it to other princes; were that so, there would be daily
changes of kingdoms, seeing that there are many sinners in every realm. And this
is confirmed by the consideration that these sins are more heinous in Christians,
who are aware that they are sins, than in barbarians, who have not that knowledge.
Further, it would be a strange thing that the Pope, who cannot make laws for
unbelievers, can yet sit in judgment and visit punishment upon them (Victoria
1580, Sec. 2).
Further, Victoria notes, even within the violence of the Old Testament, Israel never
seized land of unbelievers “or idolaters or because they were guilty of other sins against nature”
such as “sacrificing their sons and daughters to devils.” Israel only fought when directed to by
God, when enemies had “hindered their passage or had attacked them” (Victoria 1580, Sec. 2).
The sixth title examined by Victoria was one in which North American tribes could have
chosen to give up land and sovereignty voluntarily. “For on the arrival of the Spaniards we find
them declaring to the aborigines how the King of Spain has sent them for their good and
admonishing them to receive and accept him as lord and king; and the aborigines replied that
they were content to do so.” Further, “there is nothing so natural as that the intent of an owner to
transfer his property to another should have effect given to it" (Victoria 1580, Sec. 2).
Nonetheless, Victoria wrote “this title, too, is insufficient.” Addressing southern lands
acquired by the Spanish, he explained:
[F]ear and ignorance, which vitiate every choice, ought to be absent. But they were
markedly operative in the cases of choice and acceptance under consideration, for
the Indians did not know what they were doing; nay, they may not have understood
what the Spaniards were seeking. Further, we find the Spaniards seeking it in armed
array from an unwarlike and timid crowd. Further, inasmuch as the aborigines, as
said above, had real lords and princes, the populace could not procure new lords
without other reasonable cause, this being to the hurt of their former lords. Further,
on the other hand, these lords themselves could not appoint a new prince without
the assent of the populace (Victoria 1580, Sec. 2).
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Victoria, referring to tribes encountered by Spaniards of his century, concludes that because
all elements of a valid choice were not present among the aborigines, this title would be “utterly
inadequate and unlawful.” In his third section, Victoria further explained “true and voluntary
choice” could only occur if the majority of the population freely accepts the King of Spain as
their sovereign, as “a State can appoint any one it will to be its lord” (Victoria 1580, Sec 3).
Almost 200 years later, Vattel, agreed and discussed voluntary choice as it relates to treaties:
… although a nation is under an obligation to preserve with the utmost care the
liberty and independence it inherits from nature, —yet, when it has not sufficient
strength of itself, and feels itself unable to resist its enemies, it may lawfully subject
itself to a more powerful nation on certain conditions agreed to by both parties: and
the compact or treaty of submission will thenceforward be the measure and rule of
the rights of each. For since the people who enter into subjection resign a right
which naturally belongs to them, and transfer it to the other nation, they are
perfectly at liberty to annex what conditions they please to this transfer… (Vattel
[1758,1773] 1844, 94 §193).
The “necessary law of nations,” according to Vattel, guides states into agreements,
recording in treaties whatever points necessary for the arrangement ([1758,1773] 1844, §9).
These guiding laws can be termed necessary because nations are “absolutely bound” to observe
them,” just as men are bound to observe the law of nature ([1758,1773] 1844, §7). The law of
nations - also known as ‘the natural law of nations,’ or ‘international law’ - is simply “the law of
nature applied to nations” ([1758,1773] 1844, §6). However, it is not “precisely and in every
case the same as the law of nature.” A society is not the same as an individual and therefore has
some different obligations and rights ([1758,1773] 1844, §6). Nevertheless, since the necessary
law of nations is the “application of the law of nature to states,” it is as immutable as the law of
nature ([1758,1773] 1844, §8). “[E]very treaty, every custom, which contravenes the injunctions
or prohibitions of the necessary law of nations, is unlawful” ([1758,1773] 1844, §9).
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Treaties are a tool for use in international law, which is an extension of natural law. If you
have one, you have the other. If one were to dismiss international law out-of-hand as ‘European’
and therefore irrelevant and invalid, treaties would no longer have foundation.
With no evidence the tribes visited by the Spaniards in the 16th century had freely given their
societies over to the King of Spain in keeping with natural law, Victoria did not believe the sixth
potential title was valid.
The seventh title concerned the ‘right of conquest,’ which was said to be by special grant
from God in condemnation of abominations committed by “barbarians” (Victoria 1580, Sec 2).
However, Victoria said he was “loath” to expound on this or give it any credence. Even if
approved by God, he said, those who cause harm to others are still to blame for their actions.
“And…apart from the sin of unbelief, there might be no greater sins in morals among certain
Christians than there are among those barbarians! (Victoria 1580, Sec 2).
Having refuted all the titles he felt were invalid, Victoria proceeded to examine exceptions. A
community has the right to refuse Jesus Christ. A problem arises, however, when some in the
community want to learn about Jesus, and others will not let them. Victoria wrote that if people
“prevent the Spaniards from freely preaching the Gospel, the Spaniards, after first reasoning with
them in order to remove scandal, may preach it despite their unwillingness and devote
themselves to the conversion of the people in question.” In the minds of the Spanish, this would
prevent those who are interested from enduring condemnation and death as a result of separation
from Jesus. This was felt so crucial that Victoria concurred war could be necessary “until they
succeed in obtaining facilities and safety for preaching the Gospel.” Victoria was especially
alarmed about tribal leaders who had initially allowed preaching but then began “killing or
otherwise punishing” those who had accepted Jesus (Victoria 1580, Sec. 3). In defense of the
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weak, Victoria felt violence might be justified – but with stipulation that it be done “…with a
regard for moderation and proportion, so as to go no further than necessity demands, preferring
to abstain from what they lawfully might do rather than transgress due limits, and with an intent
directed more to the welfare of the aborigines than to their own gain” (Victoria 1580, Sec. 3).
War was allowed not because an aboriginal group rejected the Gospel, nor because of sins
committed by the group, but because those who wanted the Gospel were prevented from
receiving it:
Careful attention must, however, be paid to what St. Paul says (I Corinthians, ch.
6): "All things are lawful unto me, but not all things are expedient." So everything
said above must be taken as spoken absolutely. For it may be that these wars and
massacres and spoliations will hinder rather than procure and further the conversion
of the Indians. Accordingly, the prime consideration is that no obstacle be placed
in the way of the Gospel, and if any such be so placed, this method of evangelization
must be abandoned and another one sought for. What we have been showing is
what is lawful in itself. I personally have no doubt that the Spaniards were Bound
to employ force and arms in order to continue their work there, but I fear measures
were adopted in excess of what is allowed by human and divine law… (Victoria
1580, Sec. 3).
Victoria also deemed war lawful against any society that “allows the sacrifice of innocent
people or the killing in other ways of un-condemned people for cannibalistic purposes.” Victoria
asserts that even without the Pope's permission:
Spaniards can stop all such nefarious usage and ritual among the aborigines, being
entitled to rescue innocent people from an unjust death. This is proved by the fact
that "God has laid a charge on every individual concerning his neighbor," and they
all are our neighbors. Therefore, anyone may defend them from such tyrannical and
oppressive acts, and it is especially the business of princes to do so. A further proof
is given by Proverbs, ch. 24: "Deliver them that are drawn unto death, and forbear
not to free those that are being dragged to destruction (Victoria 1580, Sec 3).
Finally, Victoria wrote his reasoning for ‘wardship’ or ‘pupilage’ of North American tribes,
explaining:
There is another title which can indeed not be asserted, but brought up for
discussion, and some think it a lawful one. I dare not affirm it at all, nor do I entirely
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condemn it. It is this: Although the aborigines in question are (as has been said
above) not wholly unintelligent, yet they are little short of that condition, and so are
unfit to found or administer a lawful State up to the standard required by human
and civil claims. Accordingly, they have no proper laws nor magistrates, and are
not even capable of controlling their family affairs; they are without any literature
or arts, not only the liberal arts, but the mechanical arts also; they have no careful
agriculture and no artisans; and they lack many other conveniences, yea
necessaries, of human life. It might, therefore, be maintained that in their own
interests the sovereigns of Spain might undertake the administration of their
country, providing them with prefects and governors for their towns, and might
even give them new lords, so long as this was clearly for their benefit. … And surely
this might be founded on the precept of charity, they being our neighbors and we
being bound to look after their welfare. Let this, however, as I have already said,
be put forward without dogmatism and subject also to the limitation that any such
interposition be for the welfare and in the interests of the Indians and not merely
for the profit of the Spaniards (Victoria 1580, Sec 3).
While pupilage was a title entertained by Victoria, it is important to note that the American
colonists did not make any tribe their ‘ward.’ While the early 1800’s saw a push in that
direction, many 16th and 17th century colonists and tribes lived side by side, trading with each
other and coming to various agreements. There is no evidence that the colonists or Founders of
the United States were guided by Victoria’s suggestion of wardship, let alone the many titles
Victoria had dismissed as illegal or without foundation. After studying Victoria’s Relectio, Allen
wrote “…neither discovery, conquest, nor a ward or pupilage theory could justify sovereignty
over the Indians. This [the writings of Victoria] did not, then, inform the American position
toward the Indians” (W. B. Allen 1990, 13). In fact, the principle of discovery that Cohen
attributed to Victoria “bore strong marks of the constitutional debate through which the
Americans had so recently come. That is why it is incautious at best simply to relate it to the
theory of Victoria” (2010, 8).
Native American historian Billie J. Kingfisher disputes the Spanish origin theory as well.
Referring to reports that Cohen had visited the southwest while working for the Department of
Interior, Kingfisher notes, “While acquiring knowledge of Spanish Native law and policy from a
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trip to the region sounds plausible,” Cohen’s assertion of Victoria might also have been in the
service of Department of Interior’s goals. Kingfisher goes notes the lack of adequate research
performed by Cohen and infers he was writing to fulfill a predetermined purpose (Kingfisher,
2016, p. 186). Allen notes:
Cohen claimed that Franciscus de Victoria had elaborated the moral basis for these
relations with Indians. (Cohen, 1942, 47) He attributed to these principles the main
influence in deciding Johnson v. McIntosh (8 Wheat. 523 [1823]) and Worcester v.
Georgia (6 Pet. 515 [1832]). Justice Marshall, though, cited Emmerich de Vattel
(given minor notice by Cohen) and did not cite Victoria. Cohen does crossreference, from chap. 3, sec. 4, to chap. 15, sec. 4, in which the same theme,
‘aboriginal possession’ or title is treated in detail, and in which Vattel is properly
cited. Still, Cohen’s main argument relies on Victoria, stating, “…the theory of
Indian title put forward by Victoria came to be generally accepted by writers on
international law of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries who were
cited as authorities in early federal litigation on Indian property rights.” Vattel,
however, did not rely on Victoria and indeed disagreed with Victoria (W. Allen
2010, 3).
The argument in McIntosh more deeply echoed Vattel, “including his praise of American
sensitivity to the Indians” (W. Allen 2010, 8).

Vattel
The focus of Victoria’s writings was not the same as that of Vattel. Vattel’s writings were more
concerned with the colonists’ sovereignty over themselves in respect to their relationship with
tribal nations than they were with sovereignty over tribal members or control of land. Vattel had
concluded that “the establishment of several colonies in the continent of North America, while
restricting itself to just limits, can only be very legitimate” since it brings cultivation and more
intense usage to the land. Additionally, “the peoples of these vast lands rather wander than dwell
in them.’ (I, §814)” (W. Allen 2010, 3).
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Vattel, in Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelles, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations
et des souverains [edition of James Brown Scott, The Classics of International Law, (Washington, D.C., Carnegie
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With these two factors in mind, Vattel reasoned that:
When therefore a nation finds a country uninhabited and without an owner, it may
lawfully take possession of it: and after it has sufficiently made known its will in
this respect, it cannot be deprived of it by another nation. Thus navigators going on
voyages of discovery, furnished with a commission from their sovereign, and
meeting with islands or other lands in a desert state, have taken possession of them
in the name of their nation: and this title has been usually respected, provided it was
soon after followed by a real possession (Vattel [1758,1773] 1844, 99 §207).
That said, Vattel does not advocate or justify conquest. Vattel questioned whether a
distant nation can possess a territory that it does not actually occupy, and whether an arriving
group can “legitimately occupy a portion of a vast territory ‘in which one finds only some
nomadic peoples, incapable by reason of their small numbers of inhabiting the entire land’” (W.
B. Allen 1990, 11,12).
These two questions contended with the world’s growing population and limited
resources. Is it right and moral for any people group to claim all the land it desires despite not
needing it or using it for any sustaining purpose? Vattel’s reasoning in §81 is that there is a moral
obligation to cultivate the earth for sustenance and that no one should “claim exclusive power
over land” that they neither need nor will live in or cultivate (W. B. Allen 1990, 11).
Vattel argued that leaving land barren when others needed it would be “absolutely
contrary to natural right.” The earth’s resources were to benefit the common needs of all men
and “extends a right to particular men only to the extent that they may benefit, not in order to
obstruct others” (W. B. Allen 1990, 11). Vattel felt ‘the law of nations’ would not support the
“property and sovereignty of a nation over any uninhabited countries” that it had not taken
genuine possession of in the form of settlements or cultivation (Vattel [1758,1773] 1844, 99
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§208). Within the context of the days of exploration, it was “[n]ot discovery, then, but discovery
and use [that] conveys legitimate title… without respect to the conventions of Europe” (W. B.
Allen 1990, 11).
Finally, Vattel submitted that Europeans occupied relatively small, crowded islands and
had a genuine need to “legitimately occupy” portions of the America’s that native peoples had no
need for” (W. B. Allen 1990, 12).
Vattel justifies the need for cultivation with an explanation some might consider socialist
or globalist – although he also states that those nations that practice good stewardship of their
land should have their borders respected. He stated:
The cultivation of the soil deserves the attention of the government, not only on
account of the invaluable advantages that flow from it, but from its being an
obligation imposed by nature on mankind. The whole earth is destined to feed its
inhabitants; but this it would be incapable of doing, if it were uncultivated. Every
nation is then obliged by the law of nature to cultivate the land that has fallen to its
share; and it has no right to enlarge its boundaries, or have recourse to the assistance
of other nations, but in proportion as the land in its possession is incapable of
furnishing it with necessaries. Those nations (such as the ancient Germans, and
some modern Tartars), who [36] inhabit fertile countries, but disdain to cultivate
their lands, and chuse rather to live by plunder, are wanting to themselves, are
injurious to all their neighbours, and deserve to be extirpated as savage and
pernicious beasts. There are others, who, to avoid labour, chuse to live only by
hunting, and their flocks. This might, doubtless, be allowed in the first ages of the
world, when the earth, without cultivation, produced more than was sufficient to
feed its small number of inhabitants. But at present, when the human race [130] is
so greatly multiplied, it could not subsist if all nations were disposed to live in that
manner. Those who still pursue this idle mode of life, usurp more extensive
territories than, with a reasonable share of labour, they would have occasion for,
and have therefore no reason to complain, if other nations, more industrious and
too closely confined, come to take possession of a part of those lands. Thus, though
the conquest of the civilized empires of Peru and Mexico was a notorious
usurpation, the establishment of many colonies on the continent of North America
might, on their confining themselves within just bounds, be extremely lawful. The
people of those extensive tracts rather ranged through than inhabited them (Vattel
[1758,1773] 1844, 35-36 §81).
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Vattel recognizes that all men have an equal right to properties not already owned by
someone. “Accordingly, possession falls to the first occupant of any uninhabited territory” (W.
B. Allen 1990, 11). But while a form of discovery, what he is describing is predicated on a
natural and justified need for sustenance. In the case of American colonists, the need was not
only to provide effectively for one’s family, but to experience religious freedom. The original
American settlers came for seemingly open land and liberty, not with intention to join, infiltrate
or conquer an existing society of people, but to create independent, self-supporting communities
alongside those already existing.

Examining the Evidence
The United States of America was founded less than 250 years ago. Documentation of events is
plentiful. Yet several false stories over the years have made their way into contemporary
understanding of history.
One example that persists is the tale of chicken-pox infected U.S. Army blankets being
deliberately given to the Mandan Indians. This account was first told by University of Colorado
ethnic studies professor Ward Churchill. Yet, there was no army base at Fort Clark, let alone one
handing out blankets, as Churchill claimed. “The closest U.S. military unit was an eighthundred-mile march away at Fort Leavenworth” (Brown 2006, 100). An investigation by the
University found that Churchill had fabricated incidents, individuals, and sources (Brown 2006,
100). Churchill publicly admitted in a 2005 interview that he had “Glad-handed things a bit” in
his story of the chicken-pox virus (Churchill 2005).
Anecdotes persist concerning customs, mores, events and motivations of the tribes,
colonists and Founding Fathers. As Allen sharply and starkly points out, “…before we credit

36

tales of customs and usages from time immemorial, we must at a minimum establish an accurate
recall of those events, laws, and usages that [are well documented]. Who fails at relating what is
well within memory must not be trusted…to recall time immemorial” (W. B. Allen 1990, 8-9).
Despite Victoria’s assertion that it was not possible for the tribes that were visited by the
Spanish to give genuine consent, it is evident that in the north, some tribal members did. Tribal
members chose to become part of the larger colonial communities for various reasons: including
but not limited to protection, trade, education, or even to be part of the Christian church.
In 1740, when Samson Occom (Occum), a member of the Mohegan tribe of Connecticut
was 19 years old, he asked his mother if he could go to Eleazar Wheelock’s Bible College to
learn to read. He wrote later in 1768:
I was Born and Brought up in the traditional ways…My Parents Lived a wandering
life, as did all the Indians at Mohegan. They Chiefly Depended upon Hunting,
Fishing, & Fowling for their Living and had no Connection with the English,
excepting to Traffic with them in their small Trifles; They Strictly maintained and
followed their traditional Ways, Customs & Religion, though there was Some
Preaching among them. Once a Fortnight, in ye Summer Season, a Minister from
New London used to come up, and everyone attended. Not that they cared about
the Christian Religion, but they had Blankets given to them every Fall of the Year
and for these things they would come and there was a Sort of School kept, when I
was quite young, but I believe there never was one that ever Learnt to read anything,
— when I was about 10 Years of age there was a man who went about among the
Indian Wigwams, and wherever he Could find the Indian Children, would make
them read; but the Children Used to take Care to keep out of his way; —and he
used to Catch me Some times and make me Say over my Letters; and I believe I
learnt Some of them. But this was Soon over too; and all this Time there was not
one amongst us, that made a Profession of Christianity — Neither did we Cultivate
our Land, nor kept any Sort of Creatures except Dogs, which we used in Hunting;
and we Dwelt in wigwams. These are a Sort of Tents, Covered with Matts, made
of Flags.
And to this Time we were unacquainted with the English Tongue in general
though there were a few, who understood a little of it. When I was 16 years of age,
we heard a Strange Rumor among the English, that there were Extraordinary
Ministers Preaching from place to Place and a Strange Concern among the White
People. This was in the Spring of the Year. But we Saw nothing of these things, till
Some Time in the Summer, when Some Ministers began to visit us and Preach the
Word of God; and the Common People all Came frequently and exhorted us to the
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things of God…amongst whom I was one that was Impressed with the things we
had heard…After I was awakened & converted, I went to all the meetings, I could
come at…And when I was 17 years of age, I had, as I trust, a Discovery of the way
of Salvation through Jesus Christ, and was enabl’d to put my trust in him alone for
Life & Salvation. From this Time the Distress and Burden of my mind was
removed, and I found Serenity and Pleasure of Soul, in Serving God. By this time
I just began to Read in the New Testament without Spelling, — and I had a Stronger
Desire Still to Learn to read the Word of God, and at the Same Time had an
uncommon Pity and Compassion to my Poor Brethren - I used to wish I was capable
of Instructing my poor Kindred. I used to think, "if I Could once Learn to Read I
would Instruct the poor Children in Reading" —and used frequently to talk with
our Indians Concerning Religion. This continued till I was in my 19th year: by this
Time I Could Read a little in the Bible. At this Time my Poor Mother was going to
Lebanon, and having had Some Knowledge of Eleazar Wheelock and hearing he
had a Number of English youth under his Tuition, I wanted to go to him and be
with him a week or so, and Desired my Mother to Ask Mr. Wheelock whether he
would take me a little while to Instruct me in Reading. Mother did so; and when
She Came Back, She Said Mr. Wheelock wanted to See me as Soon as possible. So
I went up, thinking I Should be back again in a few Days; when I got up there, he
received me With kindness and Compassion and in Stead of Staying a Forthnight
or 3 Weeks, I Spent 4 Years with him (Occom (1768) 1982).
In all, about 70 tribal-member students attended Wheelock’s Bible college (The Storied History
of Dartmouth 2006).
Occom’s "A Short Narrative of My Life" is one of the earliest memoirs written by a tribal
member. Occom began writing the narrative, which he originally called a "Short, Plain, and
Honest Account of my Self," in the spring of 1768, soon after he returned from England. It is said
that he originally wrote it to “refute false reports that he was a Mohawk, that Wheelock received
large sums for his support, and that he had been converted just before the English tour in order to
become a special exhibit (Blodgett 27)” (Ruoff n.d.).
This is the story of one man and his community and does not apply to all. Too often it is
assumed that the report of one or a few in a people group applies to the entire group. Humans,
even when raised in a tribal community, are individuals. Occom went on to become well-read
and well-traveled. He was an educated, adept, eighteenth century man; not forced to become a
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Christian, not beaten in school, and not – as many viewed tribal members - an incapable
caricature in need of paternalistic care. Despite full awareness that he was being used as a prop
later in life – Occum chose to focus not on the negative of men who he knew were exploiting
him, but on the positive of Jesus Christ, who he knew was assisting for him.
Other tribal members shared his independence. Diverse stories run the gamut throughout
the history of the United States. Some eastern tribes did not object to domination. Vattel warns:
[When a nation] has placed itself in subjection [and] does not resist the
encroachments…makes no opposition to them, —if it preserves a profound silence,
when it might and ought to speak,—its patient acquiescence becomes in length of
time a tacit consent that legitimates the rights of the usurper. There would be no
stability in the affairs of men, and especially in those of nations, if long possession,
accompanied by the silence of the persons concerned, did not produce a degree of
right. But it must be observed, that silence, in order to shew tacit consent, ought to
be voluntary (Vattel [1758,1773] 1844, 95 §199).
Allen notes that while Vattel might seem to endorse confiscation of Indian land, “its…
rather the contrary” (W. B. Allen 1990, 12). Vattel praised the English Puritans for not having
confiscated the land, despite having been given permission by the assuming King of England to
do so. The Puritans, instead, purchased land from tribes of New England. “This praiseworthy
example was followed by William Penn and the colony of Quakers that he led into
Pennsylvania5” (W. B. Allen 1990, 12).
In other words, European international law concerning underused land aside, certain
colonies willingly paid local tribes, and certain tribes willingly chose to accept the exchange as
compensation for the land.
Professor of Law Stuart Banner, who has carefully researched and detailed three
centuries of land transactions involving Indian land, wrote that documented history includes
many “accounts of land purchases, transactions that at first sight are hard to square with a belief
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(Vattel [1758,1773] 1844, 100 §209).
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in a right of conquest” (Banner 2007, 3). According to Banner’s research, the British were
initially uncertain whether they needed to buy land from the tribal members or could just take it,
“By the late seventeenth century, ... the English recognized the Indians as the owners of North
America. If the English wanted Indian land, they would have to buy it” (Banner 2007, 40).
Constitutional law Professor Robert G. Natelson, on the other hand, found documentation
of early colonies adopting laws requiring the title of conqueror. Natelson wrote that “[C]olonies
(and later states) regularly exercised, or attempted to exercise, police power over those Native
Americans…who lived within their borders.” He attributed this power to a 1693 English case
called Blankard v. Galdy, where the Court of King’s Bench ruled that foreign peoples within
British domains might initially keep their own laws, but that British law applied once it was
“declared so by the conqueror or his successors.” According to Natelson, colonies and states had
“declared so” in numerous statutes. Along with laws governing the behavior of tribal members,
there were laws concerning land sales from “Indians” to whites. Natelson stated that these
measures could result in the voided deed transfers (R. Natelson 2007, 223-225).
While some colonies used a law that was specific to conquered regions, Banner infers
that most of the “borders” North American tribes would have lived within were created through
genuine land sales. Banner suggests it would make little sense for England to set up a pretense
of buying the land and asks, “…[I]f I were a settler planning to seize the Indians’ land, why
would I go through the trouble of tricking or forcing them into signing a piece of paper?”
(Banner 2007, 2). There was no United Nations at the time; no reason to carefully create an
“appearance that no conquest is taking place.” Furthermore, ”If settlers purchased land from the
Indians because that was easier than seizing it,” that does not make the transactions inauthentic
(Banner 2007, 2).
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The next question would be whether the land sales were fair. The tendency has been to
group all such transactions as one, with one side labeling them as ‘forced’ and the other side
labeling them as ‘voluntary.’ Yet, Banner points out, these land sales were conducted over a
period of 300 or more years in states and regions hundreds of miles apart. Further, neither the
settlers nor tribal members can be lumped into one stereotype. Innumerable people were
involved; “diverse groups of people with a wide range of interests and motivations.” (Banner
2007, 2). The transactions must be viewed on a spectrum. “Whites were never a single bloc
with uniform interests, and neither were Indians. At all times there have been Indians with good
reasons to sell land and others with good reasons not to sell… Indians were no more monolithic
in their views than whites” (Banner 2007, 6).
Banner explains, “At most times, and in most places, the Indians were not exactly
conquered,” but at the same time, not every transaction was free of pressure. “The truth was
somewhere in the middle…every land transfer of any form included elements of law and
elements of power” (Banner 2007, 4).
Non-tribal members, for the most part, purchased land within the constraints of the law of
the time. “Law was always present, but so was power” (Banner 2007, 4). In seventeenth century,
colonial America, tribal members and Europeans were almost equal in power. Transactions at
that time were usually profitable for both sides and were for the most part voluntary. Banner
points out that many transactions on the east coast occurred in areas where tribal members and
settlers had contact for years. Following the first land sale or two, the tribal leaders would have
understood the consequence of a sale. Further, it is evident from documents that tribal leaders
came to negotiations with requests to include in the transaction. If tribal members wanted tools,
guns, or commodities and were able to trade land for it, historical documents show they did so.
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Banner suggests that if transactions were unfair to tribal members, the unfairness might not have
been in that land was sold, “but rather in the quantities that were sold or the prices the sellers
received” (Banner 2007, 2).
Following the Revolutionary War, the newly created American government continued
treating tribes as property owners, not because the federal government had inherited the policy
from Britain, but in part because real estate titles had been established. “[M]uch of the English
population derived title to their land from the Indians. Many colonists had bought land either
from the Indians directly or at the end of a chain of title that originated with the Indians” (Banner
2007, 25).
More importantly, following the Revolutionary War, Americans had a responsibility to
follow through on the constitutional claims they had presented to Great Britain (W. Allen 2010,
7). “The American Revolution occurred on the basis of the theory that the land of the Indians
belonged, not to the King of Great Britain …but to the Indians” (W. Allen 2010, 1). Most of the
Founding Fathers valued integrity. The newly founded United States needed to keep its promises
and maintain the high standards of decency it had set. The new government had no intention of
continuing England’s posture as conqueror of North American tribes. “Not only would deriving
their relationship to the Indians from England undermine the justifications of American
independence, but it would surrender the just claim to principles of right, newly enunciated and
applied to human life (W. B. Allen 1990, 8).
Unfortunately, as years passed, subsequent leaders were not as concerned about the
principles of America’s founding. The power relationship between tribal members and non-tribal
members became increasingly unequal and in the nineteenth century, “there was little pretense
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that land cessions were voluntary in any meaningful sense of the word, even as they retained the
form of negotiated treaties” (Banner 2007, 4).
Nevertheless, the law was always involved, even during the worst of the nation’s history.
The Rule of Law, even when bent and broken, kept conscientious people in check and put
pressure on the less-conscientious (Banner 2007, 4). In the twentieth century, tribes were able to
win back land or compensation through effective use of the legal system. “[T]he law of the past
is still relevant – in some cases, even more relevant than it was at the time – because it is still the
standard by which the actions of the past are measured” (Banner 2007, 5).
Legal scholar Matthew L. M. Fletcher wrote in 2005 that Banner's research indicates
Chief Justice Marshall was incorrect in saying the Doctrine of Discovery had always been the
rule for acquiring Indian lands. Banner shows that “the English purchased a huge portion of the
East Coast without regard to the Doctrine of Discovery” (Fletcher 2006, 680) and “As more and
more English speculators bought land from Indians, more and more land purchases began to rely
on that chain of title” (Fletcher 2006, 633). Allen adds:
The tribes did not integrate the colonists who wanted to own the land into their
tribal jurisdictions, even though “they generally and freely integrated within tribes
Europeans and Africans. Indians sold the jurisdiction both because it mattered little
to them and because they received valuable consideration” – including the promise
of protection (W. B. Allen 1990, 13).

Federal Indian Policy: Revamped with America’s Independence
Coming to peace with the many tribes that had sided with Britain was a challenge for the new
United States. “The Iroquois in the North and the Cherokees, Creeks, and Chickasaw in the
South were particularly troublesome,” so the Continental Congress created “three departments
for Indian affairs, each focused on a different geographical region” (Kinney 2007-2008, 908).
Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry, and James Wilson were all appointed to the middle
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department and “’empowered to treat with the Native Americans’ in the name and on behalf of
the united colonies” (Kinney 2007-2008, 908).
The colonists in general had “debated the law of discovery and the law of conquest with
the Crown long before they employed the terms in their dealings with Indians,” Allen explains.
“To sustain their own just claims, they had to refute the claims of the Crown, reflected in
Blackstone’s Commentaries, that the lands of the colonies were conquered lands, carrying with
them the absolute dominion, or ‘plenary power,’ of Great Britain—a meaning Blackstone
elaborated in the observation that ‘sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms; one
cannot subsist without the other’” (W. B. Allen 1990, 13).
Sixteenth century Genevan legal and political theorist, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui had
asserted that absolute sovereignty over the people of another land is a right conveyed by
conquest. However, “discovery” does not convey absolute sovereignty. Discovery, as described
by Vattel in reference to colonization of a deserted land, carries “corporate standing under the
constitution of the mother country” (W. Allen 2010, 8).
Allen notes, “The Americans, then, articulated a principle of discovery, a constitutional
principle, which was essential to the attainment of their independence and in accord with which
it was necessary for them to maintain that America was not conquered but rather freely settled.
This meant, in turn, that their relations with the Indians could not have been the relations of
conquerors to conquered, if they were to maintain consistency with their revolutionary claims”
(W. B. Allen 1990, 13).
Their claims, articulated in the July 1776 “Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms”
against Britain within their “Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North-
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America,” colonists stated how they viewed themselves, their status, and their cause. America
was their home – the land where they were born and raised; the only home they had ever known:
In our own native land, in defense of the freedom that is our birth-right, and which
we ever enjoyed till the late violation of it – for the protection of our property,
acquired solely by the honest industry of our fore-fathers and ourselves, against
violence actually offered, we have taken up arms. We shall lay them down when
hostilities shall cease on the part of the aggressors, and all danger of their being
renewed shall be removed, and not before (Congress 1775, 129).
Further, in that same document, they expressed their view that Great Britain did not have a Godgiven sovereign authority over the land – or over any of its people:
If it was possible for men, who exercise their reason to believe, that the Divine
Author of our existence, intended a part of the human race to hold an absolute
property in, and an unbounded power over others, marked out by his infinite
goodness and wisdom, as the objects of a legal domination never rightly resistible,
however severe and oppressive, the inhabitants of these colonies might at least
require from the Parliament of Great-Britain some evidence, that this dreadful
authority over them has been granted by that body (Congress 1775, 120).
In 1776, when Congress began drafting the Articles of Confederation, “they disagreed
over the scope and authority of the central government over Indian affairs.” Several states were
concerned their authority would be limited if the federal government were given exclusive
jurisdiction over tribal affairs. “Virginia was particularly concerned over the control of the
tributary tribes within its borders-including the Mattaponi-and wanted some guarantee that it
would be able to manage its own Native American affairs” (Kinney 2007-2008, 908). Other
delegates disagreed and James Wilson argued, “[w]e have no rights over the Indians, whether
within or without the real or pretended limits of any Colony. They will not allow themselves to
be classed according to the bounds of Colonies” (Kinney 2007-2008, 908). James Madison
contended that the compromise reached in the Articles of Confederation was, "obscure and
contradictory” (Kinney 2007-2008, 908-909). The wording of the Article read:
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[t]he United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive
right and power of... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians,
not members of any of the States provided that the legislative right of any State
within its own limits be not infringed or violated (Kinney 2007-2008, 909).
“In effect, this provision created more confusion over Native American affairs than it
resolved” (Kinney 2007-2008, 909). Therefore, the new Constitution in 1789 removed references
to state power over tribal affairs and changed the way negotiations with tribes were to be
handled. George Washington, having determined the colonists to be a free people, considered the
tribes to be so as well. Consequently, he opposed treating the tribes as conquered nations (W.
Allen 2010, 12).

Colonial Negotiations
A treaty is a compact under international law, “made between two or more independent nations
with a view to the public welfare” (Black 2018). According to Vattel, the necessary law of
nations is immutable and binding, therefore, “every treaty, every custom, which contravenes the
injunctions or prohibitions of the necessary law of nations, is unlawful” (Vattel [1758,1773]
1844, §9). Equally, if a treaty is within the bounds of international law, a violation of the treaty is
a violation of the law of nations ([1758,1773] 1844, Ch 15, §221). “This is the principle by
which we may distinguish lawful conventions or treaties from those that are not lawful, and
innocent and rational customs from those that are unjust or censurable” ([1758,1773] 1844, §9).
Because the British and colonists recognized natural law, they approached tribal leaders
with treaties, requesting various permissions and trades. While differences in language and
culture can make negotiations difficult, steps were taken by both sides to alleviate
misunderstanding. According to history professor Nancy L. Hagedorn, good interpreters were a
vital part of the process. “Between 1740 and 1770 more than one hundred men and women of
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varied ethnic and occupational backgrounds served as interpreters in the British colonial
territories north of Virginia” (Hagedorn 1988, 62).
Hagedorn explains the history of treaty making and describes some of the process:
Although the roots of forest diplomacy can be traced to the Iroquois Condolence
Council… by the mid-eighteenth century it incorporated many elements borrowed
from European practice. Gun salutes, toasts, the distribution of European trade
goods as presents at the conclusion of councils, and especially the keeping of
written records of the proceedings and treaties were European innovations. In short,
the Indian conference is a product par excellence of European-Indian contact, as
well as one of the primary arenas in which contact occurred…English government
officials found it necessary to operate within the established system of Iroquois
council protocol, just as the Indians had to accept and adopt certain colonial
practices. At the center of this process of adaptation and accommodation was the
interpreter (Hagedorn 1988, 61).
Chosen interpreters “demonstrated a command not only of English and one or more
Indian languages, but also of European and Iroquois ‘methods of business.’ … The Iroquois also
recognized these differences and encouraged potential interpreters to "learn the ways and
manners of the Indians in propounding any matter" so that they would know ‘how negotiations
were carried on when conducted according to their method’” (Hagedorn 1988, 62).
The interpreters assisted in meeting rooms and at council fires to mediate between the
two cultures. The concept of “culture” refers to the “pattern of meanings, values, and norms”
shared by members of a society and is based on the different meanings separate societies assign
to colors, objects, activities, and vocalized sounds. To properly mediate, the interpreter needed to
deal with the differing “perceptions, expectations, meanings, and values” of both societies
simultaneously (Hagedorn 1988, 61).
The tribal members and non-tribal members both looked for good interpreters; “‘a friend
to go between them’ - a person of ‘Ability and Integrity’ in whom both sides could ‘place a
confidence’” (Hagedorn 1988, 61). While some historians have indicated interpreters were
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biased - and some obviously were motivated by their own agenda - they were rarely without
checks and balances. For example, if the trustworthiness of an interpreter was questioned by
either side, others could be – and were – asked to attend and listen to the translations. For the
most part, interpreters were trusted by both sides. “Conrad Weiser was one interpreter who
seemed to fit this image of an individual ‘equally allied to both’ sides” (Hagedorn 1988, 61).
A person had to have the language skills and cultural sensitivity to perform the job
correctly. “Metis, as persons of mixed European and Indian parentage, were particularly well
suited for the position of interpreter and came by the required knowledge most easily. Not
surprisingly, two of the most prominent mid-eighteenth-century interpreters, Arent Stevens and
Andrew Montour, were metis'” (Hagedorn 1988, 62). Others learned by living with the Iroquois
for an extended period:
As Sir William Johnson told Lord Hillsborough in I769, an intimate knowledge of
Indian affairs was not to be gained ‘during the period of a Governor's residence at
an American Capital, of a Commandant at an Outpost, or of a Traveller in the
Country.... It is only to be acquired by a long residence amongst them, a daily
intercourse with them, and a desire of information in these matters Superseding all
other consideration’ (Hagedorn 1988, 62).
While some were unscrupulous and took advantage of tribes, most interpreters, according
to Hagedorn, seem to have been “true mediators interested in maintaining amicable relations
between the two sides of the fire” (Hagedorn 1988, 65). Documentation was primarily written
and stored by the colonists and surviving records predominantly reflect the European’s point of
view. However, tribal officials did secure “written copies of deeds and treaties.” They were also
known to request gun salutes and toasts at council meetings, so had some understanding of
European business customs (Hagedorn 1988, 71-72). Further, Attorney Adam F. Kinney
contends that despite the disadvantages borne by tribes during that time period, “… several
Native American tribes managed to manipulate the colonial powers' rival interests expertly
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during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (Kinney 2007-2008, 907). Nevertheless, some
treaties reflect cooperation and trust by certain eastern tribes, several of which agreed to ally and
fight with one nation or the other during conflicts. For example, several tribes from Wisconsin,
including the Menominee, Ho-Chunk, Ojibwe, and Potawatomi, joined “military campaigns led
by French army officer Charles de Langlade” (MSU 2018). Kinney notes:
The Iroquois, for example, were especially adept at manipulating French, Dutch,
and English interests to secure for themselves significant power, despite their
comparative weaknesses in technology and population. For example, at the onset
of the Seven Years War the Iroquois indicated favoritism for the French, but
ultimately aligned with the British in exchange for the promise that no British
subjects would be permitted to settle on Iroquois lands and hunting grounds west
of the eastern mountains. With Iroquois support, the British won the Seven Years
War and effectively ejected France from North America, and the Iroquois then
stood in a stronger political position vis-a-vis the British (Kinney 2007-2008, 907).
Between 1756 and 1763, every European power was at war and the combat was ensuing
on five continents. This was referred to as the Seven Years’ War. However, the first battles
began two years earlier on North American soil. This component of the worldwide war was
between Great Britain and France and was known as the French and Indian War. Fought between
the years 1754 and 1763, the North American conflict was meant to settle which nation would
control the colonial territories.
Following the signing of the Treaty of Paris by the British, French and Spanish on
February 10, 1763, conflicts began over who among the denizens of the western territories had
jurisdiction over the land. British colonists, having fought and won against the French, believed
they now had the right to move west into former French areas. But these were also areas where
tribes were living. The British, in effort to prevent conflict as well as prevent unscrupulous land
purchases, decided to manage tribal affairs “under the central authority of the Crown rather than
through the various local colonial governments” (Kinney 2007-2008, 907). On October 7, 1763,
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the British issued a Royal Proclamation that ordered all settlers to leave Indian Country and
forbade any further private land purchases for the time being. Only “government agents could
trade with the Native Americans” or make treaties with the tribes. “…centralized control over
tribal affairs…” would become a tenet of America’s federal Indian policy (Kinney 2007-2008,
907).
Tribes were similarly at odds with each in the Revolutionary War. Some tribes believed
the promise of the British to stem the tide of colonies and settlements and assisted them during
the war. Others, having established good relationship with the colonists, agreed to fight with the
Americans. James Bowdoin, president of the Massachusetts General Court, reported:
…it was strongly urged upon [Delegates from the St John’s & Mickmac Tribes in
Nova Scotia and a couple chiefs from the Penobscot Tribe] to join with us in the
war: and accordingly they have engaged to do it, and have Signed a Treaty for that
purpose” …“ they looked on themselves to be one people with us; and that whatever
Governmt we were under, they were willing to Subject themselves to; that they had
no doubt their Tribe would be willing to join Genl Washington;… (Bowdoin 1776).
On July 12, 1776, in Watertown, Massachusetts, Bowdoin asked delegates for proof they
represented their tribes before beginning their treaty conference. Ambrose of the St. John Indians
presented “a large parchment, containing a Treaty made between those Tribes and the
Government of Nova-Scotia in 1760,” as well as a letter from General Washington and a letter to
them from the General Court of Massachusetts-Bay. Ambrose told Bowdoin that the letters were
the reason he and others had come to see General Washington [see Force, American Archives,
5th ser., 1:]839)” (The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 2018). Ambrose then
delivered a speech on behalf of the native delegation, stating:
The St. John’s and Mickmac Tribes are all one people, and of one tongue and one
heart. We are very thankful to the Almighty to see all the Council; the Almighty
has given the English and Indians one heart. General Washington sent us something
(the letters aforesaid) last fall and this spring, and that is the reason of our coming
here now to speak. The Captains that are come up with me, and all our people, are
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all one as Boston; our eyes and our ears will not turn to the other side of the water
to see or hear what they do. We want a Father or a French Priest. Jesus we pray to,
and we shall not hear any prayers that come from England. We shall have nothing
to do with Old England, and all that we shall worship or obey will be Jesus Christ
and General Washington… General Washington advised us to pray to Jesus for aid
and assistance, and to be thankful for the lands that God had given us. All our old
men and women pray that the Almighty would enable us to walk in the right way.
General Washington wrote us a letter desiring us to pray for him, and assist him all
in our power. All our Captains and Chiefs do pray that he and his brothers may be
masters of this country. We are both one country. We are of their country and they
are of our country [Peter Force, ed. American Archives. 9 vols. Washington, D.C.,
1837–53. 1:839] (The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 2018).
While treaties may have granted the British and American governments significant
benefit and authority, many tribes never signed treaties (R. Natelson 2007, 208-209).

Federal Power Over Tribal Members
“Life, faculties, production – in other words, individuality, liberty, property – this
is man. And in spite of the cunning of artful political leaders, these three gifts from
God precede all human legislation, and are superior to it” (Bastiat 1998, 1).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: “No person shall
be…deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…” and the Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 1, states "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law..." (Congress 1787). But for about two centuries, the federal
government has assumed a power that has at times deprived tribal members of these privileges.
Natelson writes, “For many years, Congress has claimed, and the Supreme Court has
conceded, a plenary power over American Indian tribes” (2007, 204). But according to
Natelson, there are problems with how historical documents have been construed. Fletcher
agrees and notes that the origin of federal authority over Indian tribes is unclear, as the
Constitution carried no “clear textual provisions” concerning such power. Due to that lack, the
Supreme Court has created a body of “unwritten constitutional law.” (Fletcher 2006, 654).
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Justice Breyer's 2004 majority opinion in United States v. Lara is an example of Congressional
authority in dealing with Indian affairs being categorized as “beyond the strictures of the
Constitution" (Fletcher 2006, 656). This unwritten authority, according to Natelson, is said to
have been inherited from the British Crown, which transmitted “extraconstitutional sovereign
authority to the Continental Congress, which then passed it to the Confederation Congress,
which in turn conveyed it to the federal government” (2007, 204). However, Natelson argues:
As a matter of historical record, the British Crown did not transfer its foreign affairs
powers to the Continental Congress, but to the states. The Confederation Congress
did not receive its authority from the Continental Congress, but from the states. The
federal government did not receive its powers from the Confederation Congress,
but from the people (R. Natelson 2007, 205-206).
Natelson further contends that case law does not support the doctrine of inherent plenary
authority. The Supreme Court “has acknowledged the [plenary] theory, but only rarely and in
limited respects” (R. Natelson 2007, 204). He added, “The Supreme Court’s reluctance to fully
accept inherent sovereign authority is understandable, for the doctrine is fundamentally
unconvincing. It clashes with the Constitution’s underlying theory of enumerated powers and
would render some enumerated powers redundant.” (R. Natelson 2007, 205).
Natelson explained that the dicta of Chief Justice Marshal and others has frequently been
cited as recognizing Congress’s plenary authority over Indian Affairs – but it does not (R.
Natelson 2007, 204). Other cases often cited are similarly lacking. “A passage in Chief Justice
Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford6 suggests an inherent sovereignty theory, but later in
the opinion Taney made it clear that he was invoking an enumerated power” (R. Natelson 2007,
204). Natelson explained further, “Kansas v. Colorado (1907),7 the Supreme Court’s clearest
pronouncement on inherent sovereign authority in internal affairs, actually rejected the doctrine.

6
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Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)
Kansas v. Colorado 206 U.S. 46 (1907)
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright resuscitated it, but only for foreign affairs. In 2004, the Court
suggested an application to Indian concerns, but the Court’s language was neither definitive nor
necessary to its decision” (R. Natelson 2007, 205).
Lastly, if inherent authority had in fact existed in any context when the federal
government was created, Natelson clarifies its fate: “[T]he doctrine of inherent sovereign
authority is simply contradicted by the text of the Constitution. Any extra-constitutional
authority inhering in the federal government in 1789 was destroyed two years later, when the
Tenth Amendment became effective. By its terms that Amendment precluded any federal power
beyond those bestowed by the Constitution… precisely to re-assure Anti-Federalists who feared
that the new government might claim powers beyond those enumerated” (R. Natelson 2007, 206207).
This leaves theories that plenary authority comes from within the Constitution. Several
Constitutional powers are suggested, including the War Power, Executive Power, Necessary and
Proper Clause, the Treaty Clause, Territories and Property Clause, and the Indian Commerce
Clause. However, Natelson contends “…[M]ost of those provisions can be readily dismissed”
(R. Natelson 2007, 207). For example, Natelson states that if it were true that the Territories and
Property Clause, were the source of plenary power:
…then legal title to this land is federal ‘property’ subject to congressional
management under the Territories and Property Clause, and such title would give
Congress at least some jurisdiction over the minority of Indians who reside on
reservations. But this begs the question of the source of authority for holding
reservation land in trust. As already noted, pre- or extraconstitutional power is not
a viable answer. Nor, as originally understood, is the Territories and Property
Clause, for that Clause originally granted Congress the unlimited power to dispose
of federal lands within state boundaries, but not the unlimited capacity to retain or
acquire such lands. As for the treaty power, it happens that not a single Indian treaty
provides that the government has retained or acquired trust title to the reservation.
The sole references to trust arrangements in Indian treaties are peripheral
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provisions, such as temporary trusts incident to sale and trusts to fund Indian
schools and other amenities (R. Natelson 2007, 209-210).
Just one theory for the origin of plenary power remains. Felix Cohen, in his ‘Handbook of
Federal Indian Law,’ states that Congress has power over tribes through the Indian Commerce
Clause as long as members are wards of the government (Cohen [1942] 1971, 353). A large body
of law has been written in support of this.

Commerce Clause
‘Federalism’ involves two or more levels of government, each with unique, independent,
political authority ruling over the same land and people. Further, in “market-preserving
federalism,” there is a common market, and sub-governments “have primary regulatory
responsibility over the economy;” but are unable to print money or access unlimited credit from
the central government” (Weingast 1995, 4).
The United States Constitution was written to protect the lives, liberty and property of the
People. As part of that protection, the Constitution needed to clarify roles and responsibilities
necessary for the promotion of a stable and productive economy. The founding fathers
understood that regulation of commerce was a proper function of government, and regulation of
interstate and international commerce was a proper function of federal government.
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution enumerates the powers vested in the
federal government to regulate commerce between lower and foreign political entities:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare
of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States; To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes… (Congress 1787).
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The commerce clause is one of the Constitution's central pillars. It prevented states from
setting up trade barriers, while at the same time not giving the federal government complete
power. In protecting markets, the commerce clause is at the heart of what has become one of the
“largest common markets in the world” (Weingast 1995, 8). But this clause also contains one of
the limited mentions of tribes within the Constitution. The third clause refers to Congress’
power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes” (Congress 1787, Art. 1 Sec 8).
The United States Constitution goes on to reserve all other rights and powers to the
people and to the States. Amendment IX declares that "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people" and
Amendment X declares "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people” (Congress
1787).
Despite this, the Bureau of Indian Affairs claims “Article 1, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution vests Congress, and by extension the Executive and Judicial branches of our
government,” with exclusive authority over the tribes (BIA, 2013).
Constitutional Law Attorney Philip J. Prygoski affirms Congress’s constitutional power
to regulate commerce with tribal governments, and states the “Indian Commerce Clause” is the
primary power source and vehicle for Congress to define tribal sovereignty (Prygoski 2015).
Natelson asks, “[W]hy were treaties understood for so long as the principal method of
dealing with tribes if Congress could regulate all affairs under the ICC?” (R. Natelson 2019). In
his historical research, Natelson found that the “drafting history of the Constitution, the
document’s text and structure, and its ratification history all show emphatically that the Indian
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Commerce Power was not intended to be exclusive” to the federal government. He further notes,
“Throughout the Colonial and Revolutionary period, colonies and states frequently entered into
treaties with Indians within their territorial limits. New York even appointed treaty
commissioners after the Constitution had been issued and ratified” (R. Natelson 2007, 223).
Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson and William Samuel Johnson, alluded to this state authority
to regulate commerce with Indian tribes inside their borders (R. Natelson 2007, 225).
State authority over commercial regulation aside, United States v. Kagama (1886)8
“rejected the Indian Commerce Clause as a source of plenary congressional authority” (R.
Natelson 2007, 210). The Supreme Court stated “it would be a ‘very strained construction’ of
the Commerce Clause to conclude that it authorized creation of a federal criminal code for Indian
country” (R. Natelson 2007, footnote 65, at 210 ). Kagama “did recognize unenumerated
federal power over Indian affairs, but the Court’s justification was Indian dependency on the
federal government, not inherent sovereignty” (R. Natelson 2007, 204-205).
Patent attorney Nathan Speed notes that when Congress first began asserting authority
over tribes beyond trade, the Indian Commerce Clause was not cited as the source of that
authority. Further, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the Clause was the source of
plenary power over tribes (Speed 2007)
Despite this, according to Cohen, the Clause has become “the most often cited basis for
modern legislation regarding Indian tribes” [ (LexisNexis 2005, 397) ] In the case Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, (1989), it was stated that “the central function of the Indian
Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian
affairs” (R. Natelson 2007, 211).

8
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Many have argued that the Founding Fathers intended the word “commerce” within the
cited clause to refer not just to merchant trade, but to all economic activity and even beyond to
any and every transaction. Natelson contends that a meaning that expansive would not belong in
a list of ‘enumerated’ powers. However, this argument persists, and being so pervasive, several
studies have recently examined how the word was employed in constitutional, lay and legal
contexts “before and during the Founding Era” (R. Natelson 2007, 214).
Those studies9 found that “‘commerce’ meant mercantile trade, and that the phrase ‘to
regulate Commerce’ meant to administer the lex mercatoria (law merchant) governing purchase
and sale of goods, navigation, marine insurance, commercial paper, money, and banking (R.
Natelson 2007, 214). Natelson states:
In both lay and legal discourse in the 18th Century, the term “commerce” “was
almost always a synonym for exchange, traffic, or intercourse. When used
economically, it referred to mercantile activities: buying, selling, and
certain closely-related conduct, such as navigation and commercial finance (2006).
In Justice Clarence Thomas’ concurrence in United States v. Lopez, (1995)10 agreed, stating:
At the time the original Constitution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling,
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes. See 1 S. Johnson,
A. Dictionary of the English Language 361 (4th rev. ed. 1773)11 (defining
commerce as “Intercourse; exchange of one thing for another; interchange of
anything; trade; traffick”); T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English
Language (6th ed. 1796) ("Exchange of one thing for another; trade, traffick"). This
understanding finds support in the etymology of the word, which literally means
"with merchandise." See 3 Oxford English Dictionary 552 (2d ed. 1989) (com-"with"; merci--"merchandise"). In fact, when Federalists and Anti Federalists
discussed the Commerce Clause during the ratification period, they often used trade
(in its selling/bartering sense) and commerce interchangeably (United States v.
Lopez 1995).

9

See generally Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101
(2001); (R. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause 2007, Supra note 2, 214 )
10
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585, 586, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995)
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(reprint 1978)
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Thomas quoted his Lopez comments in his concurrence in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
(2013), and added, “The term ‘commerce’ did not include economic activity such as
‘manufacturing and agriculture,’ ibid., let alone noneconomic activity such as adoption of
children” (Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2013). Thomas also cited Natelson nine times in his
concurrence.
“Thus,” Natelson writes, “‘commerce’ did not include manufacturing, agriculture,
hunting, fishing, other land use, property ownership, religion, education, or domestic family
life.” In fact, the Federalists during the Constitution’s ratification explicitly maintained that “all
of the latter activities would be outside the sphere of federal control” (R. Natelson 2007, 214215). He adds in his article concerning the legal meaning of the Commerce Clause, “The fact that
other uses of the term “commerce” existed during the pre-ratification and post-ratification
periods, does not change the accepted general meaning of the word ‘commerce’” (R. G. Natelson
2006, 789, 811)
Finally – and most obvious - the word ‘commerce’ could not have had a broader meaning
for Indian tribes than it had for States and foreign Nations, which are located in the exact same
clause (R. Natelson 2007, 215). Natelson notes, “I have been able to find virtually no clear
evidence from the Founding Era that users of English varied the meaning of “commerce” among
the Indian, interstate, and foreign contexts” (R. Natelson 2007, 216).
Attorney Krystal V. Swendsboe concurs, quoting Vielma v. Eureka Co.,12 “When the
terms of a statute are ambiguous, we will employ cannons of statutory construction to discern the
legislature’s intent…In the absence of some indication to the contrary, we interpret words or
phrases that appear repeatedly in a statute to have the same meaning’(citations omitted) ”

12

218 F.3d 458, 464–65 (5th Cir. 2000)
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(Swendsboe 2019) and in Clark v. Martinez,13 “To give th[e] same words a different meaning for
each category would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one” (Swendsboe 2019).
Natelson further asks “If a broad power was intended, why use the same word for Indians
as was used for foreign nations and interstate commerce? Why not use instead the readily
available and traditional phrase ‘Indian affairs’?” After all, he notes, the writers of the
Constitution were meticulous in the word usage and “knew about the presumption of the same
word not changing meaning” (R. Natelson 2019). Natelson wrote in 2019:
Edmund Randolph’s list of powers that can be exercised under the Commerce
Clause with foreign nations, interstate commerce, and Indian tribes is a list of
examples of common kinds of regulation within the three categories. It
does not define different scopes. For example, Randolph speaks of restricting the
travel of merchants with the Indians, but he could have used exactly the same
example for merchants with foreign countries, as in the case of embargoes (R.
Natelson 2019).
Despite this, the United States government has not asserted plenary jurisdiction over state
and international actors in the same manner it has tribes and tribal members.
Assistant Professor of Law, Gregory Ablavsky, agrees and stated: “[T]he history of the
Indian Commerce Clause’s drafting, ratification, and early interpretation does not support either
‘exclusive’ or ‘plenary’ federal power over Indians. In short, Justice Thomas is right: Indian
law’s current doctrinal foundation in the Clause is historically untenable” (Ablavsky 2015).
The final draft of the Constitution gave James Madison, a nationalist, less authority than
he had wanted for the federal government and the ratification process reduced the powers even
further. But even with this, not even Madison “suggested granting Congress plenary dominion
over the Indians. His proposal was for Congress to ‘regulate affairs with the Indians’—to govern
transactions between tribes and citizens. Yet this still was more than the convention, or the
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public, was willing to accept” (R. Natelson 2007, 258). Fellow delegate, John Rutledge of
South Carolina, instead suggested to the Committee of Detail a federal power concerning Indians
that “stripped down Madison’s proposal to a mere commerce power” (R. Natelson 2007, 258).
Among the issues defined by the Federalists as outside of congressional regulation (and
therefore, under state jurisdiction) were “crimes malum in se (except treason, piracy, and
counterfeiting), family law, real property titles and conveyances, inheritance, promotion of
useful arts in ways other than granting patents and copyrights, control of personal property
outside of commerce, torts and contracts among citizens of the same state, education, services for
the poor and unfortunate, licensing of public houses, roads other than post roads, ferries and
bridges, and fisheries, farms, and other business enterprises” (R. Natelson 2007, 248-249).
To summarize, the Indian Commerce Clause was included to give Congress the power to
regulate trade between tribes and non-tribal members. It gave Congress the ability to override
state laws, but not to abolish or alter “pre-existing state commercial and police power over
Indians within state borders” (R. Natelson 2007, 265). The Commerce Clause did not establish a
‘Trust status” authorizing a pupilage condition. Nor did it grant Congress a plenary police power
over tribal members or a license to interfere in Indian affairs.
Natelson concludes, “…the results of textual and historical analysis militate
overwhelmingly against the federal government having any ‘inherent sovereign power’ over
Indians or their tribes” and “…the Founders intended the states to retain their broad residual
police power” (R. Natelson 2007, 266).
Neither the British nor the early federal government of the United States have title from
North American tribes by right of conquest of the entire land. They did, however, have title over
certain parcels by purchase of deed and may have had title of other lands by right of discovery
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and use. But questions remain, including how much was stolen, whether some western tribes
lost title by conquest, or whether most tribal nations, over the years, had voluntarily ceded
authority to the federal government through various agreements, trades, legislation, or attrition.

Federal Treaties
It is very important to note that both prior to the founding of the United States and in the near
century after, the treaty process was the necessary method of official interaction with the Indian
tribes. Federal government delegations needed to meet with the leaders of each one of the scores
of tribes in order to come to agreements. This is not the way one deals with conquered nations.
It was the way Christian gentlemen dealt with other sovereign nations.
The first US treaty was the Treaty with the Delaware, signed on September 17, 1778, also
known as the Treaty of Fort Pitt. Treaties outlined the negotiated territories, set up basic rules,
and detailed the price and items the United States were giving in exchange. According to
William J. Lawrence J.D.,14 “Treaties were not solemn promises to preserve in perpetuity
historic tribal lifestyles, lands, or cultures, as is often claimed today. In fact, plans for
assimilating Indian people into mainstream American life were spelled out in most treaties, often
requiring that treaty payments be used for construction of schools, homes, programs to train

A member of the Red Lake tribe, William J. Lawrence “earned a bachelor's of arts degree in business
administration at Bemidji State University in 1962. He served as a commissioned officer with the U.S. Marine Corp
from 1962-66. He also earned a Juris Doctor Degree from the University of North Dakota in 1972. He was
employed as the director of economic development and planning for the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians from
1968-69; he was an educational administrator for the Minnesota Department of Education, 1968-75; the
superintendent of the Colorado River Agency Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1975-78; the executive director for the Fort
Mohave Indian Tribe, 1978-82; a contract representative for Honeywell Inc Military Avionics Division, 1984-92,
and the owner and publisher of the Native American Press/Ojibwe News 1988-2009. He was an adjunct instructor
teaching a class on investigative reporting in the Mass Media Department at Bemidji State University, during the
spring of 2006. He received the Freedom of Information Award by the Society of Professional Journalists in 2007.
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Indian adults in agriculture, and promises to aid the transition from a subsistence lifestyle to
active citizenship” (Lawrence 2002, 393).
One example is in the wording in the 1828 Treaty of the Cherokee:
It is further agreed by the United States, to pay two thousand dollars, annually, to
the Cherokees, for ten years, to be expended under the direction of the President of
the United States in the education of their children, in their own country, in letters
and the mechanic arts; also, one thousand dollars towards the purchase of a Printing
Press and Types to aid the Cherokees in the progress of education, and to benefit
and enlighten them as a people, in their own, and our language. It is agreed further
that the expense incurred other than that paid by the United States in the erection
of the buildings and improvements, so far as that may have been paid by the
benevolent society who have been, and yet are, engaged in instructing the Cherokee
children, shall be paid to the society, it being the understanding that the amount
shall be expended in the erection of other buildings and improvements, for like
purposes, in the country herein ceded to the Cherokees (U.S. GPO 1828, 290 Art.
5).
Another example is in the 1855 Treaty of the Chippewa:
Four thousand dollars ($4,000) per annum, for thirty years, to be paid or expended,
as the chiefs may request, for purposes of utility connected with the improvement
and welfare of said Indians; subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior:
Provided, That an amount not exceeding two thousand dollars thereof, shall, for a
limited number of years, be expended under the direction of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, for provisions, seeds, and such other articles or things as may be
useful in agricultural pursuits. Such sum as can be usefully and beneficially applied
by the United States, annually, for twenty years, and not to exceed three thousand
dollars, in any one year, for purposes of education; to be expended under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior (U.S. Govt 1855, Art. 3).
The treaties between the United States and Indian nations have had a significant impact
on the life, liberty and property. Because of the significant legal, emotional, social, physical and
economic impact treaties have had on tribal members, state and federal agencies, non-members
who live on or near reservations, there is much controversy concerning them.
George Washington had decided to treat tribal members as free and not as conquered
nations, “but the pre-eminent case of the Cherokees and related tribes eventually led to
abandonment of that policy in later administrations” (W. Allen 2010, 12). According to Allen,
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the territorial claims of the Cherokees ran from the northward-flowing Tennessee on the west to
the Kanawha, Broad, Edisto on the east; from the Chattahoochee, Coosa, and Black Warrior on
the south to the Ohio on the north. Although none of those boundaries was conceded by their
[immediate] neighbors, the Cherokees succeeded in transmitting their claims thereto into an
ownership sufficient for sale15” (W. B. Allen 1990, 9). This raises the question whether the
Cherokee had sold land that might not have been theirs. He goes on:
Thus, the great acquisitions by the United States were effectuated by purchase
through treaties. During this period, tribes such as the Chickasaws remained small
and sustained their integrity through a policy of naturalizing alien people. The
southern Indians in general had mated economic communism with individual
liberty by means of maintaining a state so near anarchy that only “unanimous
consent” could attain any practical purpose and dissident minorities consequently
did not exist.
Against this background, neighboring states, like Georgia, were often
tempted beyond resistance to intrude on Indian holdings, with the result that the U.
S. dealt as often and as much with American citizens as with Indians in attempting
to maintain a stable policy. The failure to execute the Treaty of New York, which
concerned boundary lines, effectively undercut efforts to restrain Georgia. This set
up conflicts, for which the Chief McGillivray16 was also in part responsible. In
1785-86 three Treaties of Hopewell were signed, one with the Cherokees
(November 28), one with the Choctaws (January 3), and one with the Chickasaws
(January 10). That with the Choctaws contained an acknowledgment of American
sovereignty (although the 31 signators had been inundated with liquor) (W. B.
Allen 1990, 9).
Chief McGillivray came to New York on July 21, 1790 “on Washington’s invitation to
form a treaty in which he ‘refused . . . acknowledgment of United States sovereignty except over
those Creeks living within the limits of the United States.’ Here is where the connection between
land cessions and sovereignty began to be formed” (W. B. Allen 1990, 9). The day after
McGillivray arrived, “President Washington signed an Act for Regulating Trade and Intercourse
with the Indian Tribes. The Act was founded on continuing nationhood for Indians, save as

15
16

(Cotterill, 5, 7, 12, 85, 174, 188-89, 196, 202, 203, 207, 215, 217-18, 220, 234)
Alexander McGillivray, the Muscogee Chief of the Upper Creek towns
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explicitly surrendered in treaty. This had the effect of obligating the United States to defend
established Indian land claims” (W. B. Allen 1990, 9).

The Early Years of the New Nation

The Non-Intercourse Act of 1790
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act (also known as the Nonintercourse Act, the Indian NonIntercourse Act, or the “Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes”) was
passed on July 22, 1790, to protect tribal members from being taken advantage of by thieves. It
set reservation boundaries, established regulations, banned the sale of land to non-tribal members
unless approved by the federal government, and created federal licenses for those who wanted to
trade with tribal members. While some of it remains in effect today, revisions in 1793, 1796,
1799, 1802, and 1834 removed some of the protections (W. Allen 2010, 14).
Some have argued that section 5 of the Act, which clarifies what will happen to non-tribal
members who commit a crime against tribal members, is proof that the Commerce Clause was
meant to involve more than just commerce. It appears to address “criminal rather than a
commercial regulation” (R. Natelson 2007, 252).
However, in Worcester v. Georgia (1832), Justice McLean contended that “this section’s
successor was, despite its criminal content, a merely routine trade regulation. He emphasized that
the law regulated the conduct of United States citizens and residents only. It did not regulate the
conduct of Indians and certainly was not an assertion of ‘political jurisdiction’ over Indian
country.” He said measures like this are no different from laws requiring citizens to honor
embargos. “McLean’s unsupported statement is not really probative of original understanding,
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for he was writing long after the Founding Era and did not cite sources from that time.” (R.
Natelson 2007, 253).
“Whatever the merits of Justice McLean’s conclusion, the fundamental problem with
arguing that the Indian Intercourse Act sheds light on the Commerce Clause is this: the Indian
Intercourse Act was not adopted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. It was adopted pursuant to
the Treaty Power” (R. Natelson 2007, 254).
The 1834 version of the Intercourse Act is codified at 25 U.S.C. section 177 and remains
substantially the same today. Adult men who are tribal members continue to be prohibited from
selling land received through allotment or inheritance that the tribal government might have an
interest in - unless it is “negotiated in the presence of a federal commissioner and ratified by
Congress” (DOJ 2015).
For example, Gideon Peon, a member of the Flathead Reservation in western Montana,
wanted to sell his property in 1947. Unfortunately, although he had been a respected postal
worker for twenty years, he was declared “incompetent” to manage his own property. Furious, he
went to Congress to obtain permission to take his land out of trust. Congress acquiesced and
passed a bill to free his land, but President Truman vetoed it on the advice of his Secretary of
Interior – who had gotten his advice from the BIA (Scofield 1992, 10, 11). A similar request by a
tribal member named Joseph J. Pickett was also vetoed that same month (Univ of Illinois 1947)17
(E. Morris 2017).

17

See Appendix 6
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President Washington’s Perspective
Throughout his presidency, Washington strived to serve with integrity and principle, honoring
God to the best of his ability. He did not believe in using the executive veto unless Congress was
enacting something unconstitutional. It was not a tool to push his own version of policy –
because it was the job of Congress to create law, not the president. Washington did not believe
the President should take over the duties of Congress or usurp the Constitution. If the
Constitution needed to be changed, it should be done through the amendment process (Newell
2012, 11).
In his final farewell speech in 1796, Washington asked those who would follow him into
office to follow his example and “confine themselves within their respective constitutional
spheres” (Washington 1796). He warned, that if “virtue and morality do not underlie American
behavior: … ‘cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of
the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government’” (Newell 2012, 19).
This is true at any level of government – federal, state, county or tribal. Therefore,
Washington encouraged those who would seek public office to be “servant-leaders”- delegates
guided by obligations to followers” (Newell 2012, 20).
But he also wisely reminded the followers that they themselves have obligations as well.
“They must cherish union, constrain self-interest, obey the Constitution and laws, and let reason
guide their public affairs. They were not just people; they were citizens” (Newell 2012, 20).

The Early 1800s
Self-constraint and reason have both proven difficult obligations for the citizens of the nation to
uphold and servant-leaders have struggled to maintain Washington’s advice. It was around this
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time that the myth of federal control over tribes began to develop. Natelson writes, “During the
nineteenth century, judges and advocates began to advance the view that the federal power over
foreign, interstate, and Indian commerce is exclusive, implicitly barring all state regulation
within those spheres” (R. Natelson 2007, 211).
Although the myth of plenary power was to grow from this point on, Allen believes the
1802 Intercourse Act allowed for states’ rights and included the potential to extinguish land
claims (W. B. Allen 1990, 9), while Fletcher maintains that Congressional acts from the
beginning, “and especially that of 1802, which is still in force,” treated tribes as nations,
respected their rights and boundaries, and purposed to protect them (Fletcher 2006, 646).
On April l6, 1811, Indian Agent Return J. Meigs wrote to the Secretary of War
concerning the Cherokees’ resistance to surrendering their land and stated, “I have ever been of
the opinion that the Indians have not the right to put their veto on any measure deliberately
determined and decreed by the Government” (W. B. Allen 1990, 9)
Agent Meigs did not seem to view tribal members with the same regard of President
Washington, but Chief Pushmataha of the Choctaw continued to believe the Choctaw nation was
on equal footing with the American government. In 1811 he told the Shawnee Chief, Tecumseh:
Halt! Tecumseh, listen to me. You have come here, as you have often gone
elsewhere, with a purpose to involve peaceful people in unnecessary trouble with
their neighbors. Our people have no undo (sic) friction with the whites. Why?
Because we have had no leaders stirring up strife to serve their selfish personal
ambitions.
You heard me say our people are a peaceful people. They make their way
not by ravages upon their neighbor, but by honest toil. In that regard they have
nothing in common with you. I know your history well. You are a disturber! You
have ever been a trouble-maker. When you have found yourself unable to pick a
quarrel with the white man, you have stirred up strife between different tribes of
your own race.
Not only that! You are a monarch, an unyielding tyrant within your own
domain; every Shawnee, man, woman, and child must bow in submission to your
imperious will. The Choctaws and Chickasaws have no monarchs. Their chieftains
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do not undertake the mastery of their people, but rather are they the people's
servants, elected to serve the will of the majority. The majority has spoken on this
question, and it has spoken against your contention. Their decision has, therefore,
become the law of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, and Pushmataha will see that the
will of the majority, so recently expressed, is rightly carried out to the letter.
If, after this decision, any Choctaw should be so foolish as to follow your
imprudent advice and enlist to fight against the Americans, thereby abandoning his
own people and turning against the decision of his own council, Pushmataha will
see that proper punishment is meted out to him, which is death.
You have made your choice; you have elected to fight with the British.
The Americans have been our friends and we shall stand by them. We will furnish
you safe conduct to the boundaries of this Nation, as properly befits the dignity of
your office. Farewell, Tecumseh. You will see Pushmataha no more until we meet
on the fateful warpath (Pushmataha 1811).
Some of the Creek agreed with Tecumseh and in 1813, using red painted sticks as weapons, went
to war against brethren who chose to side with Europeans. The United States eventually
intervened in this Creek Civil War, with Major General Andrew Jackson leading troops.
In 1814, Jackson defeated the Creek at the battle of Horse Shoe Bend, near the
Alabama/Georgia border. “On August 9, 1814 Andrew Jackson exacted the ‘Treaty of Fort
Jackson’” (W. B. Allen 1990, 9) and closed the war. The Creek were forced to surrender:
“Under the terms of the treaty, the Creek Nation ceded nearly 22 million acres to the United
States – taking land even from those who fought alongside the United States. Jackson justified
the seizure of so much territory as payment for the expense of an “unprovoked, inhuman, and
sanguinary” war (Braund 2017). It was through early wars such as this that the impression of
‘title by conquest’ began to develop – and Jackson’s reputation grew.
This “set Cherokees and Choctaws in an impossible position from which they would
never recover—despite an apparent respite won by the Cherokees on March 22, 1816, when two
treaties acknowledged their land claims south of the Tennessee at the price of cession of all their
South Carolina claims. The very concept of the ‘Indian Agent’—at once an ambassador but also
a factor—worked against Indian claims of sovereignty. Nevertheless, tribes often demanded the
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appointment of such an official” (W. B. Allen 1990, 9). It was through the request for federal
agents that the voluntary acquiesce to federal and state control began to develop.
“The treaties of March 22, 1816 were dead by fall, replaced by separate treaties liberally
defended by the eloquence of bribery, with Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws. These were
followed immediately by calls for ‘removal’ and further demands for cession.
President James Monroe said in his annual message to Congress in 1817, “The earth was
given to mankind to support the greatest numbers of which it is capable, and no tribe or people
have a right to withhold from the wants of others more than is necessary for their own support
and comfort" (ICC 1978, 1). In March of the same year President Monroe declared that tribal
members should no longer be dealt with by treaties but rather by legislation” (W. B. Allen 1990,
9). Nonetheless, the policy of treaties continued for about 50 more years.
By July 1817, and under coercion, Cherokees had agreed to swap land in Georgia and
Tennessee for that territory in Arkansas on which a few voluntary emigrants already lived.” The
‘Calhoun Treaty’ was the fresh policy of the newest Secretary of War, John C, Calhoun.
Additional negotiations with the Cherokee tribe took place in 1819. This brought only another
decade of peace, and the agreement “included clauses that foreshadowed Cherokee citizenship
and permanent inhabitancy” – setting up the tragic and “ultimate confrontation” of the Trail of
Tears (W. B. Allen 1990, 9).
In October 1820, Andrew Jackson led a team to meet with the Choctaw and sign the
Treaty of Doak’s Stand. “Under the terms of the treaty, the Choctaws were to cede half of their
land in what was by then the state of Mississippi in exchange for land in Arkansas.” During the
meetings, Chief Pushmataha accused Jackson of exaggerating the quality of the western land, but
on October 18, despite continuing dissatisfaction and suspicion, signed the treaty (NPS 2017).

69

In the first of what came to be known as the ‘Marshall Trilogy” of Indian Law
precedents, Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823)18 decided that non-Indian private citizens could no
longer purchase land from tribal members. Only the federal government could purchase tribal
land. This not only began the open articulation of a plenary power over tribal members, it
effectively eliminated competition for the land; keeping the price of tribal land low for the
federal government. To rationalize the decision, Chief Justice John Marshall described the tribes
as “fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from
the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness”
(Johnson v. M'Intosh 1823).19
The Yakama Tribe asserts:
Under that doctrine, this Court judicially manufactured an extra-constitutional
congressional plenary authority to abrogate treaties and regulate Native Nations.
This manufactured authority rests on the false assertion that our sovereignty and
free and independent existence were ‘necessarily diminished’ upon Christian
European arrival on the North American continent (Yakama 2018, 5-6).
Attorney James Poore states it was not the initial arrival of European’s that diminished
sovereignty, it was the trading of land in the early 1800s that did it. When the United States
gained control of all the territories and incorporated the tribes into the fabric of the states, the
tribes lost their sovereignty. Now living within U.S. territory, they were subordinate to the
sovereignty of the state and federal governments with only limited jurisdiction subject to the U.S.
Constitution. Poore states, “The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires such a result” (J.
A. Poore 1995/1999, 23-24).

18
19

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823)
21 U.S. 543; 1823 U.S. 293; 5 L. Ed. 681; 8 Wheat. 543
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Chief Justice Marshall wrote concerning Constitutional authority over subordinate
governments in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819):20
It is of the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its action within
its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments,
as to exempt its own operations from their own influence. This effect need not be
stated in terms. It is so involved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily
implied in it, that the expression of it could not make it more certain. We must,
therefore, keep it in view, while construing the constitution (427).
Chief Justice Marshall had also ruled in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) that the "nullity of any act, or
law, inconsistent with the Constitution, is produced by the declaration, that the Constitution is
the supreme law" (J. A. Poore 1995/1999, 23-24). In further depreciation of tribes as sovereign
nations, Chief Justice Marshall found in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, (1828), that the power to
govern and legislate comes with possession of territory (1998, 55, footnote). Poore maintains
there is no question that tribal government are subordinate:
Thus, the Property Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by Chief Justice Marshall and in later decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, compel the conclusion that tribes may not have
powers or laws which are inconsistent with the Constitution (1995/1999, 23-24).
Poore notes that “The analysis that forms the basis for this conclusion has not been rejected,
or even considered, by Talton or the other cases recognizing the continuing existence of
pre-constitutional sovereignty” (J. A. Poore 1995/1999, 24). Attorney General William
Wirt agreed and asserted in 1828 that there were three criteria for tribal independence:
1) Government by their own laws
2) Absolute power of war and peace; and
3) Inviolable territory and sovereignty.
Allen holds that Wirt’s criteria does not apply to tribes in the United States even today.
He further states that referring to tribes as sovereign while they clearly are not “is a cruel and
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inhuman pun—for they are capable of none of the essential attributes of sovereignty” (W. Allen
2010, 17). Allen contends that lacking genuine sovereignty, the status of those with tribal
heritage is further injured by lack of full rights as United States citizens. While tribal members
today are given some of the benefits of sovereignty and some of the benefits of citizenship, they
are clearly denied the ability to be fully one or the other. Allen writes, “It is an extreme
aggravation of the joke, therefore, to deny Indians at the same time the essential protections of
citizenship” (W. Allen 2010, 17)
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Chapter 3
History Leading Up to the ICWA

The current stated mission of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, created in 1824, is to “enhance the
quality of life, to promote economic opportunity, and to carry out the responsibility to protect
and improve the trust assets of American Indians, Indian tribes and Alaska Natives” (BIA 2019).
The BIA, admitting this has not always been the mission, states that the agency has “changed
dramatically over the past 185 years, evolving as Federal policies designed to subjugate and
assimilate American Indians and Alaska Natives have changed to policies that promote Indian
self-determination” (BIA 2019).
Referring to his work on the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Allen states, “In our study
we found it a particularly striking and revealing fact that the BIA was created on March 11, 1824
by then Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, who later became the greatest of all antebellum
defenders of slavery”21 Calhoun’s influence on Indian policy occurred at the same time as the
shift from treating tribal members as “friends and brothers” to treating them as “children of the
Great White Father.” According to Allen, “Washington’s language had always been, ‘my
brothers,’ from the early 1750s through the end of his Administration” (1990, 8). Thomas
Jefferson had initially introduced use of the term “father” in an unratified 1803 compact with the
Cherokee. He then began referring to himself as “their father the President of the United States,”
and asked them to refer to him as “our Father, the President.” Calhoun took the concept and
enlarged it to the “Great White Father” (W. B. Allen 1990, 8)
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Allen reports that Calhoun’s writings “demonstrate an intention to civilize the Indians.”
He elaborates:
In other words, only by treating Indians unequally, i.e. as lower than human, will
they become human. In embarking upon an enterprise to civilize a race by direct
intervention and superintendence of their way of life, Calhoun involved himself in
tyranny as much as he did in denying the possibility of civilization to the black race
(W. B. Allen 1990, 8).
An excerpt from a Calhoun report illustrates:
Our views of their [the Indians] interest, and not their own, ought to govern them.
By a proper combination of force and persuasion, of punishments and rewards, they
ought to be brought within the pales of law and civilization . . . When sufficiently
advanced in civilization, they would be permitted to participate in such civil and
political rights as [the government] might safely extend to them . . . It is only by
causing our opinion of their interest to prevail, that they can be civilize and saved
from extinction22 (W. B. Allen 1990, 8).
Allen maintains that “the logical conclusion of such sentiments is the constitutional and
administrative tyranny which still serves as the linchpin of our Indian policy (plenary power and
guardianship), and under which tribes still suffer” (W. B. Allen 1990, 8). It was in this season,
less than 50 years after the founding of the United States, that George Washington’s recognition
of tribal members as a free people appears to have come to a halt and the myth of ‘Title by
Conquest’ began to take root. Where there is a ‘conqueror,’ there must be a ‘conquered.’
Allen writes:
By December 1, 1824 Americans who negotiated with Creeks announced (in a
timid echo of a claim made to the Cherokees in 1823) that ‘they [Creeks} had been
conquered in the Revolution and had since held their land as tenants at will . . . ,’
holding only by the forbearance of the United States. This explicit renunciation of
the original policy fostered by George Washington is the immediate cause of the
entire tragedy of Indian history in the United States since that day. At the very
same time the fraudulent ‘Indian Springs Treaty’ had the Creeks abandoning all
claims and agreeing to removal! The treaty was subsequently abrogated by
President Adams, but it had in fact been ratified by the Senate, clearly indicating
the disposition of official opinion in the United States toward Indians (W. Allen
2010, 15).
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Pushmataha and other Choctaw chiefs travelled to Washington, D.C. in 1824 to
renegotiate the flawed Doak’s Stand treaty. Tragically, Pushmataha died of illness just before
Christmas in 1824. He was given a military funeral by the United States with burial in the
Congressional Cemetery (NPS 2017).

Wardship

Indian Removal Act of 1830
In 1829, newly elected President Andrew Jackson purportedly wrote a letter to the Southeastern
tribes that was then carried by a representative to tribal leaders and read aloud at various
community gatherings. The original letter, assumed for decades to have been lost, is said to have
reappeared and been recently sold at auction. The Raab Auction house avers the wording of the
letter to be the following:
Say to them as friends and brothers to listen [to] the voice of their father, & friend.
Where [they] now are, they and my white children are too near each other to live in
harmony & peace. Their game is destroyed and many of their people will not work
& till the earth. Beyond the great river Mississippi, where a part of their nation has
gone, their father has provided a co[untry] large enough for them all, and he
ad[vises] them to go to it. There, their white…[will not trou]ble them, they will
have no claim to [the l]and, and they & their children can live upon [it as] long as
grass grows or water runs, in peace and plenty. It shall be theirs forever. For the
improvements which they have made in the country where they now live, and for
the stock which they [can]not take with them, their father will [sti]pulate, in a treaty
to be held with them, [to] pay them a fair price.
Say to my red Choctaw children, and my Chickasaw children to listen. My
white children of Mississippi have extended their laws over their country; and if
they remain where they now are…must be subject to those laws. If they will
[remove] across the Mississippi, they will be free [from] those laws, and subject
only to their own, and the care of their father the President. Where they now are,
say to them, their father the President cannot prevent the operation of the laws of
Mississippi. They are within the limits of that state, and I pray you to explain to
them, that so far from the United States having a right to question the authority of
any State to regulate its affairs within its own limits, they will be obliged to sustain
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the exercise of this right. Say to the chiefs & warriors that I am their friend, that I
wish to act as their friend, but they must, by removing from the limits of the States
of Mississippi and Alabama, and by being settled on the lands I offer them, put it
in my power to be such (Raab 2019). [See Appendix for full text]
Choctaw Chief David Folsom, himself a Christian who had fought alongside Jackson,
received the President’s message concerning removal in late November 1829 and rejected it.
After learning of the rejection by the Southeastern tribes, Jackson pushed the Indian Removal Act
through Congress. The result of this act would become known as the Trail of Tears. To justify
the horror he had determined to commit, Jackson gave the following speech to Congress:
It gives me pleasure to announce to Congress that the benevolent policy of the
Government, steadily pursued for nearly thirty years, in relation to the removal of
the Indians beyond the white settlements is approaching to a happy consummation.
… It puts an end to all possible danger of collision between the authorities of the
General and State Governments on account of the Indians. … It will relieve the
whole State of Mississippi and the western part of Alabama of Indian occupancy,
and enable those States to advance rapidly in population, wealth, and power. …The
present policy of the Government is but a continuation of the same progressive
change by a milder process. The tribes which occupied the countries now
constituting the Eastern States were annihilated or have melted away to make room
for the whites. The waves of population and civilization are rolling to the westward,
and we now propose to acquire the countries occupied by the red men of the South
and West by a fair exchange, and, at the expense of the United States, to send them
to land where their existence may be prolonged and perhaps made perpetual. …
Can it be cruel in this Government when, by events which it cannot control, the
Indian is made discontented in his ancient home to purchase his lands, to give him
a new and extensive territory, to pay the expense of his removal, and support him a
year in his new abode? … Rightly considered, the policy of the General
Government toward the red man is not only liberal, but generous. He is unwilling
to submit to the laws of the States and mingle with their population. To save him
from this alternative, or perhaps utter annihilation, the General Government kindly
offers him a new home, and proposes to pay the whole expense of his removal and
settlement (NARA 1830). [See Appendix for full text]
Scholar of Native American history, Willard Hughes Rollings, wrote that Congress,
“under intense pressure from eastern politicians” as well as President Jackson, passed the Indian
Removal Act in 1830, authorizing “removal of all eastern tribes to lands west of the Mississippi.”
Rollings noted that while the Act required the government to “negotiate treaties of removal with
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all of the eastern tribes,” the massive removal “forced over 80,000 Indians to surrender their
homelands and move west” (Rollings, 2004).

The Marshall Trilogy
In 1830, the Cherokee Nation asked the United States Supreme Court for relief from Georgia
laws on the grounds the Cherokee tribe was a foreign nation and not subject to state law. They
asked that the laws of Georgia that purported to govern them be ruled unconstitutional.
In the second case of the Marshall Trilogy (Johnson v. M’Intosh having been the first),
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831)23 held that “there was no original jurisdiction [held by the
Cherokee tribe] because the Cherokee Nation was not a ‘foreign state’” (Wilkinson and
Volkman 1975, 613). Chief Justice John Marshall wrote:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore,
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished
by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether those
tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can,
with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we
assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession
when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile, they are in a state of pupilage.
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian
(Cherokee v. Georgia 1831).
Rollings contends that Marshall used the term “ward” in error; that he was “only referring
to their special status as Indians, and for lack of a better word, he used ward.” Rollings believes
that ‘wardship’ as intended by Marshall meant something “far different from that of white
wards” (Rollings, 2004, p. 136). Nevertheless, Shawn Regan, former ranger for the National
Park Service and a public affairs fellow at the Property & Environment Research Center
(PERC), wrote, “Chief Justice John Marshall set Native Americans on the path to poverty in
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1831 when he characterized the relationship between Indians and the government as ‘resembling
that of a ward to his guardian’” (Regan 2014). These words established the federal trust doctrine,
which essentially says tribes and tribal members are incapable of owning and managing land.
“The government is the legal owner of all land and assets in Indian Country and is required to
manage them for the benefit of Indians” (Regan 2014).
Fletcher asserts Marshall had come up with the term “Domestic Dependent Nation” out
of “whole cloth” to “avoid classifying Indian tribes as either states or foreign nations.” He also
equated tribes to “wards” and claimed they were “in a state of pupilage.” Justice Johnson, in his
concurrence, used the terms "master and conqueror" and said tribes are in a "feudal dependence"
to the United States. Justices Thompson and Story dissented. Citing Vattel, Justice Thompson
found that “weaker states signing treaties of protection do not, as a side-effect, lose their
sovereignty. All that is required for a weaker state to retain statehood is a reservation of the right
to self-government, a staple in American Indian treaties” (Fletcher 2006, 651).
While self-government continued to be inferred by treaties, the Jackson administration
dictated all outcomes. In 1831, the Choctaw were the first to walk the Trail of Tears in accord
with the Indian Removal Act. The Seminole followed in 1832, and the Creek in 1834.
In the third case of the Marshall Trilogy, while confirming “inherent sovereignty of tribes
existed before their integration into the United States,” Worcester v. Georgia (1832)24 ruled that
the federal government had jurisdiction over the tribes (J. A. Poore 1998, 54). The “core of the
majority opinion relied upon the enactment of the First Congress of the trade and intercourse
acts” (Fletcher 2006, 645). The Marshall Court voted 5-1 in Worcester that Georgia laws
governing the Cherokee tribe were unconstitutional – not because the tribes currently carried an
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inherent and original jurisdiction, but because federal government held power over the tribes.
The ruling rescued tribes from State jurisdiction by maintaining the federal government had
exclusive control. Nevertheless, “Justice Story wrote to his wife, ‘Thanks be to God...the Court
can wash their hands clean of the iniquity of oppressing the Indians and disregarding their
rights’” (Fletcher 2006, 645). The Cherokee Nation had won Worcester, but they and the
Chickasaw would still walk the Trail of Tears before the end of the decade. Marshall wrote:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of
the soil, from time immemorial; with the single exception of that imposed by
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European
potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and
this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as
well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means
"a people distinct from others (Worcester v. Georgia 1832).
Attorney Blythe Marston maintains that Marshall “addressed the paradox of a
subordinate sovereign in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia. In Cherokee
Nation.” Marston states that while Marshall held the tribes are "domestic dependent nations"
with "relationship to the United States resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian,"' he also
contended that "the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not
surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by associating with a stronger, and
taking its protection."' Thus, he stated that tribes are "independent political communities"
(Marston, 1984, p. 377). Fletcher believes Marshall “threw down the gauntlet” in making it clear
state law did not apply in Indian Country:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is by
our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States (Fletcher
2006, 647).
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Marshall's opinion includes Vattel’s assessment that a weaker power “does not surrender
the right to self-government by agreeing to the protection of the more powerful nation” (Fletcher
2006, 653). M’Lean concurred with the majority opinion, but wrote:
The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians, within a state, is
undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary. This is shown by the settled policy of
the government, in the extinguishment of their title… (A) sound national policy
does require that the Indian tribes within our states should exchange their territories,
upon equitable principles, or, eventually, consent to become amalgamated in our
political communities.
At best they can enjoy a very limited independence within the boundaries
of a state, and such a residence must always subject them to encroachments from
the settlements around them; and their existence within a state, as a separate and
independent community, may seriously embarrass or obstruct the operation of the
state laws. If, therefore, it would be inconsistent with the political welfare of the
states, and the social advance pf their citizens, that an independent and permanent
power should exist within their limits, this power must give way to the greater
power which surrounds it, or seek its exercise beyond the sphere of state authority
(Worcester v. Georgia 1832, at 562).
Despite Worcester rejecting the "dependency" theory and replacing it with a "distinct and
independent" theory, the Court went on to use the dependency view articulated in Cherokee v.
Georgia to create plenary power and a trust relationship over tribes (Fletcher 2006, 654). Due to
the contradictions, the Marshall Trilogy, while often cited as the precedent for plenary power and
trust relationship, continues to generate questions, confusion and disagreement.

Trust Relationship and Plenary Power
While the Marshall Trilogy instigated tribal subordination to the federal government, some claim
the Trilogy supports an inherent sovereignty doctrine. Nevertheless, Natelson writes:
…Marshall’s dicta simply do not support the doctrine. Marshall observed in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that the federal-tribal relationship “resembles that of a
ward to his guardian.” But a guardianship analogy implies a restricted, fiduciary
power. The Founders themselves used the fiduciary analogy to emphasize the
limited nature of federal authority. Similarly, while Marshall’s dictum in Worcester
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v. Georgia suggested that federal governance of Indian affairs was exclusive of the
states, the pronouncement was unrelated to inherent sovereign authority. Neither
dictum would be particularly probative of the Constitution’s original meaning in
any event, since they were issued more than four decades after the Constitution’s
ratification (R. G. Natelson 2007, 206).
Concerning Worcester’s holding that “federal power over the Cherokee tribe was
exclusive,” Natelson notes that Worcester was decided four decades after the Constitution’s
ratification and therefore is not evidence and has no bearing on the Constitution’s original
meaning (R. G. Natelson 2007, 211).
In explaining the wardship status, Fletcher argues that ‘plenary power’ and the ‘trust
relationship’ both came out of an argument within the Marshall Court over the word ‘protection’
in Indian treaties. Justice Baldwin's concurrence in Cherokee Nation was the first to concentrate
on the word. Baldwin concluded that the use of the word “protection” in the Northwest
Ordinance and Treaty of Hopewell “granted Congress the right to decide the ‘internal affairs’ of
tribes should it wish to at a later date.” This discussion led to the “creation of the canon of
construing Indian treaty language” (Fletcher 2006, 649-650). Importantly, in ignoring the
constitutional rights of states and giving Indian tribes a political status not articulated in any
founding documents, the Court created tribal immunity from state jurisdiction and plenary power
for federal government (Fletcher 2006, 649). Fletcher notes that in Johnson, “Chief Justice
Marshall wrote in dicta that Indians …‘shall not be wantonly oppressed.’” Fletcher states:
The trust relationship exists because the Marshall Court opined that Indians were
weak and dependent and needed the assistance of a higher power - the United States
- to become civilized to the extent that they could save themselves from extinction.
The Trilogy does not include a holding that the federal government should take
action to assist Indians as moral imperative, but the origins of that view are there.
There are two (mis)conceptions of the trust relationship. Since the Marshall Court
declared that Indians were weak and dependent (even if they could not make such
a holding clear in the Cherokee cases), the Court asserted that the United States
must treat them well. The Court would help out the policy making branches by
holding them to a higher standard, what the Court referred to a hundred years later
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as a ‘fiduciary relationship.’ Nongovernmental entities such as the Friends of the
Indian pushed this conception as well (Fletcher 2006, 658-659).
.
Allen believes “[t]here was a crucial historical error reading American citizens who are
Indians out from under the protections of the Constitution. It is only partially, and not most
importantly, the reliance upon the common law of citizenship though that is closely related to the
error. The error is a misconstruction of the international law of ‘discovery’ as it applies to the
status of Indians” (W. Allen 2010, 2).
United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries,25 “written just after
the landmark decisions of the early 1830s as well as his 1859 abridgment of that work” are
authoritative concerning the jurisprudence of the era. “In the first work he reported the law as
the Supreme Court had decided it, although indicating along the way that the history did not
justify it. By 1859, however, he was sufficiently removed from the controversies of the 1830s
that he could rewrite the sections dealing with Indian law” (W. Allen 2010, 9).
Story, while still sitting on the court, claimed in his Commentaries that “America had
inherited from the British Crown a prerogative power in dealing with the Indians.” According to
Allen, “this would have depended upon a right of conquest as opposed to that form of discovery
the Americans had asserted in the Revolution. Nevertheless, this was precisely the argument the
Court had developed in the series of cases from McIntosh.” Story went on to say that because of
conquest, tribes are “distinct political societie[s], capable of self-government.” In other words,
as the court had ruled, “domestic dependent nations” …and yet as well, “ward to a guardian” (W.
Allen 2010, 9).
Story quoted Marshall’s writing, “All our institutions recognize the absolute title of the
Crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognize the absolute title of the
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Crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with an absolute and complete title in the
Indians”26 (W. Allen 2010, 9). Allen argues:
The problem, however, is that if the Indians had no such absolute and complete
title, the Americans had no basis for their Revolution! After Story quoted
Marshall’s McIntosh opinion at length, presenting the history of “conquest or
treaty” that led to European domination of Indians, and in the very few mentions of
Indians at all - New Haven, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, all counter to the thesis one gets a picture of ready and easy accommodation, punctuated by the generosity
of William Penn. In short, Story comes very near to certifying the “desert land”
point of view, reducing the notion of European discovery to nothing more than a
polite fiction of realpolitik (W. Allen 2010, 10).
Interestingly, after Story was no longer on the bench, he gave a different analysis. In
chapter sixteen of his Commentaries he refutes both the Doctrine of Discovery as well as
“Blackstone’s claim that colonies were conquered lands.” Story wrote:
At the time of the leading grants from the Crown, there had been no ‘conquest or
cessions from the natives.’ The Indians were not overcome by force and were not
considered as ‘having any regular laws, or any organized government.’ They were
subjected to obedience ‘as dependent communities, and no scheme of general
legislation over them was ever attempted.’ Indeed, they were generally regarded
as at liberty to govern themselves, so long as ‘they did not interfere with the
paramount rights of the European discoverers.’ The implication that the
‘discoverers’ acquired no rights over the Indians was then affirmed by Story in the
declaration, ‘as there were no other laws there to govern them, the territory was
necessarily treated, as a deserted and unoccupied country, annexed by discovery to
the old empire and composing a part of it.’ This shows clearly that the theory of
discovery does not undergird the notion of a ‘domestic dependent nation’ and
cannot, therefore, constitute the foundation of a wardship or pupilage27 (W. Allen
2010, 10-11).28

26

Quoted at 1 Story 15
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 2 vols., (Boston: Charles C. Little and James
Brown, 1851), 2d edition
28
Allen notes that “further credence” can be found in Story’s A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the
United States, Reprint of the 1859 edition (Lake Bluff, Illinois: Regnery-Gateway, Inc., 1986). “At chapter one, p.
28, Story uses a different voice to describe the Indian situation” (W. B. Allen 1990, 14).
27

83

Allen writes, “This subtle reading of Story’s famous work gains further credence when
we consider the critical portion of his subsequent work Familiar Exposition. There, Story uses a
different voice to describe the Indian situation:”
At the time of the discovery of America...the various Indian tribes, which then
inhabited it, maintained a claim to the respective limits, as sovereign proprietors of
the soil. They acknowledged no obedience, nor allegiance, nor subordination to
any foreign nation whatsoever; and as far as they have possessed the means, they
have ever since consistently asserted this full right of dominion, and have yielded
it up only, when it has been purchased from them by treaty, or obtained by force of
arms and consent. In short, like all civilized nations of the earth, the Indian tribes
deemed themselves rightfully possessed, as sovereigns, of all the territories, within
which they were accustomed to hunt, or to exercise other acts of ownership, upon
the common principle, that the exclusive use gave them an exclusive right to the
soil, whether it was cultivated or not. It is difficult to perceive, why their title was
not, in this respect, as well founded as the title of any other nation, to the soil within
its own boundaries. How, then, it may be asked, did the European nations acquire
the general title…? The only answer which can be given, is their own
assertion…that their title was founded upon the right of discovery… The truth is,
that the European nations paid not the slightest regard to the rights of the native
tribes. They treated them as mere barbarians and heathens, whom, if they were not
at liberty to extirpate, they were entitled to deem mere temporary occupants of the
soil. They might convert them to Christianity; and, if they refused conversion, they
might drive them from the soil, as unworthy to inhabit it. They affected to be
governed by the desire to promote the cause of Christianity and were aided in this
ostensible object by the whole influence of the papal power. But their real object
was to extend their own power and increase their own wealth, by acquiring the
treasures, as well as the territory, of the New World. Avarice and ambition were at
the bottom of all their original enterprise. This Justice Story no longer sits on the
Court and no longer defers to the ‘settled rule of law’ (W. Allen 2010, 11).
Allen explains, “When Story accepted Marshall’s reliance on Spanish and Portuguese
experience, instead of distinguishing the U. S. from the other America, his voice changed, and he
blasted the foundation as a hypocrisy.” Story writes that the “right of discovery” is now viewed
as settled foundation and considered incontestable – despite being doubtful in origin and
“unsatisfactory in its principle” (p. 30).” Allen then notes, “This means that the principle of
discovery yields the occupation of the territory of North America, and perhaps even jurisdiction

84

over it, but can by no means yield ‘plenary power’ over either individual Indians or tribes”
(1990, 13-15).
Fletcher adds that it is “…ironic that Chief Justice Marshall's final constitutional opinion
was Barron v. Baltimore, a decision holding that the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states.”
Barron was also the decision the Court later used to hold that the Bill of Rights does not apply to
tribes, either (Fletcher 2006, 645).

The Definition of an “Indian”
United States v. Rogers, (1846)29 defined an Indian as someone who has a degree of Indian blood
and is recognized as an Indian. In United States v. Dodge,30 the Court stated, “The definition of
exactly who is and who is not an Indian is very imprecise…Courts have generally followed the
test discussed in United States v. Rogers.” Case law has not diverged from this since 1846.
Thus, according to Attorney Jon Metropoulos, “… the one immutable requirement to be
an ‘Indian’ for purposes of the statutory definition on which Congress relied is an immutable
racial characteristic; the person’s race must be, at least in part, Indian. United States v. Rogers,
45 U.S. 67 (4 How.) 567, 572-73, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1845). (By adoption into a tribe, a non-Indian
does not become an Indian.) (Brief for Amicus Curiae of TM. EM & RM 2003, 19).
The application of that seemingly sensible rule has run into difficulties. Americans move
about the country, inter-marrying and freely choosing their political and religious affiliations.
Not everyone with Tribal heritage is affiliated with the tribe or their customs. Metropoulos
explains how this also raises the issue of racial discrimination:
Even if Congress limited the class of people it subjected to tribes’ pre-constitutional
criminal jurisdiction to tribal members (i.e., depriving ‘only’ 1.7 million citizens of
29
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their rights rather than 4 million) every single one of those people would be an
‘Indian’ by race. Not one non-Indian would suffer that treatment. At the very best,
in that case, the person’s membership in a tribe would be an additional factor, but
race would be the one indispensable and obviously immutable characteristic of the
class of U.S. citizens given such ‘special treatment’ (Brief for Amicus Curiae of
TM. EM & RM 2003, 20).

The Birth of the Reservation System

The Indian Appropriations Act of 1851
The Indian Appropriations Act of 1851 created the reservation system, forcing those who could
be classified as Indian to move to a set area for management. This freed land for others to move
on to and avoided the problem of clashes between people groups.
On January 12, 1854, Chief Seattle announced his surrender to the reservation system and
gave a short speech accepting a diminished life they would lead. He also cautioned Americans
to be just with his people. He said:
Yonder sky that has wept tears of compassion upon my people for centuries untold,
and which to us appears changeless and eternal, may change. Today is fair.
Tomorrow it may be overcast with clouds. My words are like the stars that never
change. Whatever Seattle says, the great chief at Washington can rely upon with as
much certainty as he can upon the return of the sun or the seasons. The white chief
says that Big Chief at Washington sends us greetings of friendship and goodwill.
This is kind of him for we know he has little need of our friendship in return. His
people are many. They are like the grass that covers vast prairies. My people are
few. They resemble the scattering trees of a storm–swept plain. The great, and I
presume—good, White Chief sends us word that he wishes to buy our land but is
willing to allow us enough to live comfortably. This indeed appears just, even
generous, for the Red Man no longer has rights that he need respect, and the offer
may be wise, also, as we are no longer in need of an extensive country.
There was a time when our people covered the land as the waves of a wind–
ruffled sea cover its shell–paved floor, but that time long since passed away with
the greatness of tribes that are now but a mournful memory. I will not dwell on, nor
mourn over, our untimely decay, nor reproach my paleface brothers with hastening
it, as we too may have been somewhat to blame.
Youth is impulsive. When our young men grow angry at some real or
imaginary wrong, and disfigure their faces with black paint, it denotes that their
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hearts are black, and that they are often cruel and relentless, and our old men and
old women are unable to restrain them. Thus it has ever been. Thus it was when the
white man began to push our forefathers ever westward. But let us hope that the
hostilities between us may never return. We would have everything to lose and
nothing to gain. Revenge by young men is considered gain, even at the cost of their
own lives, but old men who stay at home in times of war, and mothers who have
sons to lose, know better.
Our good father in Washington––for I presume he is now our father as well
as yours, since King George has moved his boundaries further north––our great and
good father, I say, sends us word that if we do as he desires he will protect us. His
brave warriors will be to us a bristling wall of strength, and his wonderful ships of
war will fill our harbors, so that our ancient enemies far to the northward—the
Haidas and Tsimshians—will cease to frighten our women, children, and old men.
Then in reality he will be our father and we his children. But can that ever be? Your
God is not our God! Your God loves your people and hates mine! He folds his
strong protecting arms lovingly about the paleface and leads him by the hand as a
father leads an infant son. But, He has forsaken His Red children, if they really are
His. Our God, the Great Spirit, seems also to have forsaken us.
…Day and night cannot dwell together. The Red Man has ever fled the
approach of the White Man, as the morning mist flees before the morning sun.
However, your proposition seems fair and I think that my people will accept it and
will retire to the reservation you offer them. Then we will dwell apart in peace, for
the words of the Great White Chief seem to be the words of nature speaking to my
people out of dense darkness.
…We will ponder your proposition and when we decide we will let you
know. But should we accept it, I here and now make this condition that we will not
be denied the privilege without molestation of visiting at any time the tombs of our
ancestors, friends, and children. Every part of this soil is sacred in the estimation of
my people. Every hillside, every valley, every plain and grove, has been hallowed
by some sad or happy event in days long vanished. Even the rocks, which seem to
be dumb and dead as the swelter in the sun along the silent shore, thrill with
memories of stirring events connected with the lives of my people, and the very
dust upon which you now stand responds more lovingly to their footsteps than
yours, because it is rich with the blood of our ancestors, and our bare feet are
conscious of the sympathetic touch… (Chief Seattle 1854). [See Appendix]
A report from Secretary of Interior Thompson to the House Committee on Indian Affairs
in 1859 related that simply giving large amounts of money to be divided per capita had a
“deleterious effect upon their morals, and confirmed them in their roving, idle habits” (Cohen
[1942] 1971, 16). The secretary advised that gathering tribal members upon small reservations
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and allotting each individual member “tracts of land…with all the rights incident to an estate in
fee-simple, except the power of alienation” has worked much better (Cohen [1942] 1971, 16).
Early in the Civil War, concern arose when several tribes seemed to betray the United
States by signing treaties with the Confederacy. Caleb B. Smith, Secretary of Interior at the
time, questioned whether the federal government had made a mistake in making treaties with
quasi-independent tribes. He contended they had none of the elements of nationality; were within
the limits of the authority of the United States; and were endangered by the rapid progress of a
civilization that needed as much land to be cultivated as possible. Further, he asserted, even
though tribes have consented to removal in treaties, everyone knows that many only did so
because they had no genuine choice. Smith argued for an end to the concept of independent
nations, and instead, regard tribes as “wards of the government, entitled to its fostering care and
protection.” He suggested land suitable for use should be given them for their homes, along with
necessary supplies until they can be trained in self-sustenance (Cohen [1942] 1971, 16).
A report from the Secretary of Interior to the Committee on Indian Affairs in 1862
suggested it would be in everyone’s best interest if the states were allowed a working
relationship with the tribes as well, with “state legislation leading to intimate citizenship the goal
to be pursued” (Cohen [1942] 1971, 16):
Very much of the evil attendant upon the location of Indians within the limits of
States might be obviated if some plan could be devised whereby a more hearty
cooperation with government on the part of the States might he secured. It being a
demonstrated fact that Indians are capable of attaining a high degree of civilization
it follows that the time will arrive, as in the case of some of the tribes it has
doubtless now arrived, when the peculiar relations existing between them and the
federal government may cease, without detriment to their interests or those of the
community or State in which they are located: in other words, that the time will
come when in justice to them and to ourselves, their relations to the general
government should be identical with those of the citizens of the various States. In
this view, a more generous legislation on the part of most of the States within whose
limits Indians are located, looking to a gradual removal of the disabilities under
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which they labor, and their ultimate admission to all the rights of citizenship, as
from time to time the improvement and advancement made by a given tribe may
warrant, is earnestly to be desired, and would, I doubt not, prove a powerful
incentive to exertion on the part of the Indians themselves (Cohen [1942] 1971, 16).
On April 9, 1866, the Civil Rights Act was passed, protecting the constitutional rights of
all citizens...except for “Indians non-taxed”. The rationale was that tribal members had
allegiance to a pre-constitutional self-government. However, tribal members who chose to live
as taxed citizens were choosing to live under the United States’ jurisdiction and Constitution.
In 1868, the Fourteenth amendment was passed, allowing birthright citizenship. Now all
people born in the U.S. were to have citizenship and their civil rights protected, without regard to
race, color, or previous condition …except “Indians non-taxed.”
The last treaty signed between the United States and a tribe was with the Nez Perce in
1868. “Over a span of approximately 100 years, nearly 400 treaties were negotiated between
dozens of Indian tribes and the U.S. government, most during the westward expansion of the
mid-1800s. Nearly a third were treaties of peace. The rest were treaties ceding Indian land to the
U.S. government and establishing reservations. During this period, the United States paid more
than $800 million for the lands it purchased from tribes” (Lawrence 2002, 393). The Indian
Claims Commission concurred, stating in 1978 in its final report that the United States had
purchased 95 percent of its public land for a stated $800 million. The report stated this was done
through treaties and agreements with the tribes:
This figure and the treaties mitigate the myth of rude conquest and dispossession.
Jefferson observed … that the lands of this country were not taken from the Indians
by conquest as is 'so generally supposed. "I find in our historians and records,
repeated proofs of purchase, which cover a considerable part of the lower country;
and many more would doubtless be found on further search. The upper country, we
know, has been acquired altogether by purchase made in the most unexceptional
form." Thus the treaties were made and obligations incurred by the United States
Government (ICC 1978, 1).
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There were no treaties made with residents of what had been known as “Russia America”
– as the indigenous population had been under Russian rule until 1867, when the United States
purchased the land. There was no need to organize the groups onto reservations. The Alaskan
natives were classified “as ‘identifiable Indian groups,’ not ‘tribes’ in the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1936 and the later Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946” (Marston, 1984, pp. 384-385).
They were later identified as "Native Governmental Entities,” which “allowed them to receive
certain federal benefits but didn’t bestow a sovereign status” (Marston, 1984, p. 386).

The Indian Appropriations Act of 1871: Treaties Statute
According to the Final Report of the Indian Claims Commission in 1978:
Historical precedent and national policy called for the United States to acquire this
land by the legal forum of treaty-making and legislation rather than the simpler
method of conquest and confiscation. The separate Indian tribes were considered
as sovereign nations during the treaty-making period and in 370 treaties they
negotiated away nearly two billion acres of North America, leaving themselves 140
million acres at the end of that period in 1868. (The last treaty was made and ratified
in 1868, but the process was not formally ended until 1871, after which
Congressional and Executive "agreements" continued the procedure)(ICC 1978, 1).
The Indian Appropriations Act of 1871 brought an end to recognition of tribes as
independent, sovereign nations and with that, an end to making treaties with tribes. Stipulating
that no current treaties ratified prior to March 3, 1871, would be reversed, the Act stated:
…hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall
be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with
whom the United States may contract by treaty: Provided, further, that nothing
herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any
treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe
(1871).
Poore notes, “…tribes were no longer separate states as found in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia. This obviously was a substantial diminishment of retained sovereignty” (1998, 66).
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Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce said in 1879 of the diminishments:
Treat all men alike. Give them all the same law. Give them all an even chance to
live and grow. All men were made by the same Great Spirit Chief. They are all
brothers. The mother Earth is the Mother of all people, and people should have
equal rights upon it. We only ask an even chance to live as other men live (1877).
Chief Joseph echoed Frederick Douglass, who had similarly said in an 1865 speech
concerning newly emancipated slaves:
Do nothing with us! Your doing with us has already played the mischief with us.
Do nothing with us! If the apples will not remain on the tree of their own strength,
if they are worm-eaten at the core, if they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let
them fall! I am not for tying or fastening them on the tree in any way, except by
nature's plan, and if they will not stay there, let them fall. And if the negro cannot
stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on
his own legs! Let him alone!’ (Meyers 2011, 11)
While the tribes were no longer considered independent, sovereign nations, the federal
government allowed tribal leaders to have limited local jurisdiction. However, according to
Poore, this was not due to recognition of or a restoration of retained sovereignty. This type of
jurisdictional power was no different than that which Congress gave territories. As early as 1819
in McCulloch v. Maryland,31 the Court had found that Congress gave the tribes very limited
powers that were entirely subject to the United States constitution (1998, footnote 66, at 63). The
extent of their jurisdiction was also subject to change upon decision of Congress.
For example, in 1881, in the case Ex parte Crow Dog, the U.S. Supreme Court found the
federal government did not have jurisdiction over a tribal member who murdered another tribal
member. Indian on Indian crime was considered the jurisdiction of tribal leaders. As a result,
Congress passed the Major Crimes Act of 1885, which removed tribal jurisdiction over seven
felony crimes. Since then, the list of crimes subject to federal jurisdiction has grown to include:
…murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A
[aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a minor or ward, abusive
31

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324 (1819)
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sexual contact], incest, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious
bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery and a felony under section 661 of Title 18
[within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the taking
away with the intent to steal the personal property of another]32 (FOCSE 2005, 36).
Along with the Major Crimes Act, Congress has over the years passed various Trade and
Intercourse Acts that have increasingly called into question tribal sovereignty. “As time passed,
the allowable intrusion into Indian country and affairs increased” (J. A. Poore 1998, 66).
In 1886, United States v. Kagama upheld the Major Crimes Act, the 1871 Appropriations
Act, and Congress’ plenary power over tribes. The Court made clear that the power the federal
government had over the tribes was based on their location within U.S. boundaries, not due to
the commerce clause. According to the Court, the federal and state governments were the only
sovereigns (J. A. Poore 1995/1999, 20). The Court wrote:
But these Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States. The soil
and the people within these limits are under the political control of the government
of the United States, or of the states of the Union. There exists within the broad
domain of sovereignty but these two (Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379).

Moving Off the Reservation

The General Allotment (or Dawes) Act of 1887
Almost four decades after creating the reservation system, Senator Henry Laurens Dawes
sponsored the General Allotment Act,33 a bill fulfilling the intent of many treaties to provide

32
33

18 U.S.C. § 1153.
General Allotment Act 24 Stat 388
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land34 35 and tools necessary for people to gradually adapt to the prevailing economy.36 The Act
gave permission for reservation land to be surveyed and divided into equal parcels so titled
portions could be given to individual tribal members. The head of a household would receive 160
acres, a single adult or an orphan under the age 18 would receive 80 acres, and all others under
the age of 18 who were born prior to the date of the President directing an allotment on their

ARTICLE VI of the Laramie Treaty (1868): “If any individual belonging to said tribes of Indians, or legally
incorporated with them, being the head of a family, shall desire to commence farming, he shall have the privilege to
select, in the presence and with the assistance of the agent then in charge, a tract of land within said reservation, not
exceeding three hundred and twenty acres in extent, which tract, when so selected, certified, and recorded in the
"Land Book" as herein directed, shall cease to be held in common, but the same may be occupied and held in the
exclusive possession of the person selecting it, and of his family, so long as he or they may continue to cultivate it.
Any person over eighteen years of age, not being the head of a family, may in like manner select and cause to be
certified to him or her, for purposes of cultivation, a quantity of land, not exceeding eighty acres in extent, and
thereupon be entitled to the exclusive possession of the same as above directed” (United States 1868)
35
ARTICLE 2 of the Treaty with the Chippewa (1855): “And at such time or times as the President may deem it
advisable for the interests and welfare of said Indians, or any of them, he shall cause the said reservation… to be
surveyed; and assign to each head of a family, or single person over twenty-one years of age, a reasonable quantity
of land, in one body, not to exceed eighty acres in any case, for his or their separate use; and he may, at his
discretion, as the occupants thereof become capable of managing their business and affairs, issue patents to them for
the tracts so assigned to them, respectively; said tracts to be exempt from taxation, levy, sale, or feiture; and not to
be aliened or leased for a longer period than two years, at one time, until otherwise provided by the legislature of the
State in which they may be situate, with the assent of Congress. They shall not be sold, or alienated, in fee, for a
period of five years after the date of the patents; and not then without the assent of the President of the United States
being first obtained. Prior to the issue of the patents, the President shall make such rules and regulations as he may
deem necessary and expedient, respecting the disposition of any of said tracts in case of the death of the person or
persons to whom they may be assigned, so that the same shall be secured to the families of such deceased person;
and should any of the Indians to whom tracts may be assigned thereafter abandon them, the President may make
such rules and regulations, in relation to such abandoned tracts, as in his judgment may be necessary and proper”
(United States 1855).
36
ARTICLE 8 of the Treaty with the Sioux – Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands (1867) “All expenditures under the
provisions of this treaty shall be made for the agricultural improvement and civilization of the members of said
bands authorized to locate upon the respective reservations, as hereinbefore specified, in such manner as may be
directed by law; but no goods, provisions, groceries, or other articles—except materials for the erection of houses
and articles to facilitate the operations of agriculture—shall be issued to Indians or mixed-bloods on either
reservation unless it be in payment for labor performed or for produce delivered: Provided, That when persons
located on either reservation, by reason of age, sickness, or deformity, are unable to labor, the agent may issue
clothing and subsistence to such persons from such supplies as may be provided for said bands.” (United States
1867) and:
ARTICLE 9: “The withdrawal of the Indians from all dependence upon the chase as a means of subsistence being
necessary to the adoption of civilized habits among them, it is desirable that no encouragement be afforded them to
continue their hunting operations as means of support, and, therefore, it is agreed that no person will be authorized
to trade for furs or peltries within the limits of the land claimed by said bands, as specified in the second article of
this treaty, it being contemplated that the Indians will rely solely upon agricultural and mechanical labor for
subsistence…” (United States 1867)
34
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reservation, would receive 40 acres. Further, as some treaties had stipulated,37 38 land that was
left over after the allotment would be available to non-tribal members (Congress 1886).
Dawes and Senator Richard Coke, who had preceded Dawes as Chair of the Indian
Affairs subcommittee, both believed this law would “make Indians part of the nation, bringing
them under the "shelter" of the Constitution”39 (J. A. Poore 1998, 63-64) as well as the “laws of
the States and Territories in which the lands are situated” (Prucha 1976, footnote 72, at 237).
The Supreme Court in Montana v. United States40 agreed that the intent of the Act was to foster
assimilation. The Court stated:
…The policy of the [Allotment] Acts was the eventual assimilation of the Indian
population…throughout the congressional debates…it was assumed that the
‘civilization’ of the Indian population was to be accomplished, in part, by the
dissolution of tribal [political] relations… (1981, at 559, n. 9).
Further, the Court stressed in Montana that Congress never intended for tribes to have
regulatory authority over non-tribal members who purchased the former reservation land (J. A.
Poore 1998, 62). The court stated, “It defies common sense to suppose that Congress would
intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction
when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal
government” (Montana v. United States 1981).

Ninth proposal of the Agreement with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians, Appendix (1872): “At
the expiration of ten (10) years, the President of the United States shall sell or dispose of all the remaining or
unoccupied lands in the lake Traverse reservation, (excepting that which may hereafter be set apart for school
purposes;) the proceeds of the sale of such lands to be expended for the benefit of the members of said bands located
on said lake Traverse reservation; and, at the expiration of fifteen (15) years, the President shall sell or dispose of all
the remaining unoccupied lands (excepting that which may be hereafter set apart for school purposes) in the Devil’s
Lake reservation; the proceeds of the sale of such land shall be expended for the benefit of all members of said
bands who may be located on the said Devil’s Lake reservation” (United States 1872).
38
ARTICLE 6 Treaty with the Omaha (1854): “And the residue of the land hereby reserved, or of that which may
be selected in lieu thereof, after all of the Indian persons or families shall have had assigned to them permanent
homes, may be sold for their benefit, under such laws, rules or regulations, as may hereafter be prescribed by the
Congress or President of the United States” (United States 1854).
39
See Bordewich, supra note 5, at 119 (J. A. Poore 1998, 63).
40
Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9.
37
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That said – dicta elsewhere in the Montana opinion states that tribal governments have
retained a certain amount of sovereignty and can exert limited jurisdiction over non-members,
even on non-Indian fee lands. This jurisdiction would apply only when the non-tribal member
had voluntarily consented to a contract relationship or when the non-member was a clear danger
to the community (J. A. Poore 1998, footnote 63, at 62).
Poore also notes that in Hagen v. Utah,41 the Supreme Court held that Congress had
diminished the Uintah Indian Reservation when unalloted land was removed from tribal control.
The Court stated, “In light of our precedents, we hold that restoration of unalloted reservation
lands to the public domain evidences a congressional intent with respect to those lands
inconsistent with continuation of reservation status” (1998, 64). Not all tribes were subject to the
Dawes Act, however. Due to terms within several treaties, a few tribes were initially exempted
from the allotment process. Section Eight of the Dawes Act exempted what were known as the
“Five Civilized Tribes,” among a few others. Section Eight stipulates:
That the provisions of this act shall not extend to the territory occupied by the
Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Seminoles, and Osage, Miamies and
Peorias, and Sacs and Foxes, in the Indian Territory, nor to any of the reservations
of the Seneca Nation of New York Indians in the State of New York, nor to that
strip of territory in the State of Nebraska adjoining the Sioux Nation on the south
added by executive order (US Govt 2008).
On March 3, 1893, in effort to set the five tribes on the same path to individual selfsufficiency most other tribes were on, Congress appointed a commission to investigate rumored
troubles in Oklahoma Indian Country and assist them in the allotment process. The Commission
became known as the Dawes Commission, after Senator Dawes, its first chairman (NARA 2017).
The Commission later reported to Congress that the state of affairs on the reservations was tragic
and irreparable. The U.S. Supreme Court quoted from the Commission reports:

41

Hagen, 510 U.S. at 414. (1994)
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It is apparent to all who are conversant with the present condition in the Indian
territory that their system of government cannot continue. It is not only nonAmerican, but it is radically wrong, and a change is imperatively demanded in the
interest of the Indian and whites alike, and such change cannot be much longer
delayed. The situation grows worse and will continue to grow worse. There can be
no modification of the system. It cannot be reformed. It must be abandoned and a
better one substituted. That it will be difficult to do your committee freely admit,
but because it is a difficult task is no reason why Congress should not at the earliest
possible moment address itself to this question (Dawes Commission 1895)
(Stephens v. Cherokee Nation 1899, at 451).
The Commission also warned Congress that there was a danger of violence between
settlers and tribes if the situation continued:
…It cannot be possible that in any portion of this country, government, no matter
what its origin, can remain peaceably for any length of time in the hands of one
fifth of the people subject to its laws. Sooner or later violence, if nothing else, will
put an end to a state of affairs so abhorrent to the spirit of our institutions. But these
governments are of our own creation, and rest for their very being on authority
granted by the United States, who are therefore responsible for their character. It
is bound by constitutional obligations to see to it that government everywhere
within this jurisdiction rests on the consent of the governed. There is already painful
evidence that in some parts of the territory this attempt of a fraction to dictate terms
to the whole has already reached its limit, and, if left without interference, will
break up in revolution (Dawes Commission 1895) (Stephens v. Cherokee Nation
1899, 451-452).
The Curtis Act of 1898 invalidated the treaties that interfered with the allotment. The
Dawes Commission was now tasked with dividing the land of the Five Civilized Tribes into
parcels for individual members. While some saw the sinister motivation for the Allotment Act,
others saw it as the only possible path for a functioning society. Historian D. S. Otis wrote
concerning a hearing on the Dawes Act:
It makes understandable the entire subsequent working out of the allotment
program. It was apparent that the Indian system was being smashed by the white
economy and culture. Friends of the Indian, therefore, saw his one chance for
survival in his adapting himself to the white civilization. He must be taught
industry and acquisitiveness to fit him for his ‘ultimate absorption into the great
body of American citizenship.’ Making him a citizen and a voter would guarantee
to him the protection of the rules under which the competitive game of life was
played (Otis 1973).
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Indian Citizenship Act of 1924
Congress had chosen to grand citizenship to tribal members who received allotments or who
voluntarily moved away from Indian Country because it did not intend Indian Reservations or
tribal governments to be permanent. Poore notes that “Citizenship of Indians diminished or
eliminated tribal sovereignty that was inconsistent with the Constitutional rights of citizens” (J.
A. Poore 1998, 58). Poore explains:
The Acts themselves provided that the Indian citizens could not be deprived of
equal protection by either the state or territory in which they resided. The dicta in
Duro42 notwithstanding, traditional constitutional law principles, including equal
protection, would require that when Congress granted citizenship to all Indians, it
eliminated any power or retained sovereignty of tribes inconsistent with the
Constitution (J. A. Poore 1998, 61).
Further evidence of the diminishment of the reservation system is found in In re Heff
(1905).43 Citing the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court found in Heff that Congress intended
that when tribal members became United States citizens, they become citizens of the states and
territories where they reside (J. A. Poore 1998, footnote 71, at 64). The 14th Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Secondly, section 6 of the Dawes Act also pronounces:
That upon the completion of said allotments and the patenting of the lands to said
allottees, each and every member …to whom allotments have been made shall have
the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or
Territory in which they may reside; and no Territory shall pass or enforce any law
denying any such Indian within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. And
every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States to whom
42
43

495 U.S. 676 (1990).
In Re Heff 197 U.S. 488 (1905)
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allotments shall have been made under the provisions of this act, or under any law
or treaty, and every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States who
has voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart from
any tribe…is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is entitled to
all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens, whether said Indian has
been or not, by birth or otherwise, a member of any tribe of Indians within the
territorial limits of the United States without in any manner affecting the right of
any such Indian to tribal or other property (US Congress 1887).
Even before tribal members were given citizenship, the Supreme Court indicated all
citizens have the same rights. (J. A. Poore 1998, 60). In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall stated, “A...
citizen…becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and
standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not
authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights” (Osborn v. Bank of the United States
1824).
Nevertheless, tribal members were treated as though they were not covered by the
Constitution. Consequently, in 1924, Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,44
which granted citizenship to all resident “Indians” who up to that point had not been citizens.
Congress also removed the ground that had made clear their lack of citizenship. The parallel
Revenue Act of 1924 affirmed there was no longer any “Indians, non-taxed.” The Indian
Citizenship Act, also known as the “Snyder Act,” read:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all noncitizen Native Americans born within
the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be
citizens of the United States: Provided, That the granting of such citizenship shall
not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Native American to
tribal or other property (United States 1924).
Poore notes that Congress had granted Citizenship to some tribal members prior to 1924
with an understanding that the Constitution protections would apply to them. "Congress clearly

44

43 Stat. 253, Ch. 233 (1924)
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did not intend for Indians to be subject to unconstitutional actions of tribes when it began
granting citizenship to Indians" (J. A. Poore 1998, 60-61). Unfortunately, passing of the
citizenship act did not ensure Constitutional protections for all tribal members. Further, despite
the allotment, restrictions on trust property remained. Lawrence wrote:
In 1924, the Indian Citizenship Act extended national and state citizenship to all
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States who were not already
citizens and granted them the right to vote. This Act should have made Indians
equal to all other citizens of the United States, with the same Constitutional
protections, rights, and responsibilities. But the federal government has continued
to treat Indians separately from other citizens, especially if they live on reservations
(Lawrence 2002, 395).
According to Allen, International law and the origin of ‘title’ to North America are now
moot issues. Dr. Allen explains:
Technically, none of the titles apply today. They provide historical explanation, but
legal status now traces to the legislative grant of citizenship in 1924. Accordingly,
the discourse about treaty rights is mis-leading. The treaty commitments describe
moral commitments more than legal commitments and the sovereignty claims are
no stronger than the sovereignty recognized in the states (W. B. Allen 2018).

The Meriam Report of 1928
The Meriam Report was a comprehensive study on the economic and social conditions within
tribal communities in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The Institute for Government
Research (now known as the Brookings Institution) was asked to conduct the study in 1926
(NAU 2005) by Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work (The Institute for Government Research
1928, vii).
Technical Director, primary editor, and the man whom the report was nicknamed after,
Lewis Meriam, began work on the project on June 12, 1926 and additional staff began work in
October 1926. Field work began shortly after, in November 1926, and continued almost nonstop
for seven months. In that time, the staff visited ninety-five tribal jurisdictions including
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“reservations, agencies, hospitals, schools,” and many of the communities that tribal members
had migrated to. Almost all Western States with significant tribal populations were included.
Following the field survey, compilation of the report began in June 1927 (The Institute for
Government Research 1928, vii). Areas of interest to the survey staff included:
1) A General Policy for Indian Affairs
2) Health
3) Education
4) General Economic Conditions
5) Family and Community Life and the Activities of Women
6) The Migrated Indians
7) The Legal Aspects of the Indian Problem
8) The Missionary Activities among the Indians (1928, vii).
While it is said that Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier used the findings of this
report as foundation for the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (NAU 2005), it is interesting to
note aspects of the report that do not conform to Collier’s views concerning Indian Country. For
example, the Meriam report fully supported missionary work within the reservation system. The
report stressed the need for cooperation between the federal government, churches and
missionaries, noting that positive aspects of cooperation depend on spiritual qualities such as
“charity, fairmindedness, tolerance, forbearance, and a willingness to ignore minor differences
for the sake of achieving common ends” (The Institute for Government Research 1928, 812).
According to the report, adequate cooperation brings together different groups for the
purpose of discussing common ends and assists in avoiding misunderstanding of each other’s
point of view. For this reason, the report stated that missionaries facilitated cooperation and
understanding. The survey staff reported that many of the missionaries “were of noble blood and
had renounced titles and estates to engage in the work” (The Institute for Government Research
1928, 812). Further, they reported:

100

…nearly all were of such exceptional ability as to have commanded attention in
any community and to have possessed themselves of wealth and reputation, has
they so chosen; yet they deliberately faced poverty and sufferings, exile and
oblivion, ingratitude, torture, and death itself in the hope that some portion of a
darkened world might be made better through their effort (1928, 812).
The survey staff found the missionary activity dominated by “a high spirit of service,
sacrifice and devotion.” The report admitted that “isolated instances” of human traits such as
selfishness were bound to exist even in missionaries, but those instances were rare and “never
should be accepted as indicting missionaries as a class. The group as a whole is earnest, devoted
and self-sacrificing” (The Institute for Government Research 1928, 823). The activities the
missionaries engaged in were also said to be of an “extremely high order” and at times, their
work and equipment exceeded that of the government. The Ursuline Sister’s school in St.
Ignatius, Montana, is mentioned as a prime example, as well as Bloomfield, Oklahoma (1928,
823). The report notes that “Good lives are the most effective sermons. Indians, like all other
human beings, are more influenced by deeds than words.” Missionaries are “rich in a varied
expression of Christian love in the form of good works” (The Institute for Government Research
1928, 834).
The survey staff also interviewed “migrated Indians” and recorded their responses. The
report states that although most of those interviewed believed that the dishonesty and cheating by
Indian service officers was now - for the most part - a thing of the past, they remain wary due to
the exploitation in the past. This wariness was true even in those who had left the reservation
system to live in the city. Media attention concerning dishonest federal and state personnel and
the “failure of the courts to punish those in high positions” are cited as reason for the despair of
tribal members. Still, some tribal members who moved to the city told survey staff that some in
the Indian agency had tried to prevent them from giving a tribal point of view to the Indian
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office, even though they had been asked to by other tribal members. Interestingly, despite the
wariness, the report noted that both city-dwelling tribal members and their reservation
counterparts are often preyed upon by “glib talkers” who want them to make statements to
“magazines, newspapers, or the League of Nations” concerning the rights of tribal members”
(The Institute for Government Research 1928, 740). They are at “the mercy of all kinds of
attorneys who assure them of the validity of various apparently fantastic claims.” One tribal
member stated the Indians have confidence in those who damn the people they damn, and the
people the Indians damn are those in the Indian Bureau” (The Institute for Government Research
1928, 740). The report notes concerning those who were manipulating tribal members:
Because they play upon past wrongs in the handling of Indian affairs and can cite
present instances of injustice, unscrupulous persons without intention to deal with
present problems, or incompetent persons who can get no further than talk and
agitation have practically as much chance to secure leadership as have intelligent,
interested Indians and whites with the intention, ability, and resources for the study
and prosecution of legitimate claims through proper channels (1928, 741).
While some tribal members who are “spiritually tied to their people back on the
reservation” have seen the fallacy of giving everyone their fee patents and hoping for the best,
others “impatient of the initial delay for a well thought-out program, urge the compulsory
removal of children from reservation life so the next generation may go forward with less strain.”
When asked what effect that would have on the family, one tribal member stated and others
inferred, “The homes that are broken up are either unfit or practically non-existent…there is no
alternative to ruthless breaking away, although the Indian who successfully makes the break
should feel no obligation to help those left behind” (1928, 741).
Others mentioned that while Congress designated portions of the Indian appropriations
for “civilization purposes,” bureaucrats decide priorities and how that goal will be met. But
survey staff found the tribal members most often asked that federal government simply:
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1) Set aside the present denial of the Indian's right to a dignified means of
presenting to the agency or department his views and problems on matters
affecting his welfare.
2) Prevent the very general discourtesy, harshness, and unsympathetic attitude on
the part of agency employees.
3) Break down the refusal to explain to Indians the uncomprehended procedures
and inconsistent policies subject to arbitrary reversal.
4) Secure a determination of general or individual enrollment rights, without
Indians being saddled with court costs, and with such decisiveness that the
arbitrary charges and reversals of the government in the past may not reoccur,
and this by some other means than the government's present proposal that
Indians incur the expense of legal counsel so that the government may ascertain
the Indian's legal status and the accuracy of government solicitors' opinions
heretofore accepted by the government and sometimes later set aside.
5) Do away with the present practice of forcing the Indians to lease land they
desire to farm; or at least prevent leases and grazing permits at less than current
rates in the same locality.
6) Demand reliable bondsmen of lessors and provide for adequate procedures to
collect bond for breach of contract.
7) Secure the restriction of non-Indian cattle to the designated leased area so as to
prevent devastation of Indian ranges, and authorize the sale of predatory horses
that consume Indian ranges (The Institute for Government Research 1928, 742).
These requests aside, the survey staff found that federal Indian policy, including the loss
of individually allotted property, to this point had caused harm to tribal members and changes
were necessary. To this the report recommended immediate financial expansion in the activities
of the Indian office, including:
1) To improve the quantity, quality, and variety of diet available for Indian children
in boarding schools, seek from Congress at the earliest possible moment an
additional appropriation of one million dollars, to be immediately available.
2) For the directing, developmental, and planning work of the Service, seek from
Congress at the earliest possible moment, to be immediately available,
appropriations for the following purposes:
a. The establishment of the recommended Division of Planning and
Development, $250,000.
b. The employment of six medical specialists to aid the director of medical
work and for their necessary expenses, $50,000.
c. The employment of a senior personnel officer and an assistant personnel
officer and for their necessary expenses, $15,000.
d. The employment of a senior statistician and of statistical clerks and for the
purchase of statistical equipment, $20,000.
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3) For the general improvement of the Indian Service, seek from Congress for the next
fiscal year an emergency lump sum appropriation of $5,000,000, to be available
for:
a. Classification and salary standardization of existing positions in the Indian
Service according to the Classification Act of 1923, such classification and
salary standardization to be subject to the approval of the Federal Personnel
Classification Board and to be based on the duties and qualifications which
will be required to bring the positions up to a reasonable standard.
b. The creation of new positions in the fields of health, economic
advancement, education, and social development at salaries to be fixed
according to the new Indian Service classification, as approved by the
Federal Personnel Classification Board.
c. Bringing institutions already authorized by law which are to be kept as
permanent to a reasonable standard with respect to state of repair and
equipment.
d. Establishing public health clinics.
e. Adding additional grades to existing Indian day schools, opening new day
schools and providing school transportation for day school pupils, with a
provision that not to exceed $300,000 may be spent for necessary
construction.
f. Hiring additional labor force at the boarding schools to reduce the amount
of purely productive labor required of Indian children with the provision
that not more than $200,000 may be expended for the purchase of laborsaving machinery.
4) Take up with the United States Civil Service Commission the matter of securing
promptly an adequate supply of properly qualified employees for the positions as
reclassified with the new salaries:
a. Doctors
b. Dentists
c. Public health nurses
d. Graduate general nurses
e. Dental hygienists
f. Agricultural demonstration workers
g. Employment agents
h. Home demonstration workers
i. Social caseworkers
j. Recreation workers
k. Schoolteachers
i. School supervisors
l. Industrial teachers of various types
m. Director of boys' activities in boarding schools
n. Director of girls' activities in boarding schools.
(The Institute for Government Research 1928, 53-55)
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Nevertheless, in strong contest to Collier’s view, the general recommendations of the
report also proposed an end to federal administration of tribal concerns, gradually replacing it
with state administration. The report states:
That it is in general highly desirable that the states should as rapidly as possible
assume responsibility for the administration of activities which they can effectively
perform alike for whites and for the Indians with a single organization, with the
exception of activities that are directly concerned with Indian property. Experience
tends to demonstrate that national control and supervision of property must be about
the last of the activities transferred to the states. To avoid any possibility of
misunderstanding regarding the position taken with respect to the taxation of
Indians, it should be clearly stated that it is regarded as highly desirable that the
Indians be educated to pay takes and to assume all the responsibilities of
citizenship. The survey staff by no means advocates the permanent existence of
any body of tax-exempt citizens or a policy of indefinitely doing for people what
they should be trained to do for themselves. The matter of taxation, however, like
other problems in the Indian Service, should be approached from the educational
standpoint. In the first lessons in taxation the relationship between the tax and the
benefit derived from it by the Indians should be direct and obvious. The form of
the tax should be one that has real regard for the capacity of the Indian to pay. The
old general property tax has many defects as a system for well-established white
communities; it is often ruinous as a first lesson in taxation for an Indian just
stepping from the status of an incompetent ward of the government to one of full
competency. His chief asset is land which bears the full brunt of his tax, and he has
relatively small income from which to meet it. An income tax would be far better
for the Indian just emerging from the status of incompetency than the general
property tax. What is advocated is not that the Indian be exempt from taxation, but
that he be taxed in a way that does not submerge him.
A few words should also be added to prevent misunderstanding with respect
to the position taken in the matter of cooperation with the states. Such cooperation
is highly desirable. Ultimately most of the Indians will merge with the other
citizens and will secure government service mainly from the state and local
governments. The sooner the states and counties can be brought to the point where
they will render this service and the Indians to the point where they will look to the
government of the community in which …they live, the better (The Institute for
Government Research 1928, 99).
The Meriam Report concluded that the basic weakness of federal Indian policy, or
“Indian Administration,” was that the past emphasis had usually been on “the Indian's property
rather than on the Indian himself.” (NAU 2005). According to the American Indian Policy
Review Commission (AIPRC) a few decades later, “…the Meriam Report recommended that ‘no
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effort be devoted toward building up an independent organization in such cities for migrated
Indians, but rather toward establishing cooperative relations with existing agencies which serve
the population as a whole’ (AIPRC 1977, 431).
The Institute published its findings and submitted its report, officially called “The
Problem of Indian Administration," to Secretary Work on February 21, 1928.
Following the Meriam Report, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs presented
Resolution 79 to conduct a general survey of tribes and tribal members across the United States
to assess their condition and needs. This survey, which lasted over a decade, resulted in an
extensive report, which later informed the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. “This 41-part
report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs details the conditions of life and the
effects of policies enacted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on Native Americans. It provide
insights into many major tribes: Sioux, Navaho, Quapaw, Chickasaw, Apache, Pueblo, Ute,
Cherokee, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kickapoo, Klamath, and many others” (US Congress. Senate
1929). This survey will be explored more deeply in a later paper.

Assimilation Stopped: The Reservation System Reinforced

Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934
According to former Montana State Representative Rick Jore, many officials today believe
Indian treaties were intended to create "permanent homelands" for the tribes. However, Jore
maintains this is incorrect. He asserts:
They were intended to transition the tribes away from a ‘tribal’ and ‘nomadic’
culture into a ‘private property, agrarian’ culture so as to ‘assimilate’ them into the
dominant culture/law system. This effort culminated in the 1924 Indian Citizenship
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Act but was then reversed somewhat by the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act45 when
‘severability’ (allotment) was stopped and the ‘remaining surplus lands’ within
reservations was ‘restored’ to tribal ownership (Jore 2016).
Allen comments that “The 1924 blanket grant of citizenship to all American Indians
proved to be the gift of an ‘Indian giver,’ for in 1934 Congress passed the IRA …and
…reasserted authority over tribes as wards of the federal government” (2010, 21).
While under the premise of increasing tribal self-government, Congress and tribal leaders
knew 85 years ago that the IRA – the ‘Indian New Deal’ under Franklin Roosevelt – would rerenew and re-extend federal “guardianship” control over tribal members. A 1934 fact sheet put
out by the Mission Indian Agency in Riverside, California, stated:
This bill specifically provides, in section 11 of title 1, that Federal guardianship of
Indians and tax exemption of Indian lands shall be continued. It does offer a way
in which Indians may, if they wish, bring an end to objectionable features of the
present Federal guardianship by gradually assuming local control over matters
which the Indian Office now handles (Mission Indian Agency 1934).
Attorney, professor of Philosophy, and later author of the Handbook of Federal Indian
Law, Felix S. Cohen was primary drafter of the IRA. Collier, using the Meriam Report as basis,
wanted assimilation to be abandoned. Cohen was brought in to help do that.
According to Kingfisher, the IRA “was drafted without any direct input from, let alone in
consultation with, Native People.” He states Cohen, Collier, and Solicitor Nathan Margold “saw
Native involvement as unnecessary when drafting this important piece of legislation.” Tribal
governments only learned of it after the bill had already been submitted to the Indian Affairs
Committees; amended and passed. It was only after everything was finished that tribes were able
to weigh in (Kingfisher, 2016, pp. 92-93).

45

Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934), also known as the Wheeler-Howard Bill
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Brett W. Curry, a reviewer of historian Dalia Tsuk Mitchell’s Cohen biography relates,
“Aided by Cohen’s pragmatism and determination, Congress passed and President Roosevelt
signed the IRA into law in 1934. However, in the wake of contentious congressional hearings
…a number of Cohen’s most radical proposals were excised from the final bill” (Curry 2007).
Attorney Donald C. Mitchell explains that Section 2 of Title 1 originally authorized the
Secretary of Interior to allow charters granting “such powers of government…as may seem
fitting in the light of the experience, capacities, and desires of the Indians concerned.” Section 3
of Title 1 then authorized the charter to “’prescribe a form of government adapted to the
[Indians’] needs, traditions, and experience,’ ‘specify the powers of self-government to be
exercised by the chartered community,’ and ‘provide for the planned extension of these powers
as the community offers evidence of capacity to administer them’” (Mitchell 2016, 18). Senator
Wheeler objected to these sections as well as several others. The bill that was eventually signed
into law was not the extension of power what Collier had wanted.
However, Section 16, authorizing the adoption of tribal constitutions, had remained in the
bill. The Constitution was permitted to vest three “inconsequential powers” to the tribe. Four
months later, the DOI published a legal opinion concerning the “Powers of Indian Tribes.” The
opinion, written by Cohen, purported to analyze what Congress had meant by the term “existing
law” in section 16 (Mitchell 2016, 18-19). In doing this, according to Mitchell, Cohen
“intentionally misconstrued” the intent of Senator Wheeler and the other members of the Senate
and House Committees on Indian Affairs “…to give Indian tribes the legal authority” that
Wheeler and the other members “intentionally withheld” (Mitchell 2016, 19). Cohen wrote:
…those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general
delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished…What is not expressly
limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty… (Mitchell 2016, 19).
108

According to Mitchell, the retained inherent tribal sovereignty did not come through
Congress, courts or historical record. It was an opinion written by a lone bureaucrat in 1934.
A report by the Department of Interior ten years after implementation of the IRA noted
its purpose was “to conserve and develop Indian lands and resources; to extend to Indians the
right to form business and other organizations; to establish a credit system for Indians; to grant
certain rights of home rule to Indians; to provide for vocational education for Indians; and for
other purposes” (Haas 1947). The National Congress of American Indians describes it this way:
“The principal goal of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was to halt and reverse the abrupt
decline in the economic, cultural, governmental, and social well-being of Indian tribes caused by
the disastrous federal policy of ‘allotment’ and sale of reservation lands” (NCAI 2017).
At this point, many tribal members had already taken their families and left the
reservation system, never to return. Nonetheless, Lawrence contends the IRA “moved away from
assimilation, again made Indians wards of the federal government, and provided for placing
previously allotted land back into federal trust, with the federal government, not Indian people,
holding the title.” According to Lawrence, it also established a process for landless tribes to
become federally recognized and obtain land that would then be put under federal control. With
the help of the IRA, “reservations expanded an estimated 7.6 million acres between 1933 and
1950” but at the same time, “BIA authority, programs, and staff were also expanded. Today,
there are approximately 53 million acres of land in federal trust status for Indian tribes”
(Lawrence 2002, 395-396).
The federal government’s tenth year study also cautioned that Tribal policies and powers
are limited within the IRA, and tribal constitutions, by-laws and charters do not give tribal
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councils power to control tribal members except in certain matters agreed upon by the tribal
members:
They do not interfere with the pursuit by the members of their own private
objectives except in such ways and to such an extent as the members themselves
have agreed. They do not interfere with allotment rights or shares in tribal benefits.
The property with which the Tribal Council may deal is only the property of the
tribe as a whole, not that of the individual members (Haas 1947).
While the Supreme Court recognized that the policy of allotment was repudiated in 1934
by the IRA (Montana v. United States 1981, at 559, n. 9), Poore argues, Cohen notwithstanding,
that the ‘repudiation’ did not result in reinstatement of any ‘retained inherent sovereign’ power.”
Poore contends that Congress, through the IRA, merely offered new, limited power to tribes
along with possibility of restoring the reservation systems (J. A. Poore 1998, 63).
The question of power and jurisdiction is pressing. According to Kingfisher, the same
month that Cohen took his position as head of the Department of Justice’s Indian Law Survey in
1939, Collier’s office received notice of a court case “that was not covered by the 1885 Major
Crimes Act.” The question posed was under which jurisdiction may a tribal member wife obtain
a divorce from a non-tribal member husband. The situation was further complicated by the fact
the husband had already “abandoned his wife and left the reservation.” The tribal courts did not
have jurisdiction under current statutes (Kingfisher 2016, 168-169). Kingfisher writes:
Despite the long history of intermarriage between Natives and non-Natives of
various tribes, especially among members of the Five Civilized Tribes, or the status
Freedmen who married other African Americans, the Indian Reorganization Act,
did not consider, let alone address the issue of …jurisdiction …regarding marriage
to non-tribal members. This in turn impacted other issues such as determining tribal
enrollment and heirship issues, especially in those instances when a non-Native or
male from another tribe married into a previously matriarchal society where
membership was traced through female family members. Instead…Cohen …
imposed a patrilineal family structure on tribes who might not have such rigid
concepts (2016, 169).
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Further, by the time the IRA was passed, many non-tribal members had become
established landowners within reservation boundaries. According to Tim Malone, Washington
State’s Assistant Attorney General in the 1980’s, the IRA stopped erosion of the “Indian land
base,” but it did not “restore the status quo…The non-Indians who were invited onto the
reservations stayed there” (Malone 1988, 5). This, according to Malone, presented the first of the
two major constitutional problems:
Do these tribal governments, revitalized as they are under the new federal policy
adopted in the 1930’s, have governmental power over the non-Indians who remain
on the reservations? That problem, I suggest, is becoming more acute each year, as
Tribes claim the power to tax these non-Indians, to regulate their lands, to regulate
and even take over their water supplies, and to make these non-Indians subject to
tribal courts (Malone 1988, 5).
Tribal laws, regulations and courts grew in strength and number under the provisions of
the IRA, but with this, concern that the civil rights of non-tribal members might not be protected.
The IRA had also brought employment preferences into the reservation system, generating
concerns of job discrimination against non-tribal members who were also low-income and in
need of jobs. The preferences, however, were to ensure tribal members had opportunity for
positions in local administration, allowing input into policies that would affect them. It also
provided opportunities for income and economic growth within businesses located on tribal land.
Nevertheless, the BIA initially ignored IRA preferences in hiring, so tribal members
brought suit in the 70’s. Law Professor Sarah Krakoff wrote that this forced the BIA to adopt a
new policy:
To be eligible for preference in appointment, promotion, and training, an individual
must be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a Federallyrecognized tribe.” The Supreme Court in Mancari (1974)46 unanimously upheld
this preference because it relied on a political distinction—membership in a
federally recognized tribe—rather than a racial one (Krakoff 2017, 503).

46

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535(1974)
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The second constitutional issue noted by Malone was a “growing industry targeting offreservation, non-tribal customers. State environmental protections can be ignored, and cigarettes
and alcohol have been sold tax-free to non-Indians” (Malone 1988, 6).
Malone also predicted in 1988 that tribal governments, with their competitive advantage
in the casino industry, would essentially set state policy in relation to gambling. This would be
because the protections many treaties had established preventing white people from owning land
or doing business within reservation boundaries were now broken down. Tribal governments
were now increasingly pushing for jurisdiction over non-tribal members, as well as the ability to
be legal havens for non-tribal businesses wanting to avoid state taxes or regulations (Malone
1988, 7).
Malone suggested businesses such as Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical, St. Regis Paper,
U.S. Oil and Refining, Cavenham Industries, and Chemical Processors, Ltd. All seemed to have
located within reservation boundaries to avoid state environmental regulations (Malone 1988,
18). Casinos have also enjoyed a certain amount of freedom from state taxes and regulations
when locating within tribal boundaries.
Between non-tribal members who were already homesteaded and new businesses moving
in, tribal governments needed to make clear within their constitutions who was a member and
who was not. The IRA had established that each tribal government could now independently
determine who was eligible for enrollment. Most tribes decided that at least ¼ blood quantum
was necessary for membership. The Northern Ute tribe had the strictest criteria, requiring 5/8
blood quantum. Their membership numbers in 2013 were around 3000. Other tribes determined
there would be no blood quantum at all – only the requirement that one’s blood line be traceable
back to a historical membership roll. For example, the Cherokee tribe requires that heritage be

112

directly traced to the Dawes Roll. With that requirement, their membership has grown from
40,000 to well over 300,000 in 15 years (Cherokee Nation 2019) and currently includes
thousands of children with as little as 1% heritage. Their membership already primarily consists
of citizens with dominant European heritage, and in years to come, the percentage of actual tribal
heritage will be even less. Several families with no living memory of relationship with the tribe
have found their children or grandchildren suddenly subject to the jurisdiction of the Cherokee
tribe when those children were in need of social services care, or if the parents considered giving
a newborn up for adoption (CAICW 2014).

Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1942)
Almost every agency of federal government has departments working to ensure their programs
meet the legal requirements for Indian Country. Having a manual that list treaties, statutes and
regulations is essential. Just a few of the government agencies whose policies and decisions
affect Indian Country are “the U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Commerce,
Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and Human
Services, Department of Energy and many others, including, of course, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs” (Tribal Court Clearinghouse, 2014).
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law has come to be known as the “bible” of
federal Indian law. According to Malone, “…the Marshall-Cohen view, as accepted in modern
times…decides or directly implicates each of the following central issues” (Malone 1988, 8):
•
•
•

First, tribal powers are defined initially by looking to the entire store of
authority possessed by any nation, not by searching for federal statutes
establishing tribal prerogatives.
Second, Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity.
Third, tribes can exert regulatory authority over landowners with tribal territory
because tribes are governments, not just proprietors.
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•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Fourth, limits on the powers of states and the United States in the Constitution
do not restrict Indian tribes.
Fifth, tribal existence depends on the tribes’ own will, not on recognition by the
United States.
Sixth, since tribes are separate sovereigns, general grants of federal jurisdiction
do not allow for judicial review of tribal actions.
Seventh, tribes possess the inherent authority to adopt regulatory laws without
the approval of the Department of the Interior.
Eighth, tribal courts, as the judicial arms of the local sovereigns in Indian
country, are the proper courts to develop the factual records in the first instance
when the extent of tribal authority is challenged in federal court.
Ninth, tribal resource rights are measured in part by looking to the intent of the
tribes - - as inherent sovereigns possessing such rights before relations with the
United States - - at the time treaties of agreements were negotiated with the
United States.
Last, the fact of independent governmental authority allows courts to draw
analogies between tribes and cities, states, and even the United States in order
to justify exercises of tribal powers” ( (C. Wilkinson 1967, 62-63) (Malone
1988, 8) Bulleting added).

Felix S. Cohen had an incredibly quick mind - graduating from New York City College
“magna cum laude, just before his nineteenth birthday” (Cohen [1942] 1971, viii).47 From there
he went on to receive his Master of Philosophy at Cambridge by age of 20, completed his PhD
residence at age of 21, his PhD from Harvard at age 22, and his Law degree from Columbia Law
School two years later.
Kingfisher notes that it was while studying philosophy at Harvard that Cohen became
interested in legal realism and legal pluralism. “Legal realism,” according to Cornell’s Wex
Dictionary, is the “A theory that all law derives from prevailing social interests and public
policy. According to this theory, judges consider not only abstract rules, but also social interests
and public policy when deciding a case” (Legal Inf Inst 2019). “Legal pluralism,” according to
Kingfisher, is the perspective that “society contained and should contain multiple centers of self-

47

Cohen biography, within 1971 edition of 1942 version, reprinted from Rutgers Law Review, Volume IX, pp.34553 (Winter 1954).
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government,” combining experiences and viewpoints for the benefit of society as a whole
(Kingfisher, 2016, p. 43). In law school, Cohen began incorporating legal pluralism into his
writing.
Curry contends it would be good to know the “sequence of events that led a man with no
policy specialization to Interior and, specifically, to a position of responsibility over Indian
affairs” (Curry 2007). As a proponent of legal pluralism, Cohen was in the company of several
of the most progressive individuals of his time. He was acquainted with the founder of the
American Civil Liberties Union, Roger Baldwin; was influenced by a leading American socialist,
Norman Thomas; and had met Oliver Wendell Holmes, who sought to rid jurisprudence of the
principles of natural law and natural rights (Curry 2007). Cohen served a brief season as a law
apprentice for a Justice on the New York Supreme Court and about a year in private practice
before he was asked to assist with the ‘New Deal’ and work for the Department of Interior under
the new Roosevelt administration ([1942] 1971, viii-ix):
The tremendous variety of administrative and legal problems that came within the
jurisdiction of the Interior Department, and in which Felix Cohen had an important
part, included territorial problems… Puerto Rico … Alaska, the Virgin Islands,
martial law in Hawaii…the Philippines; problems of the conservation of our natural
resources…; atomic energy legislation; problems involving immigration,
minorities, fair employment practices; …and the many problems of Indian
administration involving our first Americans – problems of law and order, of selfgovernment, of eco-nomic welfare, of Indian land titles and treaty rights, and of the
final disposition of tribal claims against the Government.
In 1939 he became a Special Assistant to the Attorney General on loan for
one year to head the Indian Law Survey of the Department of Justice. With the
assistance of a colleague and friend of long standing, Theodore H. Haas…he
compiled a 46-volume collection of Federal laws and treaties, and on the basis of
this special study prepared a Handbook of Federal Indian Laws which has since
become a standard source book in Indian law.
At the Interior Department, Felix Cohen achieved a measure of renown not
only as a lawyer and legal draftsman, but also as an administrator of one of the
largest legal staffs in the government about 250 lawyers with one of the most
successful litigation records of any Department.
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…He resigned from the Department of the Interior on January 2, 1948, to
re-enter the private practice of law, and was given the distinguished service award,
Interior's largest honor, by the Secretary of Interior on March 16, 1949.
The first case he argued in court as a private attorney was one of which he
was justly proud, the test case which secured for Indians the right to vote in the two
states that still denied them their constitutional right as late as July 1948…He
became general counsel to several Indian tribes and to the Association on American
Indian Affairs. In that capacity he argued cases which won not only the right to
vote, but also to participate in social security programs in states where such rights
had been denied (Cohen [1942] 1971, ix).
Cohen enjoyed 15 years working for the Department of Interior as a major architect for
both the IRA and legislation concerning the Indian Claims Commission of 1946. However, his
brief stint as head the Indian Law Survey with the Department of Justice had not ended well.
Mitchell contends that Cohen, while compiling documents for the Justice Department’s Indian
Law Survey in 1939, had again played sleight of hand (Mitchell 2016, 20).
Cohen had been asked by the DOJ to organize the vast number of treaties, statutes,
regulations and legal opinions that made up “Indian Law” into a manual that the department
could use as a functional resource. As Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes later explained in the
forward to Cohen’s Handbook:
Such…is the complexity of the body of Indian law, based upon more than 4,000
treaties and statutes and upon thousands of judicial decisions and administrative
rulings, rendered during a century and a half, that one can well understand the vast
ignorance of the subject that prevails even in ordinarily well-informed quarters. For
more than a century, commissioners of Indian affairs have appealed for aid in
reducing this unmanageable mass of materials to some orderly form. Yet during
that period none of the attempts to compile a simple manual of the subject was
carried to completion (Cohen [1942] 1971, 16).
Yet, Kingfisher states, despite the complexity, Cohen did not ask for help from historians
or make extensive use of the Library of Congress (Kingfisher 2016, 187). In April of 1939,
Norman Littell had come on as a new Assistant Attorney General and head of the DOJ Land’s
Division, which oversaw Cohen’s work. Littell initially supported the creation of the manual,
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stating, “[T]he present confusion of the law invites litigation, and a clarifying manual currently
maintained would seem to be an essential instrument…” (Mitchell 2016, 20). But instead of
compiling an objective tool for the use of the Land Division, Cohen, who, “according to historian
Dr. Christian W. McMillian, ‘had never given the “Indian Problem” a shred of thought, much
less met an Indian before he came to work for the government’” (Kingfisher, 2016, p. 3) told
Littell:
…he was writing was a book that ‘would primarily fulfill for Indian law the
function of a textbook in other branches of law, such as evidence or contracts.’
Even more important, rather than describing what Indian law was, Cohen wanted
his book to describe what he thought Indian law should be (Mitchell 2016, 20).
After having read a draft of the chapters Cohen and his team had written, an aide tasked
with monitoring the work told Littell:
All the material submitted gives evidence of inadequate research and lack of
experience in the preparation of a law book designed to serve as a complete and
accurate handbook for lawyers engaged in actual litigation. Difficult and complex
problems are casually answered in the handbook by cursory paragraphs. General
propositions of law are stated repeatedly without citation of authority. Citations that
are made do not support the propositions for which they are cited (Mitchell 2016,
21).
Kingfisher, having examined Cohen’s personal papers, notes a certain amount of
disorder48 in Cohen’s office. In an undated memorandum to Margold, Cohen admits “actual
expenditures of the Survey were consistently under… budget estimations since various legal and
clerical positions… were unfilled for substantial periods of time” (Kingfisher 2016, 138). Little’s
assistant noted:
…the difficulties inherent on a project of this magnitude would seem impossible to
treat the subject matter adequately within the time contemplated by a staff such as
has been assigned this Survey. Indeed, many persons familiar with the problems
have expressed the view that the subject matter is so vast – it cuts through the entire
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Kingfisher notes at 138: Box 12 Folder 169 of the Legal Career: Indian Law Survey of Cohen’s personal papers.
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field of law – that no staff could ever reduce it to an adequate handbook of usable
proportions (2016, 163).
Littell terminated the project. Cohen returned to the DOI with all his materials, and his
“Handbook of Federal Indian Law,” was subsequently published under the DOI instead of the
DOJ. This treatise, which reiterated his assertion that the powers of tribal government were not
“delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished,” was disseminated to each of the Supreme Court
justices and was quickly embraced as a valuable reference (Mitchell 2016, 21). It was a unique
and welcome resource, despite having only two citations of authority for his assertion on retained
sovereignty: the legal opinion he himself had written following enacting of the IRA in 1934, and
an article he had written 1940 for the Minnesota Law Review (Mitchell 2016, 21). Nevertheless,
Margold cautioned:
This handbook does not purport to be a cyclopedia. It does not attempt to say the
last word on the varied legal problems which it treats. If one who seeks to track
down a point of federal Indian law finds in this volume relevant background,
general perspective, and useful leads to authorities, the handbook will have served
the purpose for which it was written (Kingfisher 2016, 136).
Having had this apparent success, Cohen supervised another pluralist vision for the DOI
– the Alaska Development Plan. However, this effort was not successful, and Cohen began to
“recalibrate his pluralist vision.” Further, President Truman’s Interior Department was not as
welcoming of Cohen’s focus, instead “opting to view all groups through a single prism” (Curry
2007). Consequently:
Cohen became increasingly cynical, “no longer trust[ing] policymakers to create a
plural polity” (p.264) He left Interior in 1948, convinced that his efforts to promote
pluralism there could no longer be successful. Moreover, informed by his
experiences, Cohen abandoned the belief that economic and political self-reliance
among groups would, by itself, promote political tolerance (Curry 2007).
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Curry explains that with the Warren Court’s “increasing emphasis on civil liberties and
rights at home and a growing international emphasis on the protection of individual human
rights,” Cohen’s focus on pluralist “group-centeredness” was no longer popular. With American
law becoming more individualistic, Cohen shifted focus to figuring out why law and society
were unable to “accommodate diverse interests and values” and how to accommodate the values
of diverse groups when society and the legal system are focused on individual rights (2007).
The increasing emphasis on individual rights drove Cohen’s handbook out of print within
15 years. In its place, published 5 years after Cohen had passed away with lung cancer, was a
1958 edition written by others but still called “Cohen’s” handbook. This did not sit well with
those who fully supported Cohen’s version of Indian law. Permission was obtained by the Law
University of New Mexico to reprint the 1942 version. Robert L. Bennett, Director of the
American Indian Law Center at the University of New Mexico and Frederick M. Hart, Professor
of Law at the University wrote a forward for the reprint:
… For a forward-looking book to be lost or neglected is not only a loss to its author
but to society. Such a book is Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
which has all but disappeared. First published in 1942, it has overcome a far too
modest title, a difficult birth caused by war time shortages, and a bureaucratic
attempt to discredit it. For those who know the book, it is an out-standing scholarly
work by a truly significant American legal scholar… It required realization that any
domain of law, but particularly the intricacies and peculiarities of Indian Law,
demanded an appreciation of history and understanding of the economic, social,
political and moral problems in which the more immediate problems of that law are
entwined.
Felix Cohen's book is written as much for today as for 1942 since the
problems that faced the Indian community in 1942 and the choices needed to solve
them have changed little. Partly because of Cohen's many years of labor for the
Indian, the dominant society is more. willing to face these problems today.
Unfortunately, the wisdom with which Cohen approached the recurrent questions
has been largely unavailable for two reasons: (1) his Handbook of Federal Indian
Law went out-of-print and (2) it is frequently confused with another, less significant
volume.
In the early fifties, both the executive and the legislative branches of the
Federal Government determined to follow a new policy concerning Indians: a
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policy of terminating all tribes and ending Federal services to Indians. Cohen's
book, which had been originally published under the auspices of the Department of
the Interior, then proved embarrassing. Based on his painstaking studies and drawn
from his rich background in law, philosophy, anthropology, and international
affairs, it presented legal and moral arguments demonstrating that the American
Indian was possessed of certain rights, among them self-governance and selfdetermination. The response of the Department of the Interior was simple: rewrite
Cohen's book and discredit the original under the guise of a revision. The argument
was that the Cohen work was outdated and failed to take into account the substantial
changes that were claimed to have taken place during the intervening decade. But
the introduction to the vulgate version clarifies the main purpose of the re-vision.
It claims that one of the reasons for the rewriting was "for the purpose of
foreclosing, if possible, further uncritical use of the earlier edition by judges,
lawyers and laymen.
Soon the 1958 "edition of what was once Felix Cohen's work was the only
book available on Federal Indian Law, and after the Government Printing Office's
supply of this edition was exhausted, it was reissued by two other publishers. It
became confused with the original work and is now often referred to as "Felix
Cohen's Book" on Indian Law. But it is not. Many of the carefully considered
arguments that were made by Cohen were omitted, and the theme of this 1958
edition is entirely different. From a well-reasoned, balanced discussion of the
countless undecided questions (most of which are still unresolved), the book
deteriorated into a volume with a new and constant theme: The Federal
Government's power over Indian Affairs is plenary.
The 1958 edition is not Felix Cohen's work. Most people interested in
Indian Affairs have not had access to his outstanding analysis of the applicable law
and of the basic questions. The Indian policy of the early fifties has now been
discredited and both major political parties disclaim it. With hope and confidence
that Felix Cohen's work will benefit this and later generations, the American Indian
Law Center has joined with the University of New Mexico Press in bringing back
into print this volume, Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, exactly as
he wrote it (Cohen [1942] 1971, v-vi).
The Publisher’s note to this edition reads:
Long out of print since it was originally published in 1942 by the U.S. Government
Printing Office, this classic work on Federal Indian law, and the whole legal history
of Indian-white relations, is here republished in a facsimile edition. It is, as Felix
Frankfurter observed, the only book that has ever made sense and order from "the
vast hodgepodge of treaties, statutes, judicial and administrative rulings, and
unrecorded practice in which the intricacies and perplexities, confusions and
injustices of the law governing Indians lay concealed.”
Felix Cohen [1907-1953] wrote this monumental book when he was serving
under Harold L. Ickes in the Department of the Interior as chairman of its board of
appeals. His Handbook, Ickes pointed out in the foreword, "should give to Indians
useful weapons in the continual struggle that every minority must wage to maintain
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its liberties, and...it should [also] give to those who deal with Indians, whether on
behalf of the federal or state governments or as private individuals, the
understanding which may prevent oppression.”
This Handbook should not be confused with the vulgate version issued by
the Government Printing Office in 1958, and since then reprinted by two other
publishers. That expurgated edition was rewritten, according to its introduction,
"for the purpose of foreclosing, if possible, further uncritical use of the earlier
[1942] edition by judges, lawyers, and laymen.” As Philip S. Deloria of the Yale
Law School observes comparing these editions, in the current 1958 book, “Tribal
power and tribal abilities are downgraded; a preoccupation with federal power over
the tribes is evident; Cohen's description of history is mitigated without specific
disagreement or citation to opposing authorities. Where Cohen sees the tribes as
sovereign peoples, entitled to self-government and responsible for their own
destinies, the 1958 edition tends to see them as thorns in the side of the American
system of government.”
The difficult problems and choices facing Indians and whites alike have
changed little since1942. What has changed is the willingness of the dominant
society to accept responsibility for the situation and for working out with the
Indians just and effective solutions to their problems. For such cooperation Felix
Cohen's Handbook is as needed and useful a guide today as it was when written.
With the hope that Cohen's work will live again to benefit this and later
generations, the American Indian Law Center of the University of New Mexico,
directed by Robert L. Bennett and Frederick M. Hart, has joined with the University
of New Mexico Press in reprinting the Handbook of Federal Indian Law exactly as
Felix S. Cohen wrote it (Cohen [1942] 1971, xviii, Publisher's Note).
Cohen’s work did live on. The focus of the Handbook, just as the history of federal
Indian policy itself, seemed to fluctuate with the waves of new administrations. Cohen’s last
name or name in full were added to various later editions as indication of adherence to his
original teachings (Kingfisher 2016, 137). The editors of the 1982 edition lamented “how
beginning with the 1958 edition, “rich, well documented historical discussions were discarded’”
(Kingfisher 2016, 137, 203). The result of adding his name created impression “that Cohen’s
work is a source document and that anyone doing research on Native law or policy will need to
consult and cite it” (Kingfisher 2016, 203). What remains unclear is which version of the
Handbook - the 1942 version, the corrected version in 1958, or the reverted corrected version of
1982 - is the ‘Bible.’
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In 1995, the chair of the Legal Studies program at Connecticut’s Quinnipiac University,
Professor Jill E. Martin, wrote an article entitled “A Year and a Spring of My Existence: Felix S.
Cohen and The Handbook of Federal Indian Law.” In it, Martin examines the background of
Cohen’s Handbook and discusses obstacles that Cohen potentially faced. Kingfisher notes that
while Martin’s descriptions of historic events in her article “are, for the most part, factual,… her
work is like so many others in that she is still convinced that the Handbook is ‘the bible of Indian
law.’…that Cohen ‘analyzes all issues of American-Indian Law’ and that his conclusions are
sound” (2016, 137).
Nonetheless, Martin’s article was reprinted in the forward of the 2012 edition of the
Handbook and has been a source for scholars concerning the genesis of the Handbook (2016,
137). Editors of the 2012 edition also cite Cohen’s “Spanish Origins” article six times in the first
chapter concerning “History & Background of Federal Indian Policy” and, like Cohen, claimed
Marshall relied on Vitoria and Suarez for “their views on Native rights.” However:
…aside from his acknowledgement of the “Doctrine of Discovery,” Marshall never
referenced either of these theologians in his written opinion in this case or in any
of his opinions among the “Trilogy Rulings” cases. In fact, the historical narrative
Marshall gives in his 1823 Johnson v. M’Intosh focuses on land patents given by
the English monarchy and not Spanish law or policy, instead he wrote that “as a
first principle in colonial law, that all titles must be derived from the crown” and
cites jure belli claiming that Native People’s legal status is as “a conquered people”
(Kingfisher 2016, 203-204).
Further, Cohen excluded the work of established Latin American historians, such as C. H.
Haring and Lewis Hanke, “…whose work did show a stark difference between Spanish Native
law and policy and that practiced or applied by the Americans to Native People” (Kingfisher
2016, 207). Nevertheless, Kingfisher states, “…this has not prevented legal scholars and even
historians from continuing to cite Cohen’s work, despite the abundance of published work that
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give a fuller and more accurate view of …origins for American Native law and policy” (2016,
204). Kingfisher writes:
Evidence of the dominance of Cohen’s historical perspective can be found in the
1990 book, The American Indian in Western Legal Though: The Discourses of
Conquest, written by law professor Robert A. Williams Jr. Professor Williams, who
was also an editor of the Federal Indian Law textbook, claims that because [of]
Cohen’s “Spanish model thesis” law journal article that the writings of Vitoria has
been “cemented permanently in the minds of United States Indian law scholars”
and as Cohen originally claimed is proof of a “humane and rational basis for an
American law of Indian affairs” (2016, 204-205).
References like Williams’ continue the unreasoned “acceptance of Cohen’s historical narratives”
and the perception that he is “the leading twentieth century scholar on Indian rights” and law.
(Kingfisher 2016, 205). However, Kingfisher contends that Cohen depicts Native People “as
one, monolithic group” and questions why Cohen, with his “academic background and
experience,” would do this. Rollings affirms that to understand tribal members, one must
understand the cultural diversity between the tribes. He states:
These tribal distinctions are intensified by the unique and special relationship
Indian tribes have with the federal government, which is defined by 367 ratified
treaties, 73 ratified agreements, and over 100 individual statutes. These individual
tribal treaties with the federal government have defined their unique position, and
linked their tribal identity with their individualized rights and privileges as defined
by treaty (Rollings, 2004, p. 128).
Kingfisher speculates that “when given a writing assignment” by either Margold or
Collier, “Cohen researched and wrote not as an intelligent and capable academic, but rather as a
lawyer who purposely excluded evidence that did not support the argument he was told to make”
(Kingfisher 2016, 206-207). It has now been said Cohen was admonished by superiors for going
against the grain and writing the truth, and it has been said he was hired by superiors to go
against the grain and write a specific narrative, truth or not.
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Kingfisher hopes that “by presenting information supplied by Cohen’s papers, the reader
is convinced that most of these recently published works simply regurgitate the same historical
narrative regarding Cohen and his work and that it is time that scholars consider who supplied
the historical narratives they use” (Kingfisher 2016, 138-139). He writes:
… [E]ven with the emergence of specialized fields within the discipline of history
such as ethnohistory, and more recently the advent of New West historians, the
academic community still appears to gravitate to one historical narrative when it
concerns the origins of American Native policy and jurisprudence. The unfortunate
result of this is that despite claims to be operating under a supposed scientific
methodology and its accompanying claim of a more expansive and inclusive
historical outlook, the majority of historians and scholars from other disciplines still
appear to accept a single individual’s historical interpretation and narrative, that of
Felix Solomon Cohen, as espoused in his seminal work The Handbook of Federal
Indian Law. The problem with Cohen’s historical narrative is that it … is based on
flawed or unsubstantiated claims from its inception, yet it is blindly perceived by a
majority of scholars as both legitimate and credible. The result of this questionable
historical narrative … is that all subsequent scholarship that cites this narrative has
become contaminated with what amounts to little more than intellectual dogma
(Kingfisher, 2016, pp. 1-2).
Nevertheless, while indeed a monumental and useful resource for documents related to
Indian law, a there is a growing acknowledgment that Cohen’s work was not researched
thoroughly enough to have adequately informed his conclusions. Allen notes:
The opacity of presumed “plenary power” law in the 20th century was silently
revealed by Cohen, showing the entire idea to be a cruel hoax perpetuated by
lawyers and jurists. At p. 42 Cohen defers discussion of Congress’ power to
legislate over Indian affairs to Chapter 5, sec. 2.49 But in chapter 5, sec. 2, he
observed that “all the scope of the obligations assumed and powers conferred has
been discussed in chap. 3 (where the original reference to chapter 5, sec. 2 is found!)
and need not be reexamined at this point (W. B. Allen 1990, 10).
Allen contends “a critical reading of Cohen’s work reveals that there is no fundamental
basis for the claim” that Cohen’s Handbook is an authority on Federal government’s “plenary
power.” Instead, the source of such power appears to result from merely the positive assertion of

Allen used Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1942 edition (Albuquerque, NM: Five Rings
Corporation, 1986) Reprint with Foreword by Robert Bennett and Frederick Hart.
49
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Courts and Congress (most recently at the head of the Indian Child Welfare Act)” (W. Allen
2010, 18).

Justice Pursued
Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946
Prior to 1946, tribal property claims had to be handled on a case-by-case basis by the Federal
Court of Claims, using “special jurisdictional acts” passed by Congress that allowed federal
sovereign immunity to be waived for each separate case. One example is the Sioux Tribe’s
initial filing for the “Fifth Amendment taking of the Black Hills” in 1920 (DOJ 2015).
According to the final report of the Indian Claims Commission, “The process of securing
a jurisdictional act from Congress to grant access to the Court of Claims was an arduous one”:
From 1881 to 1890 the tribes filed 11 claims and secured awards on two, but 73
contracts, representing 61 more claims, were approved or pending with the
Secretary of Interior. In the years following, to World War I, 20 more claims were
filed with the Court and 12 resulted in recoveries totaling $13 million (1978, 3).
By 1946, there had been 200 such cases, and only 29 of those claims had been resolved
for the tribes. Others had been thrown out on technical grounds. It became clear another method
of dealing with the claims was necessary (ICC 1978, 3). Collier, as early as the 1930’s, had
proposed a special tribunal to handle Indian claims (IHS 2019, 4). Members of Congress
became particularly concerned after the case Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United
States (1945), which was thrown out for technical reasons. Many felt the tribe deserved a
rehearing (Cohen, Original Indian Title 1947, 57).
Therefore, on August 6, 1946, Congress established the Indian Claims Commission50 and
ensured the Act allowed re-hearings “in all cases heretofore dismissed for jurisdictional reasons”
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Pub. L. No. 79-726, ch. 959, Act of August 13, 1946, 60 Stat. 1049.
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(Cohen, Original Indian Title 1947, 57). The Commission was further intended to resolve with
finality “all existing tribal claims against the Government” (Cohen, Original Indian Title 1947,
43). President Truman stated while signing the Indian Claims Act on August 13, 1946:
This bill makes perfectly clear what many men and women, here and abroad, have
failed to recognize, that in our transactions with the Indian tribes we have at least
since the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 set for ourselves the standard of fair and
honorable dealings, pledging respect for all Indian property rights. Instead of
confiscating Indian lands, we have purchased from the tribes that once owned this
continent more than 90 per cent of our public domain, paying them approximately
800 million dollars in the process. It would be a miracle if in the course of these
dealings - the largest real estate transaction in history - we had not made some
mistakes and occasionally failed to live up to the precise terms of our treaties and
agreements with some 200 tribes. But we stand ready to submit all such
controversies to the judgment of impartial tribunals. We stand ready to correct any
mistakes we have made (1947, 58-59).
All claims that existed as of August 13, 1946 were to be considered. Any tribe that had
not yet filed a claim – whether a legal claim or moral - was encouraged to do so. The tribes had
five years, until August 13, 1951, in which to make their filings. Any suit not brought during that
time was to be forever forbidden by law. The Commission then had until April 10, 1957, to
finish its work (US Congress. Senate 1973). According to the Department of Justice, “The Act
was essentially remedial in nature and constituted a broad waiver of the United States’ sovereign
immunity” (DOJ 2015). Along with lawsuits concerning damages for violation of the Fifth
Amendment by taking titled lands from unwilling owners or for claims of inadequate
compensation, two new types of claims were to be considered: claims for "unconscionable
consideration,” and claims for breach of "fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by
any existing rule of law or equity" (DOJ 2015).
The DOJ notes that the Supreme Court held in United States v. Dann 51 that the main
purpose of the Act was to resolve the Indian lawsuits “with finality” and that the "payment of
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any claim"…“occurs when the monies appropriated by Congress to pay a final judgment in favor
of a plaintiff tribe are deposited in a special account in the Treasury to the credit of the tribe”
(DOJ 2015). No further federal claims were to be considered after the Commission dissolved.
The tribe’s acceptance of the funds awarded them was an acceptance of the final judgment and
an admission of the Commission’s authority under the United States government. The Act stated,
"The payment of any claim, after its determination in accordance with this Act, shall be a full
discharge of the United States of all claims and demands touching any of the matters in the
controversy" (DOJ 2015).
Aware of this deadline, tribal governments quickly hired attorneys to look through their
history and documents for all possible causes of action. According to the final report, the total
number of petitions filed during the five-year window was 370, which were separated into 617
dockets, resulting in “43 volumes of opinions and orders” (DOJ 2015). The average award was
$2.4 million. Lawrence notes:
The federal Indian Claims Commission, which existed from 1946 to 1977, paid
$880 million to a number of tribes as compensation for instances in which tribes
had not received fair compensation for lands they sold to the United States in the
nineteenth century. Tribes made over 500 claims before the Indian Claims
Commission and won awards in 60 percent of them. Most were property rights
claims (Lawrence 2002, 396).
The initial commission consisted of three men. In trying to give thorough consideration to
all the complex claims, the process of researching documents and coming to a judgement was
much slower than Congress had anticipated. Further, the ICC final report states:
It appears now that many of the Indian attorneys held off on filing to await the
outcome of the early decisions. Also, many tribes had difficulty securing legal
representation. And, as always in these claims, the case work-up was tedious and
time consuming. The result was that in the last weeks of the 5-year filing period the
activity increased tremendously. As this rush developed, congressional friends of
the Indian made an attempt to extend the filing period for 1 year but failed. The
flurry of claims filing intensified in the last month and a half of the filing period,
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which saw double the number filed in the 4;6 years before. With all the claims in,
the total came to 370 petitions that were divided eventually into more than 600
dockets. The Commission was confronted with a massive job. Almost all the 176
known tribes or bands filed one or more claims on old grievances. Only 17 tribes
(as of July 1951) were undecided as to their desire to file claims and several said
they had none (ICC 1978, 5).
By 1957, most of the claims remained unresolved. Thus, Congress extended the deadline
by five years again, and again…and again, and finally expanded the Commission to five
members in 1972 (US Congress. Senate 1973, 2). At that point, 208 claims had been settled for a
total of $423,926,883.92, and 227 were still pending (US Congress. Senate 1973, 4).
The Commission was reauthorized for another five years but needed to request funding
annually. When it came time for the 1977 appropriation, the bill passed both the Senate and
House committees on Interior and Insular Affairs but was stopped on the House floor. A majority
of the House balked and struck the wording that would have reauthorized the Commission. In its
place, the House inserted wording to dissolve the Commission and transfer remaining dockets
back to the Court of Claims. At this point, about 140 claims remained. The Senate and House
were forced to go to conference and deliberate an agreement (US Congress. Conference 1976, 4).
The subsequent debate over renewal of the Commission lasted for 18 months (ICC 1978,
20). The Committee of Conference was “adamantly opposed to any further extensions of the
Commission beyond the September 30, 1978 dissolution date” (US Congress. Conference 1976,
4). The eventual compromise was an administration bill with the 18-month extension to the end
of September 1978. “Public Law 94-46.5 was passed on October 8, 1976” (ICC 1978, 20).
As of January 1, 1978, there were 102 dockets remaining. The Court of Claims had
prepared for the transfer of unfinished cases by securing P.L. 9.5-69 in July of 1977 (P.L.),
which more clearly defined how the transfer would be handled. “Less than 68 dockets remained
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undisposed by September 1978, and the prospect for their final resolution by the Court of Claims
within the hoped for 5 years seemed good” (ICC 1978, 20).
In their final report, the Commission noted that while the “process of Indian claims
resolution has been a lengthy one and the Indian Claims Commission was simply an element of
that process,” tribal communities did, indeed, have "their day in court":
The Commission was a court, complete with appellate [sp] review. And it was
unique among courts in its jurisdiction over "moral claims" and having no statute
of limitations except the requirement that the claims must have accrued prior to
1946. The tribes, represented by some of the best legal talent in the country,
litigated more than .500 claims and won awards on over 60 percent of them (ICC
1978, 21).
Most of tribal governments that had submitted themselves to the judgement of this
tribunal accepted its rulings and monetary awards. Tribal leaders signed papers and accepted
funds knowing without doubt that the agreement entailed a forfeiture of rights over the land. The
fact that not every tribe signed on the dotted line and accepted the funds is evidence that
decisions to sign were made with clear understanding and ability to choose.
The final report of the Commission, summarizing the work of the Commission from
August 13, 1946 through September 30, 1978, stated that it had “it succeeded in mitigating many
of the problems which arose as a result of settlement and westward expansion in this country”
(ICC 1978, ii). The last of the resolved cases was completed in the Court of Claims in October
2006 (DOJ 2015).
What the Indian Claims Commission revealed was not only that land had been ruthlessly
taken from tribal governments and immediate compensation was required, but it indirectly
revealed that tribal governments have willingly submitted to the sovereign authority of the
federal government. It also indirectly revealed that, just as Vattel had premised, not all the land
within North America in the early centuries was being used by tribal members. Tribal
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governments as a group did not claim ownership or jurisdiction over every foot of the North
American continent. Each tribe came to the tribunal with a claim over only the portions of land
they felt were theirs - and this was with their own attorneys frantically searching for every
possible claim, no matter how large or small. In some cases, two or more tribes came to the
tribunal seeking compensation for the same portions of land. If it was found that the land was
used by more than one tribe, sometime more than one tribe was paid.
The Claims Commission, therefore, has to the extent possible verified and mapped the
land that was actually used by tribal governments. Nevertheless, in their final report, over 30
years after they began, the Commission noted:
Very few of the legal issues of Indian history have progressed to a point where a
conclusion can be written to them. The legal history of Indian claims is certainly
not one of these few. The Commission may terminate but, in spite of the
Congressional mandate that Indian claims arising prior to 1946 also terminate, they
will persist. The future of the debate on land claims rests now in a more searching
examination of the treaties and the intent of both participants. It also lies in how far
the Indians are able to push their claims for land and how far the United States is
willing to acknowledge them. Between these contending positions the treaties will
be interpreted or reinterpreted, or even revoked, as the ripening climate of
American opinion allows it to happen (ICC 1978, 20).
Yet, it was the job of the Commission, by Congressional directive, to settle the issues
with finality. If they could not answer all questions in their 30 years of research, then it is
possible those questions will not ever be answered.

The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §1302(8) 1968
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. — That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed… (General Congress 1776).
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The United States’ Declaration of Independence states in its very first sentence that all
men are created equal and are gifted with certain rights that no one can remove. Later, Supreme
Court Justice James Wilson affirmed in his writings that the purpose of the United States
Constitution was not to invent new rights, but to secure and enlarge the rights everyone already
had by nature (Wilson 1790-91).
Nonetheless, not everyone fully understood what those natural rights were. Blackstone
said in his commentaries, “The law which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellow
citizens, though it diminishes the natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind” (Blackstone
1803, 125,126). Arkes explains that what Blackstone was saying was that we give up our
unrestricted natural rights when we enter society, including the ‘liberty to do mischief;’
exchanging those wild, natural rights for civilized rights, also known as ‘civil’ rights, which are
enforced by government (2013, 961-962).
Wilson responded to Blackstone by asking incredulously, “Is it a part of natural liberty to
do mischief to anyone?” (Wilson 1790-91). Arkes elaborates on Wilson’s rebuff:
When did we ever have a ‘liberty to do mischief’? When did we ever have, as
Lincoln would say, a ‘right to do a wrong’? The laws that restrained us from raping
and murdering deprived us of nothing we ever had a ‘right’ to do. And so when the
question was asked as to what rights we give up in entering into this government,
the answer tendered by the Federalists was, ‘none’52 (2013, 961-962).
In the mind of Wilson and many others, the constitution of the new United States did not impair
or eliminate the God-given natural rights inherent to every human being, so it was unnecessary to
craft a special “Bill of Rights” to bestow these fundamental liberties. Wilson asked, “How could
we do that without implying that, in fact, we had given up the corpus of our natural rights in
coming under this Constitution?” (2013, 961-962). They were concerned that by contending a
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Alexander Hamilton had said in Federalist paper No. 84, ‘Here…the people surrender nothing’ (Publius 1787).
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Bill of Rights was necessary, it would be assumed that civil rights did not exist without it. Others
saw the addendum as a clarification that the rights existed and a protection against them being
ignored or forgotten. Still others assumed the rights needed to be bestowed.
When the Founding Fathers finally agreed on the wording of the bill – they did not state
that these rights were for American citizens alone. In fact, the Bill of Rights does not use the
word “citizen” at all, preferring instead the term “the People” (Bickel 1973, 370). Interestingly,
the original names of many North American tribes were their own native word for “the People.”
Nevertheless, it did not take long following the birth of United States for the concept of
basic human rights being intrinsic to all humans to be diminished. It was said that tribal
members were not covered by the Constitution and therefore did not have basic rights – as if the
rights were not inherent but through citizenship. Blacks, because they were deemed ‘slave
property,’ were also denied civil rights. However, on April 9, 1866, following the Civil War, the
Civil Rights Act was passed, promising citizens of all heritages the cover of natural civil rights.
Except if they were “Indians non-taxed.”
In 1968, Congress finally passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Washington
University professor Judy Lynch writes that this was in response to concerns that despite the new
tribal constitutions created through the IRA, tribal governments themselves were abusing the
rights of tribal members. Further, federal courts viewed these abuses as “internal controversies”
under the jurisdiction of the tribes and refused to intervene (Lynch 1979, 908). Cohen’s 1942
edition of his Handbook of Federal Indian Law explains:
It is…always pertinent to ask whether an ordinance of a tribe conflicts with the
Constitution of the United States. Where, however, the United States Constitution
levies particular restraints upon federal courts or upon Congress, these restraints do
not apply to the courts or legislatures of the Indian tribes. Likewise, particular
restraints upon the states are inapplicable to Indian tribes ([1942] 1971, 124).
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Lynch further notes that according to the 1958 edition of the Handbook, if an Indian
desires constitutional protection – such as religious protection, for example - members of the
Indian tribe must write the guarantees they desire into tribal constitutions. In fact, in 1958, many
tribes had written such guarantees into tribal constitutions that were then in force. The Handbook
notes this is important, because absent “such provisions, an Indian reservation may be, in some
respects, a civil rights no-man's land where there is no relief against tribal oppressions because of
the failure of Congress to make federal civil rights provisions…applicable” (DOI 1958) (Lynch
1979, 908).
Lynch reports that for seven years prior to the adoption of the ICRA, Congressional
hearings inquired about the status of Indian rights. The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights heard testimony that of 247 tribes organized under the 1934 IRA, “117 had adopted
constitutions protecting individual civil rights and 130 had not. The rights provided by the tribal
constitutions, however, were found to be inadequate. 188 other tribes operated with no
constitution at all (Lynch 1979, 909).
Examples of civil rights abuses included tribal courts that did not allow attorneys to
represent the accused or only allowed other tribal members to represent the defendant. Some
tribes did not allow an accused to remain silent. Some tribes did not allow for jury trials, and
those that did sometimes struggled to motivate tribal members to serve jury duty. Juries also did
not have to come to a unanimous decision – just a majority vote (Lynch 1979, 909). Following
years of hearings, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights urged Congress in 1968 to
guarantee tribal members select portions of the Bill of Rights (Lynch 1979, 910). Section
1302(a) of the Act lists its general protections:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall—
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1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition for a redress of grievances;
2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have assistance of counsel
for his defense (except as provided in subsection (b));
7) (A) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel and unusual
punishments;
(B) except as provided in subparagraph (C), impose for conviction of any 1
offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of
1 year or a fine of $5,000, or both;
(C) subject to subsection (b), impose for conviction of any 1 offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of 3 years or a
fine of $15,000, or both; or
(D) impose on a person in a criminal proceeding a total penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of 9 years;
8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive
any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right,
upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons. (1968).
While the ICRA is similar to the Bill of Rights in several respects, certain provisions
were left out. For example, while guaranteeing freedom of religion, the ICRA does not prohibit
establishment of a state religion. The Act also guarantees a right to counsel only at the
defendant’s own expense (if the sentence will be under a year) and does not carry provision for a
grand jury (Lynch 1979, 911). Additionally, the Act mandates equal protection under the Tribe’s
laws, not federal or state laws. Note that 1302 (8) reads “No Indian tribe in exercising powers
of self-government shall: (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;” (25 U.S Code
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1968, § 1302(8)) (emphasis added). The laws of the tribe can be different than those of the state
or federal government. Thus, Congress made a conscious decision not to provide tribal members
- U.S. citizens - with the same protections guaranteed citizens in state and federal courts (Lynch
1979, 911). Metropoulos explains:
…the ICRA amendments, leaving aside for the moment their racially
discriminatory aspect, clearly, knowingly subject U/S. citizens to the power of
sovereigns unconstrained by the Constitution. This power is real. Tribes may fine
a convicted defendant for up to $5000 and imprison him for up to a year in tribal
jail for each offence. [In contrast,] [e]ven the power of Congress over Indians is
limited by their rights as U.S. citizens (Brief for Amicus Curiae of TM. EM & RM
2003, 23).
Ominously, some tribes objected to the Indian Civil Rights Act – not because of the
omission of civil rights and protections, but to inclusion of certain protections. They objected
that the language was too similar to the federal Bill of Rights (Lynch 1979, 911). Senator Sam
J. Ervin responded to criticism saying:
I realize that the all [sic] Indian Pueblo Council of New Mexico has voiced serious
objections to the provisions of the proposed act which employs language taken from
the First and Fourth through Eighth amendments and has asked to be exempt from
that Title. In all sincerity, I do not believe that [their fears] can be justified. The
Pueblo Indians have a rich, colorful form of government founded on tradition and
wise experience. In no conceivable way was it my intention, through the provisions
of the [ICRA] to hamper, weaken or destroy the Pueblo tribal traditions or any
Indian tribal governments in this Nation (Lynch 1979, 911).
Referring to “hundreds of treaties, statutes, and regulations that support” tribal selfdetermination, Krakoff notes, “As stated in Morton v. Mancari, ‘If these laws…were deemed
invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code…would be effectively
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized’
(Morton v. Mancari 1974, 552)” (Krakoff 2017, 494). According to Krakoff:
Native nations’ governmental status situates them differently from other minority
groups for many legal purposes, including equal protection analysis. Under current
equal protection doctrine, classifications that further the federal government’s
135

unique relationship with American Indians are not subject to heightened scrutiny.
The Supreme Court held in Morton v. Mancari that such classifications are political
distinctions rather than acts of “invidious racial discrimination”5 and therefore are
not subject to the Court’s most exacting review (Krakoff 2017, 494).
Krakoff maintains that the constitution does not apply at all to United States citizens who
have tribal heritage. Krakoff wraps this disturbing notion in a rationalization made to sound as if
racial division is a good thing, stating:
…using equal protection doctrine to demand a highly formalized and acontextual
race neutrality with respect to tribes and their members today would, ironically,
perpetuate the settler/colonial project of elimination. Used in this way,
colorblindness could threaten tribes’ separate political status just as they are
beginning to break free from the historical legacies of tribal racialization (Krakoff
2017, 496).
In 1973, the National Tribal Chairman Association stated the ICRA violated “the
principle of self-government associated with Indian tribes” because the Act grants federal courts
jurisdiction “over issues such as the right to membership in a tribe, the operation of tribal
elections, the selection of tribal officials, and the right to conduct tribal governmental business.”
Tribal governments also objected to ICRA imposing federal constitutional law on tribal
governments and claimed the Act was an infringement on their sovereignty because tribal
consent was not required prior to its application. They proposed an amendment to section
1301(1) of the Act, redefining "Indian tribe" for the purposes of the Act as:
…any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and recognized as possessing powers of self-government which has
consented to the provisions of this subchapter by an affirmative vote of the adult
members of the tribe, band, or other group of Indians in an election called by the
Secretary of the Interior for that purpose (Lynch 1979, 912).
Congress did not adopt their amendment (Lynch 1979, 912).
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Resolute Members of Tribal Communities vs. Dissidents
An established American Indian Movement (AIM) began in July 1968 as an urban group
offering encouragement and support for tribal members suffering crime and poverty in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Their goal was to “fight mistreatment by police and to improve
prospects for jobs, education, and housing” (Durham, 1974). For the first few months, they were
successful in cutting down on police harassment by monitoring police radio and arriving to an
event before the police did. This resulted in a dramatic decrease in incarcerations for tribal
members, and AIM members were widely accepted by the grateful community. Nevertheless,
from the beginning, AIM had political goals. In 1968, AIM identified jurisdiction over children
as a primary goal, stating, “A major objective of the movement is to regain the young. Once the
BIA is eliminated and individual tribal states are created schools will not be a major
problem” (AIM 1968). From that start, AIM quickly developed into a national organization
focused on tribal rights and sovereignty and encouraging tribal governments to take a stronger
political stand.
According to Tribal Judge B.J. Jones, the Association of American Indian Affairs
(AAIA) conducted a nationwide study from 1969 through 1974 at the behest of the Spirit Lake
Tribe (Devil’s Lake Sioux) and the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate. The study concerned “the impact
of state child welfare practices toward American Indian children.” Through this study, the
AAIA determined that “25-35% of all Indian children were placed in either foster homes,
adoptive homes, or institutions… (Hollinger, 1992; U.S. House Report 1978)” (B. Jones 2006).
Jones reports that the results of the survey troubled tribal leaders for two major reasons.
“First, the placement of so many Indian children in non-Indian homes threatened the extinction
of the tribes. In short, tribes were losing the most basic necessity for survival - a next
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generation.” The second reason was a contention that separation from the tribe results in
“development of maladaptive behaviors such as antisocial behavior, depression and suicide
among alarming numbers of Indian children” (B. Jones 2006).
Nevertheless, others maintain that “our children were never a treaty promise” (CAICW
2004). They are not the property of tribal government and not responsible for ensuring the
hollow, perfunctory survival of the tribe as an entity. Arbitrary tribal jurisdiction over children of
non-tribal members is not found in any treaty promise. Mandatory jurisdiction over the children
is debatable. Even if treaties had promised tribal governments the right to claim jurisdiction over
children of their choosing, it is a legitimate function of federal government to revisit and address
matters that prove to violate the inherent rights of United States citizens.
While tribal leaders and Congress have maintained that the membership drain was due to
social services removing children at an alarming rate, little attention has been given the number
of parents who have consciously and deliberately taken their children and left the reservation
system and urban Indian centers. Whether through the various assimilation programs, intermarriage with non-natives, job searches or other interests, some families have simply left Indian
Country, sometimes decades ago. Of those who left more recently, some left the reservation
system to escape increasing tribal government corruption and crime rates (CAICW 2014).
Roland J. Morris Sr., a member of the Leech Lake tribe and a co-founder of the Christian
Alliance for Indian Child Welfare in 2004, testified at a Senate hearing in 1998 that “many tribal
governments have become corrupt with unchecked power and money. Because of corruption
and unwillingness to let go of power and money; tribal government themselves, in some cases,
are keeping their people in the bondage of poverty and oppression” (R. J. Morris 1998). Morris
further stated:
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It cannot be denied that current federal policy is such that tribal governments
financially benefit from the general membership's poverty level staying just as it is.
The plight of the average Native American is what keeps money flowing into the
coffers of those in charge of Tribal government. Thus, tribal government needs to
keep in control of its members, even to the extent of demanding from this Congress
that the "tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction over any ...Indian child...", as is
written in the Indian Child Welfare Act, which states further that tribal interests are
"independent of the interests of the birth parents". The Indian Civil Rights Act
mandates that no Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall violate
various basic civil rights. However, when there is no separation of powers within
tribal governments and tribal sovereign immunity protects tribal government from
civil rights claims, tribal members are left without recourse.
But many tribal members say nothing publicly. Cronyism, nepotism and
ballot box rigging are all part of political reality on many reservations. Everyone
seems to accept it as a given and because tribal government controls tribal jobs,
HUD housing, tribal loans and land leases, many members are reluctant to speak
out. Tribal government controls most everyone's strings, not to mention the judicial
system. Getting on the bad side of the government can mean the loss of one’s job
or home. Some have even been threatened that their family members would lose
their jobs.
Further disabling to membership outcry is the manipulation used to keep
control. I have seen tribal governments pressure members to rally to their cause and
political goals through misinformation, bullying, and even bribes. At a political
rally two years ago, in order to portray a good show of force for the media, a tribal
government gave its employees the day off and told the employees they were
expected to attend the rally. In order to ensure the attendance, the tribal government
offered transportation to the rally, free food, and distribution of the employees' pay
checks.
At the recent Montana gatherings held by Senator Conrad Burns in
reference to tribal jurisdiction, the tribal governments transported students from the
colleges and high schools, offered free food and dance before the hearings, and
inflamed the large group with speeches about genocide. Prior to the busses leaving
one of the schools on its way to the hearing, a student was told that unless he
planned to speak at the hearing, he wouldn't be allowed on the bus. Again, a show
of angry force was important for this media event, and it was highly unlikely that
under those conditions many tribal members would get up and say anything in
opposition to tribal government dogma.
Actual bullying usually occurs on more of a one-on-one scale. In one case,
a tribal member had been essentially share-cropping with a white neighbor. The
tribal member shared his tribally leased land; the neighbor shared his tractors and
other heavy equipment. Together, they both benefited. However, this arrangement
angered the tribal government, which without warning revoked the tribal member's
lease on the land in question, threatened to revoke other land he leased, and
threatened him with forced eviction from his HUD home. The government
eventually allowed him to keep his home and other land, but permanently revoked
the land he had shared with a non-member. This tribal member, having a large
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family, has no intention of taking another chance of losing his home by speaking
out.
In another case, a person running for office in a recent tribal election was
denied, by the tribal council, the right to advertise in the local tribal paper.
I have had many tribal members come to me in confidence and relate their
concerns and fears. I have even had a former tribal council member come to me to
discuss these issues. I see true elders feeling defeated. Many of those within tribal
government won't listen to the elders. Seeing this disrespect is hurtful to me and it
pains many other tribal members that this is the way things are.
It can be no wonder that Indian people are tired and depressed. Not only do
many feel alienated from the United States Government and the rest of society, but
many tribal governments can't be trusted either. This situation, having become a
hopeless fact of life, along with poverty and other factors, has bred depression and
loss of trust (R. J. Morris 1998).
Krakoff, in directing her focus solely toward “Non-Indians” and their objection to
“ICWA’s distinctive treatment of Indian children” (Krakoff 2017, 506), ignores the reality of
dissident tribal members. In ignoring directly affected dissident tribal members who have called
for equal protection, Krakoff herself is stereotyping and discriminating against tribal members.
Further, when defending ICWA and claiming Mancari was correct in finding federal Indian
policy is based upon political classification and membership rather than race, (2017, 506),
Krakoff ignores that ICWA mandates jurisdiction over children who are not political members of
a tribe, but merely “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe” (United States 1978).
It is also interesting to note that Krakoff uses the racial term “Indians” 423 times in her
paper (albeit including quotes from others and official names) but uses the political term “tribal
member” only 31 times. She refers racially to “non-Indians” 33 times, but never uses the term
“non-tribal member.” This consistent terminology reflects a focus on heritage, not political
affiliation.
While Morris distanced himself from his home reservation primarily for political reasons
as well as his concern over violence and drug abuse, others tribal members left the reservation
system because they wanted economic freedom. A member of the Colville Reservation in
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Washington State, Alfred Aubertin testified at a House hearing in 1965 concerning the desire of
many Colville members to terminate the reservation. He stated:
I am an enrolled member of the Colville Confederated Tribe. I am a log cutter and
have been gainfully employed for a number of years. Most of my life I have been
living on or near the reservation, have been making my own living and have never
been on welfare. I do not feel that my home is substandard, and I am for termination
of the Colville Indian Reservation. I feel that I know what is best for me and my
family and I am competent to handle my own affairs.
Through the years I have seen through personal experience in my own
family how the affairs of the Indian have been managed by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. My grandmother, Lenore Banning, owned over a million feet of timber on
her trust land and the county had to bury her. She lived in poverty all her life and
was barely existing on an old age pension. Yet it was impossible for her to sell any
of her timber, even though she owned it. She could have lived in comfort and had
no worries if her property had not been tied up in trust (Scofield 1992, 9).
It would seem the view of tribal members as being so fundamentally different from other
U.S. citizens that protections, rights and responsibilities afforded others are anathema to tribal
members was first elucidated by Cohen.
Roland J Morris reminisced about family and community camping near the lakes during
ricing season in the 1950’s. He said the joy and togetherness “was like Christmas.” He recounted
that with the season changes, he and his father would fish, set traps, harvest wild rice and tap
maple syrup to support the family. Morris cut lumber for money to buy a car. They were poor
and there was not much in the way of welfare assistance – but to him, life seemed cleaner,
happier, and healthier than it was 45 years later. Hard work felt good and, according to Morris,
dependence on federal funds and welfare programs ruined the community.
If the Handbook was an attempt to fashion a socialist ideal for the sake of tribes, the
utopian vision of Collier and Cohen has yet to come to pass. While tribal governments and
holdings have gotten more powerful, lucrative and wealthy – the health, standard of living, and
social welfare of many members living within the reservation system has gotten worse.
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Chapter 4
The Indian Child Welfare Act

American Indian Policy Review Commission
The American Indian Policy Review Commission53 was established by act of Congress
on January 2, 1975 (Fineday 2012) to exhaustively examine federal Indian policy. The law
specified “the Commission's organizational structures, areas of Indian affairs to be investigated,
and reporting requirements” along with $2.5 million and a completion date of June 30, 1977. An
additional appropriation54 of $100,000 was approved on February 17, 1977 (GAO 1977, 1) to
fund the compilation of the final report, with a May 18, 1977 deadline (GAO 1977, 3).
The Commission organizational structure included six commissioners appointed by
Congress--three each from the House and Senate. Those six selected five citizens of tribal
heritage to also serve as commissioners. From these five, three were from federally recognized
tribes, one from an unrecognized group, and one represented urban Indians (GAO 1977, 1).
Chaired by South Dakota Senator Abourezk, the Commissioners then composed the task
forces. Each task force was also to have three members, most of whom with tribal heritage (GAO
1977, 2). The Commission launched 11 task forces to investigate the following matters:
1. Trust responsibility and Federal-Indian relationship
2. Tribal government
3. Federal administration and structure of Indian affairs
4. Federal, State, and tribal jurisdiction
5. Indian education
6. Indian health
7. Reservation and resource development and protection
8. Urban and rural non-reservation Indians
9. Indian law revision, consolidation, and codification
10. Terminated and non-federally recognized tribes
53
54

Public Law 93-580, 88 Stat. 1910
Public Law 95-5
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11. Alcohol and drug abuse” (GAO 1977, 2)
The original 33 task force members included 31 with tribal heritage representing 27
different tribes (GAO 1977, 2). Each task force was to submit its final report within 1 year from
the appointment of its members (GAO 1977, 3).
Having learned from Cohen’s experience, the statute also authorized the hire of six staff
members for the Commissioners as well as administrative and clerical staff for the task forces.
An amendment further allowed the use of volunteers, the “services, information, facilities, and
personnel of the Government's executive departments and agencies with or without
reimbursement”, and the “services of consultants, experts, or organizations on a temporary or
intermittent basis” (GAO 1977, 3). In March 1975, the Director and General Counsel began their
work and four other staff positions were filled by June of 1975. 140 staff members, about 100
intermittent consultants, and numerous volunteers subsequently worked for the Commission
between June 1975 and December 31, 1976 (GAO 1977, 3). “The Committee on House
Administration provided free office space, furnishings, equipment, and utilities” (GAO 1977, 3).
Upon completion of their work, the Commission prepared a draft report and sent 1,000
copies to tribal, federal and state agencies, congressional members, ‘Indian’ advocacy
organizations, and other tribal government supporters for review. After considering their
responses, the Commission submitted its final report in to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House on May 17, 1977 (GAO 1977, 4).
Chapter nine of the final report of the AIPRC states that in the 1970’s, “almost half of the
United States Indian population lived outside the boundaries of Indian reservations.” According
to their report, “340,000 lived in cities and six cities had Indian populations which are larger than
those of any reservation except the Navajo Reservation” (AIPRC 1977, 429). Many had been

143

encouraged by federal policies to move to the cities (1977, 429). The increasing number of tribal
members living off-reservation was noted “in two Indian policy studies in the 1920's.”
Erroneously, the AIPRC claimed the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs’ Survey of the
Conditions of the Indians of the United States was first, “followed by the well-known Meriam
Report” (AIPRC 1977, 431).
According to the AIPRC, “The Subcommittee conducted and published hearings across
the United States, and largely provided the data base for the more concise Meriam Report”
(AIPRC 1977, 431). However, while the Subcommittee's hearings continued for almost 15 years
into 1943 and gathered a large amount of necessary data, the Meriam Report had been initiated
and completed prior to the subcommittee hearings. Of interest to the Subcommittee in 1943 was
the number of tribal members now living in urban areas. However, the 1977 AIPRC Report
erroneously relates, “Whatever insights might have been gained from hearing testimony were
lost when the Mariam Report published its chapter on ‘Migrated Indians’, and relied on the
material presented by Indians' employers rather than the Indians themselves" (AIPRC 1977,
431). Again, the Meriam Report was published prior to the Subcommittee’s report.
The AIPRC wrote, “Many of these people moved to cities because of Federal policies.
The earliest movements of tribal people away from tribal lands were often the indirect result of
policies which diminished the reservation land base...” (AIPRC 1977, 429). While true that many
left the reservation system in the last century and a half at the encouragement of federal policies,
it was not an “indirect” result. Assimilation was a clear and unhidden goal. Some would say it
was the only honest and responsible path forward and had no malicious intent. Yet, the AIPRC
goes on to refer to this stated policy as if it was secretive and malevolent:
The continuing assumption on the part of the Federal Government was that
assimilation was the Indian's fate. Legislation was based on this assumption. One
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of the most obvious examples of Federal action which broke up reservations,
strained tribal cohesion, and encouraged subsequent migration of thousands of
Indians to other areas was the General Allotment Act of 1887. Indeed, it is not
inaccurate to say that the migration of the Indians was a calculated result of this
legislation (AIPRC 1977, 430).
Indeed, self-sufficiency was the calculated and well-known intention. Tribal members, in
common with other U.S. citizens, were being allowed the freedom to decide what they wanted to
do with their personal assets. But the AIPRC went further with accusations concerning
motivation for federal policy, stating:
Federal policies have …forced or encouraged Indians to move away from
reservations in an effort to end the "Indian problem." …In the late 19thcentury…the policies of neglect, dependency, and assimilation were established.
…Reservations were often viewed as camps where assimilative tools would be
provided prior to the Indian's dispersal among the white population…Even
reservations, however, posed a threat among the Federal Government because they
provided a place where Indian people could not be effectively kept from
maintaining their identity and culture. So attempts were made to parcel out tribal
lands to Indian individuals in an effort to destroy the communal cohesiveness of
tribal society (AIPRC 1977, 430).
The AIPRC complained that the intent of the Allotment Act was to encourage a new,
self-sufficient way of life, provided only the skills for upward employment, and did not provide
ongoing programs of dependency once people had moved. The AIPRC appeared to believe that
citizens with tribal heritage were incapable of anything other than a life of dependence. The
Commission then stated that “Local, State and county welfare programs often refuse to serve
Indians on the grounds that they are the responsibility of the Federal Government” (AIPRC
1977, 429).
Nevertheless, the AIPRC concedes that after World War II, “Indian perceptions of
reservations and cities began to change” (AIPRC 1977, 431). According to the AIPRC:
The war showed many Indians a world they had never seen and seldom heard of.
There were opportunities for achievement in the military service which they had
never found on reservations. They proved themselves capable of using those
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opportunities... Many Indians…decided that low quality subsistence was the only
future for the reservations and setoff for the cities to find work. By 1951, more than
17,000 Navajos worked away from the reservation, primarily on railroads and
agriculture (AIPRC 1977, 431-432).
Today, the vast majority of citizens with tribal heritage live away from the reservation
system (US Census Bureau 2010) - many of whom have mainstreamed into the larger society
and disconnected themselves from tribal benefits and programs. This indicates that
‘assimilation’ in the last century did have at least some success. Citizens of tribal heritage, not
unlike other U.S. citizens, appear to be individuals with an array of skills and preferences.
Assigning malicious intent where there may have been little or none feeds a blood thirst
for blame. While persons of ill intent exist in every community and have throughout history, the
tone of this commission fed a rationalization for a reverse policy that forced citizens into a
situation that they did not necessarily want to be in.
The AIPRC report included, among other things, recommendations for the placement of
children in need of care who have tribal heritage. Those recommendations were that Congress,
“by comprehensive legislation, directly address the problems of Indian child placement and the
legislation adhere to the following principles:”

a)
b)

c)
d)

Section 153
The issue of custody of an Indian child domiciled on a reservation is the subject of
the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court where such exists.
Where an Indian 'Child is not domiciled on a reservation and subject to the
jurisdiction of non-Indian authorities, the tribe of origin of the child be given
reasonable notice before any action affecting his/her custody is taken.
The tribe of origin have the right to intervene as a party in interest in child
placement proceedings.
Non-Indian social service agencies, as a condition to the Federal funding they
receive, have an affirmative obligation - by specific programs - to:
i.
provide training concerning Indian culture and traditions to all its
staff:
ii. establish a preference for placement of Indian children in Indian
homes:
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iii.

evaluate and change all economically and culturally inappropriate
placement criteria:
iv.
consult with Indian tribes in establishing (i), (ii), and (iii).
e) Significant Federal financial resources be appropriated for the enhancement or
development and maintenance of mechanisms to handle child custody issues,
including but not limited to Indian operated foster care homes and institutions in
reservation areas, such resources be made directly available to the tribe (AIPRC
1977, 35).
The American Indian Policy Review Commission further quoted Cohen as saying:
If we fight for civil liberties for our side, we show that we believe not in civil
liberties but in our side. But when those of us who never were Indians and never
expect to be Indians fight for the Indian cause of self-government, we are fighting
for something that is not limited by accidents of race and creed and birth: we are
fighting for what Las Casas, Vitoria and Pope Paul III called 'the integrity or
salvation of our own souls. We are fighting for what Jefferson called the basic rights
of man. We are fighting for the last best hope of earth. And these are causes which
should carry us through many defeats (AIPRC 1977, 9).
However, the Commissioners overlooked that civil liberties are for individuals – not for
corporate entities attempting to place controls over individuals. It is true the fight for recognition
of the inherent basic rights of all men is, indeed, the best hope on earth. But neither basic rights
nor “the last best hope on earth” should be confabulated to mean support of a “self-government”
that mandates children with lineage be members against their will or the will of their immediate
families. That, in fact, is the opposite of liberty and is more appropriately associated with
tyranny. The AIPRC then asks, “From the misdirected present, can the United States
Government redirect its relations with the American Indians to enable them to determine their
own lives now and in the future?” (AIPRC 1977, 9). While the Commission is asking this in
relationship to tribal governments as a corporate entity, the better question is can the United
States Government redirect its relations with “the [individual] American Indians” to enable them
to [individually] determine their own lives now, and in the future…even if it means declining
involvement with the reservation system?”
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A review by the General Accounting Office was requested by Senator James Abourezk
(D-SD), Chairman of the AIPRC and a major supporter of the American Indian Movement55
(Abourezk 1972), on August 5, 1976. The GAO was tasked to “review the organization,
operation, management, accounting, and control of the American Indian Policy Review
Commission” (GAO 1977). Their audit “was directed toward ascertaining whether the
Commission carried out its activities in accordance to the provisions of its authorizing legislation
and whether these activities were properly managed and controlled” (GAO 1977). The GAO
report was submitted less than a year later, on June 29, 1977. While financial discrepancies such
as double payments for air travel, improperly documented payments to consultants and members,
and payments for air travel that had no official purpose were found on audit, the work was
completed within its amended time and budget (GAO 1977, 4).

Legislative History of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
From the beginning, much of the discussion involving the Indian Child Welfare Act56 focused
not so much on the needs of individual tribal members as it did what is best for “the tribe.”
According to Jones, Representative Morris Udall (D-NM) stated during a congressional floor
debate that "Indian tribes and Indian people are being drained of their children and, as a result,
their future as a tribe and a people is being placed in jeopardy. " Representative Robert
Lagomarsino (R-CA) agreed, stating, "This bill is directed at conditions which…threaten…the
future of American Indian tribes" (B. Jones 2006). The Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of
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According to AIM leader Russell Means, Senator Abourezk hired Means as a Congressional staff person while
Means was still in prison. Means was at that point the only convict in history to work for a Senator while serving
prison time (Russell Means: About, 2014).
56
PUBLIC LAW 95-608, 25 USC Chapter 21 (United States 1978)
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Choctaw Indians and representative of the National Tribal Chairmen's Association, Mr. Calvin
Isaac, stated:
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children,
the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in
non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their People. Furthermore,
these practices seriously undercut the tribes' ability to continue as self-governing
communities. Probably in no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be
respected than in an area as socially and culturally determinative as family
relationships (B. Jones 2006).
The Act itself reiterates that a prominent reason for the legislation was to protect the
political existence of the tribe, asserting that:
1901(3) there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of American Indian tribes than their children… (4) an alarmingly high
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and
institutions; and (5) the states…have often failed to recognize the essential tribal
relations of Indian people and the culture and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities and families. (1902) …it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes… (United States 1978).
The Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs held an oversight hearing concerning the
placement of children with tribal heritage in 1974. With the hearing testimony consisting of the
statements by chosen tribal officials and their advocates, the premise of child abduction, racism,
and that “serious emotional problems often occur as a result of placing Indian children in homes
which do not reflect their 'special cultural needs” was supported (US Congress: House 1978,
31).
The Indian Child Welfare Act was first introduced by Abourezk in 1976 as Senate Bill
3777. When that bill failed to get out of committee, Abourezk introduced it again in 1977 as
Senate Bill 1214. Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), Senator George McGovern (D-SD), and
two others cosponsored the bill. With its four titles, it was considered a “multipurpose piece of
legislation.” The first title was designed to clarify jurisdiction over and establish procedure for
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the placement of children who had tribal heritage. According to the bill, the purpose of this was
to ensure that parents of tribal heritage would receive fair hearings” (US Congress. Senate 1977).
Title II authorized financial grants directly to tribal governments and organizations. Title III
authorized the collection of all records concerning the placement of children who have tribal
heritage and set up timetables for this to be implemented. Title IV required the Secretary of
Interior to conduct a study concerning the lack of local schools on some reservations and the
impact that has on children (US Congress. Senate 1977).
The Senate-Select Committee on Indian Affairs held a public hearing on SB 1214 on
August 4, 1977. Testimony revealed that Federal, State and local agencies continually failed to
develop understanding and sensitivity to the cultural needs of Indian children” and had an
“abysmally poor record for returning Indian children to their natural parents” (US Congress:
House 1978, 32). The hearings also heard testimony that the Quinault Nation in Washington
had a substantial decrease in number of children in placement since the inception of their child
and family development programs. The Subcommittee found a need for special legislation
concerning children because of “the extreme poverty which exists on reservation areas and
among Indian families near the reservations and because of the unique cultural differences” (US
Congress: House 1978, 33). The Subcommittee also noted that “Assimilation has been tried, but
the continual educational under achievement of Indian children contradicts the validity of that
approach. Indian tribes have indicated a strong desire and ability to plan for and operate their
own directly funded programs in a number of areas including child welfare” (US Congress:
House 1978, 33).
Senate Bill 1214 was then debated on the floor of the Senate, amended and passed on
November 4, 1977. One of the disturbing aspects of the bill that received little attention or
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debate was section 1901 (3) (3), that stated “there is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children” and “the United States has
a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members or are eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe” (United States 1978). What is disturbing about this statement is
the final part of the sentence, “or are eligible for membership,” meaning a child does not need to
already have political affiliation with the tribe in order to be affected by the ICWA.
The bill was then transferred to the House of Representatives on November 8, 1977. The
committee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands, which was a subcommittee to the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, held hearings in February and March of 1978 (US
Congress: House 1978). The Subcommittee heard testimony from the following:
Administration for Children, Youth and. Families; Department of the Interior;
National Tribal Chairmen's Association; National Congress of American Indians;
Association of American Indian Affairs; Rosebud Sioux Tribe; Yakima Tribe;
Puyallup Tribe of Washington; American Academy of Child Psychiatry; National
Conference of Catholic Charities; AL-IND-ESK-A Corporation; Tacoma Urban
Indian Center; and Central Maine Indian Association. Other representatives who
provided statements were: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; Great Lakes
Inter-Tribal Council; Boston Indian Council; Minnesota Chippewa Tribe; AH-BENO-GEE Center for Urban and Regional Affairs; Native American Family and
Children Services; Urban Indian Child Resource Center; and Department of Justice
(US Congress: House 1978).
Most of the witnesses represented tribal entities, adoption interests, and federal agencies
and supported the bill. While some adoption agencies and attorneys voiced civil rights concerns
early on and varied Congressmen and the DOJ testified concerning constitutional issues, no one
was specifically asked to testify concerning the reasons families choose not to be involved in the
reservation system – families who were essentially dissidents. Among those concerned about
constitutional and privacy issues was Mary Jane Fales, Director of an Adoption organization
called the ARENA Project. She stated:
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We have close to 1,000 youngsters who are legally free for adoption registered with
us from all over North America, Canada, and the United States and a small, but
significant percentage of those youngsters have some portion of their culture Indian
related. Most of the youngsters do not and have not lived on a reservation. Many of
.those youngsters are not infants; we are talking about older children and we are
very concerned that many of these children…would be prevented from having a
permanent home instead of helped to having one. …we see many children lingering
in foster care all over the country, black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and white and we
hope to knock down these barriers, not build them up. …one of the major questions
we had, was the constitutional question which seemed to have been addressed by a
number of groups and we are pleased to see the waiver clause may be put in... But
I think we get to real questions of jurisdiction and how that would be handled …
(US Congress: House 1978, 42).
Many of the youngsters we-are talking about have significant amounts of
other heritages, like this year we placed some black Indian youngsters in a black
home. There…they will be more comfortable. Their identity problems will be less
in the black culture than they will be in the Indian culture… (1978, 43).
…We are concerned about the biological relationship that some of these
youngsters have with their non-Indian biological parents and what does this mean
if they have for example, a child who is half Caucasian and has lived with a
grandparent on the Caucasian side and has some ties. The way the law is written in
title 1, there may be real restrictions to these youngsters being able to maintain
those biological ties and contacts (1978, 43).
[We also have concerns] …that if the parent chooses to move off the
reservation and make some determination over the future of their child…if the
parent has the right to waiver notification and chooses to go into the State court
sometimes that seems more fair to the privacy or rights of that parent. I am thinking
if you can say if you choose to move to California or say your daughter chose to
move to California and have a child out of wedlock, that your own council back in
your hometown wouldn't have to be notified of the interests of that child or what is
happening with that child and have a right to determine the future of that child
(1978, 43).
Department of Justice Attorney Larry Sims also questioned the constitutionality and
advocated for the parent right to refuse tribal jurisdiction. Chairman Teno Roncalio, not wanting
to muddy the process, told a tribal member who wanted the wording of the bill strengthened:
What we will not want to do is make amendments to this bill that might not be
readily accepted by the Senate on reconsideration on tile bill and end up going to
conference… We are trying to avoid amendments on all legislation that will do no
more than effectively kill bills… So, if we can get the right kind of amendment on
this bill that would be acceptable to the Senate, we might do that, but it would
otherwise create dissension (US Congress: House 1978, 82).
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On April 18, 1978, the House committee marked-up the bill and substituted it as H.R.
12533, sponsored by Udall and Representative Roncalio (D-Wy), and was eventually cosponsored by 14 other Democrats. Many of the recommendations presented in the final report of
the American Indian Policy Review Commission, submitted on May 17 1977, were included in
the subsequent House bill, H.R. 12533, establishing the Indian Child Welfare Act (Fineday
2012). The Committee approved the bill, then sent it to the House floor where it was debated and
amended on October 14, 1978. That same day, the House substituted the text of H.R. 12533 for
the text of S. 1214 and passed S. 1214. The Senate concurred on the amendments the next day,
October 15. The bill, signed by President Carter (US Congress 1978), assured “tribal
governments the opportunity to raise Indian children in a manner reflecting ‘the unique values of
Indian culture’” (25 U.S.C. § 1902).
The bill had been amended, not out of concern for the civil liberties of individuals with
tribal heritage, but out of concern for jurisdictional conflicts with the states. The wording of
1911(a) that both the Department of Interior and the Department of Justice were concerned about
read, “An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any placement of an
Indian child who resides on or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe.” Assistant
Secretary of Interior Forrest J. Gerard explained in his letter, “We believe that reservations
located in States subject to Public Law 83-280 should be specifically excluded from section
101(a)…” (Gerard 1978). Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald agreed:
… [S]ection 101(a) of the House draft, if read literally, would appear to displace
any existing State court jurisdiction over these matters based on Public Law 83280. We doubt that is the intent of the draft because, inter alia, there may not be in
existence tribal courts to assume such State-court jurisdiction as would apparently
be obliterated by this provision (Wald 1978).
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After these letters were received, Congress amended the legislation to include the
“existing Federal law” proviso that became law. On November 8, 1978, the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) became law. Congress declared:
…that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children
from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes
which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for
assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service programs
(25 U.S.C. § 1902).
The new law, 25 USC Chapter 21§1903(4), defined an “Indian child” as any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either
o member of an Indian tribe or
o is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe
It is important to note that Congress has not passed welfare legislation concerning the
children of South Africa, China, England, France, Ireland or any other country. These foreign
nations have never asked for such legislation because they have not needed to. Their authority in
inherent and no one argues it. Yet tribal leaders have gone to both federal and state governments
to request help – because they had to. Jurisdiction over children who are U.S. citizens and state
residents has not been clear, which begs the question as to whether it is inherent to tribal entities.

Ten Years Later: ICWA Hearings
On November 10, 1987, the Select Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held an oversight
hearing on the Indian Child Welfare Act. Chairman Daniel Inouye opened the hearing stating:
It has been nearly 10 years since this act was enacted. An ample period of time has
now passed to determine whether this act and the courts and agencies which
administer it are meeting the expectations of the Congress when the act was
enacted… This act is premised on the concept that the primary authority in matters
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involving the relationship of an Indian child to his parents or extended family
should be the tribe, not the state or federal government. …The act is not limited to
reservation-based tribes…the makes specific provisions for transfers of cases from
State to tribal courts and it requires that States give full faith and credit to the public
acts of an Indian tribe.
With respect to cases over which the State retains jurisdiction, it authorizes
tribes to intervene in the proceedings and participate in the litigation. It imposes
certain evidentiary burdens in State court proceedings, and it establishes placement
preferences to guide State placements. He child will best be served by recognizing
and strengthening the capacity of the tribe to be involved in any legal matters
dealing with the parent-child relationship.
The fundamental premise of the act is that the interest of the child will best
be served by recognizing and strengthening the capacity of the tribe to be involved
in any legal matters dealing with the parent-child relationship.
The clear understanding of the Congress when this act was enacted was that
failure to give due regard to the cultural and social standards of the Indian people
and failure to recognize essential tribal relations is detrimental to the best interests
of the Indian child. …the act is founded on the proposition that there is a trust
responsibility of the United States to provide protection and assistance… (US
Congress. Senate 1987, 1-2).
Those called to testify included:
Tribal officials from the chairman of the ICWA Task Force at the Orange County
Indian Center, the director of Portland’s Indian Legal Services Program Task Force
on ICWA, a spokesperson from the Alaskan Federation of Natives, the director of
Native Services of the Tanana Chiefs Conference, the ICWA Committee Chairman
of the Affiliated Tribes of the Northwest, director of the Division of Social Services
for the Navajo Nation, a council member with the Fort Peck Reservation, a staff
attorney with the Association of American Indian Affairs, a representative of Three
Feathers Associates, and a representative of an Indian Association in Alberta,
Canada; State officials including a representative from the Washington State
Governor’s office on Indian Affairs, and a Commissioner of Juneau’s Department
of Health and Human Services; and federal officials including a Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary for the BIA’s Tribal Services and the Associate Commissioner
for the Health and Human Service’s Division of Children, Youth and Families (US
Congress. Senate 1987, III).
Caleb Shields of the Fort Peck Executive Board testified they had recently negotiated an
agreement with the State of Montana that allowed the tribal government to receive title IV(E)
funds while requiring the state to provide protective services. The state also recognizes Fort
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Peck’s tribal court jurisdiction over children from other tribes, and Fort Peck’s own foster care
standards for purposes of federal foster care funds (US Congress. Senate 1987, 3).
Alfred Ketzler, Sr, Director of Native Services of Fairbanks, AK also testified for more
funds going straight to tribes without being “subject to State veto” and accused States of
engaging in “moral blackmail” when they advocate for the best interest of the child (US
Congress. Senate 1987, 10-11). Hazel Elbert, of the BIA, however, testified that up to 89% of
homes were involved in alcohol or abuse programs, and the placement of children needs to be
done on a “case-by-case” basis in order to keep from placing children into a worse situation than
they already are (US Congress. Senate 1987, 24).
Julie Kitka of the Alaskan Federation of Natives stated that voluntary proceedings were a
“loophole in the Indian Child Welfare Act” (US Congress. Senate 1987, 12). No one was listed
who was not testifying on behalf of tribal, federal, or state interests. No one was asked to
represent citizens of tribal heritage who were purposeful dissidents of tribal government or who
had experienced harmful consequences of tribal government involvement.
On May 11, 1988, a hearing was held to address S. 1976, an amendment to the Indian
Child Welfare Act. In that hearing, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs and Cherokee
tribal member, Ross Swimmer, presented a letter from the Secretary of the Interior, Donald P.
Hodel (US Congress. Senate 1988, 46). In that letter, Secretary Hodel states:
I am extremely alarmed over the provisions of S. 1976… this bill fails the test of
reasonable balance. It would skew the balance in a manner which is wholly
unacceptable to the Department of the Interior and should be unacceptable to any
persons who are concerned about human rights issues, especially including the
human rights of children.
Although there are multiple flaws in the bill, we call your attention to three
fundamental objections:
First, the bill is anathema to the salutary constitutional principle that
legislation cannot stand if it makes classifications and distinctions based on race.
If enacted, this bill would subject certain Indian children to the claim of jurisdiction
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of an Indian tribe solely by reason of the children’s race. For example, under section
101(b) of the bill, if a tribe seeks transfer of a child custody or adoption case from
State court to the tribe, the parents’ objection to such transfer will be unavailing
unless the objection is “determined to be consistent with the best interests of the
child as an Indian.” The provision ignores all other aspects of the child’s status as
a human being. That, in my view, is pure racism…
Second, the bill is contrary to what I believe is sound prevailing public policy
in this country…This bill subordinates the best interests of the child to that of the
tribe. While we all can agree that a child’s knowledge of an exposure to his or her
cultural heritage can be a vital and valuable aspect of the child’s personality and
value system, it is wrong to elevate that concept to a point where it overrides
virtually every other concern bearing on the fundamental well-being of the child.
Third, at least the current act limits the jurisdictional claim of the tribe to the
children of tribal members. Such membership typically is obtained by voluntary
enrollment or at least can be terminated by the Indian’s voluntary act, thereby
creating a situation where the tribal members arguably may be said to have
consented to application of tribal law.
This bill, however, extends the jurisdictional reach of the tribe to children
whose parents need not be tribal members. Indeed, the parents and other ancestors
of the child may have had no connection with the tribe perhaps for years or even
generations…
The bill does substantial violence to important constitutional principles and
to sound public policy…The bill should not be enacted (US Congress. Senate 1988,
46-47).
Swimmer agreed with the Secretary and asserted that the bill endangered children who
were tri-racial, forcing children with distinctive non-native features to live in a reservation
community where those features become a stumbling block (US Congress. Senate 1988, 47).
Swimmer offered an example of an over-reach by his own tribe, the Cherokee Nation, and went
on to state:
We are subjecting Indian children who may have no interest nor their parents ever
have any interest in being Indian or being on or near a reservation of being sent to
a reservation or sent to an Indian environment in which they did not grow up and
do not want their children raised in…saying that, in effect, the natural mother is not
capable of determining what the best interests of the child are (US Congress. Senate
1988, 48).
…There are other provisions in the act that are, I think, just as onerous. One
of them is the removal of alcohol abuse and nonconforming social behavior as a
reason to remove a child from a home…We see cases on a regular basis of child
abuse in Indian country and particularly those of alcoholic families I don’t think we

157

can justify it and simply say because alcohol in certain cases is prevalent in an area
that that should be removed as an excuse.
…we need to address what is going on the reservation. We need more social
workers out there. We project the possible cost of just the amendments is going to
be $7 or $8 million. I would take that money and add social providers out there and
people who could work directly with families, who could help remove some of the
problems that we see out there on a regular basis with families (1988, 49).
The bill went no further.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court later affirmed ICWA’s purpose, maintaining that the
law was in response to “rising concern …over the consequences to Indian children, Indian
families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of
large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption and foster care
placemen” (Mississippi Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield 1989). The Court then went further, and
placed protection of the tribe as a body above the rights of individual parents and even the
children when it said:
Congress determined to subject such placements to the ICWA’s jurisdictional and
other provisions, even in cases where the parents consented to an adoption, because
of concerns going beyond the wishes of individual parents. As the 1977 Final
Report of the congressionally established American Indian Policy Review
Commission stated, in summarizing these two concerns, “[r]emoval of Indian
children from their cultural setting seriously impacts a long-term tribal survival and
has damaging social and psychological impact on many individual Indian
children.” Senate Report, at 52. [490 U.S. 30, 51] (Mississippi Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield 1989).
Holyfield contends in footnote 24 that children of heritage who have been raised in white
homes suffer “developmental problems” and ““[t]he Act is based on the fundamental assumption
that it is in the Indian child’s best interest that its relationship to the tribe be protected” (1989),
The ICWA had found its way to the Supreme Court within the decade because many
individuals who had heritage fought back in court, citing constitutional issues. Not all families
or children wanted tribal governments to have legal jurisdiction over them.
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Some State courts, in support of the civil rights of individuals, ruled that children with no
genuine connection to Indian Country should not be involuntarily forced into a legal relationship
with tribal governments. The initial case explaining this "Existing Indian Family Doctrine" or
“Existing Indian Family Exception” was In re Adoption of Baby Boy L. (1982), involving an outof-wedlock child of a non-Indian mother and an Indian father (Adoption of Baby Boy L. 1982).
The Kansas Supreme Court stated:
A careful study of the legislative history behind the Act and the Act itself discloses
that the overriding concern of Congress and the proponents of the Act was the
maintenance of the family and tribal relationships existing in Indian homes and to
set minimum standards for the removal of Indian children from their existing Indian
environment. It was not to dictate that an illegitimate infant who has never been a
member of an Indian home or culture, and probably never would be, should be
removed from its primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian environment
over the express objections of its non-Indian mother (Adoption of Baby Boy L.
1982, 175).
Another often-cited case was In re Bridget R. (1996),57 where birth parents had not
wanted the tribe to be involved in their adoption process, and which states, "It is almost too
obvious to require articulation that the unique values of Indian culture will not be preserved in
the homes of parents who have become fully assimilated into non-Indian culture” (In re Bridget
R. 1996, 1507). It was also stated in Bridget R.:
If tribal determinations are indeed conclusive for purposes of applying ICWA, and
if…a particular tribe recognizes as members all persons who are biologically
descended from historic tribal members, then children who are related by blood to
such a tribe may be claimed by the tribe, and thus made subject to the provisions of
ICWA, solely on the basis of their biological heritage. Only children who are
racially Indians face this possibility (In re Bridget R. 1996).
Other citations used in support of the EIF doctrine include:
a) In re Santos Y,58 the court found “Application of the ICWA to a child whose
only connection with an Indian tribe is a one-quarter genetic contribution
does not serve the purpose for which the ICWA was enacted…” Santos
57
58

In re Bridget R. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 [49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507]
In re Santos Y. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1274, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 692
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quoted from Bridget R’s due process and equal protection analysis at length.
Santos also notes that “Congress considered amending the ICWA to
preclude application of the ‘existing Indian family doctrine’ but did not do
so” (In re Santos Y. 2001).
b) In re Alexandria Y. (1996),59 the court held that “recognition of the existing
Indian family doctrine [was] necessary to avoid serious constitutional flaws
in the ICWA” and held that the trial court had acted properly in refusing to
apply ICWA “because neither [child] nor [mother] had any significant
social, cultural, or political relationship with Indian life; thus, there was no
existing Indian family to preserve” (In re Alexandria Y. 1996).
c) In Bridget R., the court stated, “if the Act applies to children whose families
have no significant relationship with Indian tribal culture, such application
runs afoul of the Constitution in three ways:
• it impermissibly intrudes upon a power ordinarily reserved to the
states
• it improperly interferes with Indian children’s fundamental due
process rights respecting family relationships; and
• on the sole basis of race, it deprives them of equal opportunities to
be adopted that are available to non-Indian children and exposes
them…to having an existing non-Indian family torn apart through
an after the fact assertion of tribal and Indian-parent rights under
ICWA” (In re Bridget R. 1996)
Jones disagrees with the EIF doctrine and points out that although some courts hold that
“the Act should not apply to an otherwise qualified Indian child who has not lived with an Indian
family or with an Indian family with few or no ties to an Indian tribe” (B. Jones 2006), those
court have been wrong:
The language of the Act does not support such an exception, but these Courts have
asserted that such an exception is consistent with the legislative history of the Act.
Other courts and commentators have strongly criticized this exception and some
state legislatures have taken action to repeal the judicially-created exception (2006).
Jones states further that if there is even a small hint the child has Indian heritage, the
corresponding tribe must be notified – whether the child has been connected to the tribe or not,
“In any child custody proceeding in state court where a party believes or has reason to believe
that the child involved is an Indian child there is an affirmative obligation on the part of all
59
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parties, and their attorneys, to report such to the Court so that notice may be given to the Indian
child's tribe” (B. Jones 2006).
Problems grew as tribal governments insisted that Congress, the White House, the
Courts, the State legislatures and all social services do their part to strengthen the ICWA and
prevent individuals from using “loopholes” to thwart “the law.”
Allen was Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights when it was investigating
abuses of the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1988. He states that federal Indian law, distinct from that
of other citizens, “implicates the rights of citizens.” He writes that the ICWA, in particular, “is a
case study of rights imperiled by the process of legislating for tribes without regard to citizens.”
Citing the 1988 “Final Report of the Survey of Indian Child Welfare,”60 Allen further
contends that the ICWA “produces institutional child neglect and abuse without recourse to
fundamental due process protections” (W. B. Allen 1990, 16). Stating that abuses he had
“personally documented, received innumerable complaints about, and seen reflected in official
testimony and reports” are the “natural concomitants of the systemics liabilities of this approach
to cultural preservation,” he cited “five leading consequences of the ICWA:”
1. Fewer adoptions, coupled with increasing resistance to termination of parental
rights.
2. Concerns about a lack of tribal accountability which undermines even
potentially positive enforcement of the act.
3. A not insignificant absence of tribal courts in many places and, hence, adequate
due process.
4. Federal-level efforts to communicate performance standards and to monitor or
enforce compliance have been limited.
5. No reduction in the flow of Indian children into substitute care has resulted,
coupled with a dramatic shortage of Indian foster homes, and a decline in
adoption rates spells disaster for Indian youths (1990, 16).
Indian Child Welfare: A Status Report, “Final Report of the Survey of Indian Child Welfare and Implementation
of the Indian Child Welfare Act and Section 428 of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,”
prepared by CSR Incorporated (Washington, D. C.) and Three Feathers Associates (Norman, OK) for the
Administration for Children, Youth and Families, U. S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, April 18, 1988 (W. B. Allen 1990, 16, note 11).
60
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The Fight to Protect Civil Rights

US Commission on Civil Rights:
Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act (1985-1989)
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights began looking into breaches of the Indian Civil Rights Act
in 1985 after adopting a written project proposal. The Commission’s subcommittee
subsequently conducted the most extensive study of the ICRA ever accomplished. 178 people
testified, including tribal judges, council members, U.S. Attorneys, private citizens, scholars,
attorneys, and even Ross Swimmer – the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs. Most essential
was the testimony of private citizens who had suffered violation of their civil rights at the hands
out of a tribal government (W. B. Allen 1990, 7).
Hearing locations were chosen purposefully. “Rapid City was chosen for its proximity to
the Rosebud, Cheyenne River, and Oglala Sioux Tribes, all of which were generally perceived to
be experiencing difficulty properly enforcing the ICRA. Flagstaff…was selected for its
proximity to the Navajo and Zuni Pueblo Tribes, and because the Navajo judicial system was
reputedly the best in Indian Country’ (W. B. Allen 1990, 7).
Later, hearings were added in Portland because tribal judges in the Northwest had asked
to be heard, Washington DC to hear from Bureaucrats charged with enforcing ICRA; Phoenix, to
hear from three members of the Navajo judiciary concerning their inability to be an independent
branch; and a second hearing in Flagstaff for four reasons: recent reports of civil rights
violations; issues with the ICWA; “allegations of threats to the independence of the Navajo
judiciary, and recent amendments to the Navajo Tribe’s sovereign immunity act” (W. B. Allen
1990, 7).
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As Chairman of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights during the ICRA hearings in
Phoenix, Arizona on September 29, 1988, Dr. Allen made the opening statement. Observing that
in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,61 the Court held that except for writs of habeas corpus, “the
Indian Civil Rights Act was enforced only in tribal forums and was no longer enforceable…in
the Federal courts,” Allen asserted:
It is important to note that the Court in [Martinez] predicated its holding upon the
finding, and I quote, that ‘tribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by
the ICRA.’ If not, the Court said, Congress has authority to provide other recourse.
It is significant also that the Supreme Court thought that aggrieved Indians
could press their ICRA claims with the Secretary of the Interior in those situations
where tribal constitutions require secretarial approval of any changes. The
Secretary of the Interior could simply withhold approval of those changes pending
resolution of the alleged ICRA enforcement problem. This subcommittee has
found, however, that what the Supreme Court in Martinez thought was the case
simply is not the case; The Department of Interior is doing nothing to enforce the
ICRA, nor even to monitor its enforcement.
Have we found problems with regard to the civil rights of American Indians
and with their governments? Certainly, we have heard much about such problems.
Some of these problems appear to be systemic, such as tribal council members’
interference with tribal judges’ decision making; sovereign immunity claims to
block ICRA enforcement, thereby rending the ICRA unenforceable; and thirdly,
inadequate training and funding for tribal courts.
Other problems we have found concerned not systemic problems but
particular problems or, in other words, violations of the various provisions of the
ICRA. Examples include verbal search warrants, ex parte hearings, incarceration
without being apprised of the charges, inadequate representation by counsel, and
the dismissal of a tribal prosecutor on eight occasions by the tribal council over
politically based disagreements with her prosecution of the law (United States
Commission on Civil Rights 1988, 2).
Individual tribal members had little protection or recourse through the Department of
Justice. According to Tracy Toulou, Director of Tribal Justice at the DOJ, legislation directed at
tribal members is not discriminatory because it is based on a political distinction, not a racial
distinction. Further, the DOJ has no obligation to represent justice for individual tribal members
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as their mandate is to defend tribal governments and tribal sovereignty – even if it meant
defending tribal governments against individual members (CAICW 2004).
Having served as both a member and Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
during the investigation of violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act, in 1990 Dr. Allen submitted
a public statement following the publication of the Commission’s final report. His statement
begins:
The temptation to approve this report is great despite its manifest errors of legal
and historical interpretation. The reason for this is that the Commission’s study has
finally been freed from its unhealthy and collusive connection with the Department
of Justice’s efforts to build a case for legislation previously introduced as S. 517.
During that earlier phase the Commission actually had less control over its own
study than did certain staff from the Department of Justice. The sheer scope and
importance of the inquiry, however, had the effect of producing a record of far
greater weight than the collusion intended. Despite the passage of time and changes
in staff, the record remains to support a broader effort, and the Commission’s study
is now free from those prior suspicions. Nevertheless, some aspects of the prior
analysis remain in the final product (to be expected, since the whole work could not
be redone), and these convey erroneous conclusions even while no longer
supporting their pre-determined end. I write, now, therefore, largely to clarify these
errors of legal and historical analysis and also to take full advantage of the rich
record this six-year study produced.
Moreover, I cannot concur in a report that claimed fewer than ninety
seconds of substantive Commission deliberation after more than six years study and
six-hundred thousand dollars of resources invested in it. The report is far briefer
than such an extensive record would seem to justify. Furthermore, the direction of
its recommendations, contrary to the recommendations of the very worthwhile
“Final Report and Legislative Recommendations” of the Special Committee on
Investigations of the Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the United States
Senate, is to infuse the federal government even deeper into custodial care of
Indians, while the gravamen of our findings is that that is the very source of most
of the problems we uncovered.
This abbreviated version seems to suggest far less importance for the
ultimate product than I believe it in fact merits. Indeed, I am persuaded that the
hearing and study record behind this report make it possible, for the first time in
our history, for the Government of the United States to be completely honest rather
than merely apologetic about its failures in treating with American Indians. The
approved Commission “Report” fails to live up to this high expectation.
Accordingly, I add now my own brief statement about the meaning of this extensive
record (W. B. Allen 1990, 1).
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Allen states that what the Commission factually found was:
I.

II.

There is no foundation for Congress’ and the Court’s assertion of a “plenary power”
over Indian tribes taken as independent and sovereign governments. Such a
“plenary power” neither has been nor can be acquired by conquest, treaty, or
constitutional stipulation.
A. Whatever may be the rule in international law, the assertion of complete
and arbitrary power over non-citizens by the Government of the United
States is incompatible with the Constitution of the United States, which
is superior to every positive determination by the Government.
B. Even if complete and arbitrary power over non-citizens were possible
for the Government of the United States, such unlimited power could
not be extended over citizens who, as such, are parties to the
Constitution that limits the power of government.
1. Nor can citizens be placed outside of the protection of the
Constitution by means of the fiction of “government to
government relations,” where the “government” with which the
United States deals is not in fact independent and sovereign
(including control of its own territory).
a) Therefore, insofar as the ICRA applies to U. S.
citizens, it exceeds the power of Congress to
enact.
C. The Congress of the United States can legitimately exercise no power
over tribes whose members are citizens of the United States which
power is not in fact a power over the citizens themselves and therefore
subject to the relevant constitutional limitations.
1. With respect to special protections afforded against lawfully
subordinate governments, the United States has no power
whatever to make exceptions, for any purpose whatever.
a) With respect to special protections afforded against
lawfully subordinate governments, the United States
may not apply a lesser standard of protection against
itself.
D. Not one federal dollar has been spent on the enforcement of fundamental
civil rights of American citizens domiciled on reservations since the
1978 Supreme Court decision, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
The Government of the United States has failed to provide for Indians living on
reservations guarantees of those fundamental rights it is obliged to secure for all U. S.
citizens living on territory controlled by the United States and under the laws of the
United States.
A. In abandoning by act of Congress individual U. S. citizens to the
indeterminate control of tribal governments without recourse to federal
courts of judicature the United States thereby fails to provide the just
constitutional claims for which all citizens may pray (W. B. Allen 1990,
2).
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B. Federal legislation for tribes, as distinct from citizens, implicates the
rights of citizens in other areas.
1. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is a case study of rights
imperiled by the process of legislating for tribes without regard to
citizens.
a) ICWA produces institutional child neglect and abuse
without recourse to fundamental due process
protections
2. Congress established the Legal Services Corporation to provide
legal representation for indigent clients in civil cases. An exception
to a general prohibition against uses of Corporation funds in
criminal cases is provided where persons are charged with a criminal
misdemeanor or less in a tribal court, 42 U.S.C. §2996f(b)(2); 45
C.F.R. §1613.4. In 1988, Corporation staff advised the Commission
that the Corporation had allocated $7 million for all Native
American legal services programs, of which 10 were reservation
based and were located near reservations. Discussions with
Corporation staff indicated that many of these programs are
overseen by boards of directors that include tribal council members,
and that these programs frequently represent tribal governments in
relation to state governments or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The
use of tribal council members as directors of the programs ostensibly
set up to provide representation of indigent American Indians in
litigation against tribal governments calls into question the integrity
of these programs
III.
Enforcement of ICRA by tribal governments: The record of hearings and studies
justifies the conclusion that tribal enforcement of ICRA has been at best uneven; sometimes
reaching to customary levels of expectation among Anglo-American jurisdictions, often
lacking altogether.
A. Among the explanations for, and examples of, the failures are a number
of individual and systemic factors.
1. Claims of sovereign immunity.
2. Lack of autonomy in judicial offices.
3. Woeful lack of funding of tribal courts.
4. The Secretary of the Interior has failed to use statutory means
(§450m of Public Law 93-638)
to enforce the ICRA.
5. General allegations of illegal searches and seizures.
6. Widespread denial of the right to counsel.
7. Ex parte hearings.
8. Restriction of right to a jury trial.
9. Violations of freedom of the press.
10. Violations of due process and equal protection of the laws.
11. Cruel and unusual punishments.
(W. B. Allen 1990, 2-3)
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Allen further notes that the official report of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights
concerning civil rights for tribal members argued that the Constitution does not apply to Indian
tribes (W. Allen 2010, 20). “Plenary power” is “exclusive jurisdiction” for the federal
government – to the exclusion of jurisdiction of the states the tribes are located in, as well as the
exclusion of not only Constitutional rights for tribal members, but of the truths the Founding
Fathers knew as self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. “That is why it has proved impossible to found federal concern for the civil rights of
Indians on ‘plenary power’” (W. Allen 2010, 19). This error “falls to the responsibility of the
United States government, which has operated with respect to the Indian outside the limits of the
Constitution (W. B. Allen 1990, 10).

Duro v. Reina
In Duro,62 the United States Supreme Court found another area of potential unconstitutional
authority. The Court ruled that “Criminal trial and punishment is so serious an intrusion on
personal liberty that its exercise over non-Indian citizens was a power necessarily surrendered by
the tribes in their submission to the overriding sovereignty of the United States” (Duro v. Reina
1990). The Court elaborated:
We hesitate to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out another
group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not
include them. As full citizens, Indians share in the territorial and political
sovereignty of the United States. The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a
recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who
consent to be tribal members. Indians like all other citizens share allegiance to the
overriding sovereign, the United States. A tribe’s additional authority comes from
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the consent of its members, and so in the criminal sphere membership marks the
bounds of tribal authority (Duro v. Reina 1990, 693).
Poore reasons that it would come as a great surprise to the 1924 Congress and to many
tribal members that by "consenting" to tribal membership they are “waiving their constitutional
rights vis-a-vis the tribe. Such a concept is contrary to the rest of constitutional law.” Rather,
Poore maintains that the 1924 Congress believed it had abolished tribal government – and never
imagined this type of jurisdictional issue would rise up (J. A. Poore 1998, 60)
Indicating concern for how non-members would be treated in tribal court, the Supreme
Court cited Cohen 334-335 as reference when asserting that tribal courts are “often ‘subordinate
to the political branches of tribal governments’ and their legal methods may depend on
‘unspoken practices and norms.’” The Court then cited Talton v. Mayes (1896)63 when noting
that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribal governments. “The Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 provides some statutory guarantees of fair procedure, but these guarantees are not
equivalent to their constitutional counterparts.” (1990, 693). In their Holdings, the Court ruled
that when it comes to criminal enforcement, “tribal power does not extend beyond internal
relations among members” (1990, 688). The Court noted:
…the tribes are not mere fungible groups of homogeneous persons among whom
any Indian would feel at home. On the contrary, wide variations in customs, art,
language, and physical characteristics separate the tribes, and their history has been
marked by both intertribal alliances and animosities (1990 at 695).
Poore contends that dicta in Duro “suggested that Indians who are tribal members are
second-class citizens, in that they may not have the same rights, vis-à-vis their own tribes, that
other citizens – even Indians who are not member of that tribe “ (J. A. Poore 1998, 60). The
Court stated, “…criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by our precedents and justified
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by the voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant right of participation in a
tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent” (1990, 694).
The Court cited some of its cases from over a century earlier that had maintained that
principle, including that “a non-Indian could not, through his adoption into the Cherokee Tribe,
bring himself within the federal definition of ‘Indian’ for purposes of an exemption to a federal
jurisdictional provision.” The Court noted that despite this, tribes enjoy a broad legal freedom
over their members that is “not enjoyed by any other governmental authority in this country.”
The Court ruled:
…the Bill of Rights is inapplicable to tribes, and… the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968… does not give rise to a federal cause of action against the tribe for violations
of its provisions. This is all the more reason to reject an extension of tribal authority
over those who have not given the consent of the governed that provides a
fundamental basis for power within our constitutional system. See Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 455 U.S. 172-173 (1982) (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting) (Duro v. Reina 1990, 694).
According to Metropoulos, while not making the actual ruling on Constitutional grounds,
the Court did not say or imply “that in fashioning a remedy Congress could act without regard to
constitutional constraints, specifically equal protection and due process guarantees” (Brief for
Amicus Curiae of TM. EM & RM 2003, 9).

The Push to Prevent Civil Rights

‘Duro Fix’ (1991)
Metropoulos had said the Court did not say or imply “that in fashioning a remedy Congress
could act without regard to constitutional constraints, specifically equal protection and due
process guarantees” (2003, 9). And yet they did.
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According to Metropoulos, a year later, a few members of the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs “fixed” the damage done by the Supreme Court by “slapping a rider64 amending
the Indian Civil Rights Act onto a defense bill.” The amendment, based on tribal sovereignty
rather than a federal delegation of power, is said to have again violated the civil rights of
individual tribal members:
…it cannot be said the ICRA amendments endured congressional scrutiny prior to
enactment. …they were attached as a rider to the 1991 Defense Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 101-511, §8077(b)-(d), 104 Stat. 1856, 1802-93(1990), with the
promise of “comprehensive legislation” to follow. Ex post facto hearings took place
the following summer at which not a single witness spoke for individual
nonmember Indians. Moreover, no “comprehensive legislation” was considered
much less enacted. Instead, the emergency language enacted… in 1990 was simply
made permanent. Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (Brief for Amicus
Curiae of TM. EM & RM 2003, 9).
The Supreme Court case United States v. Billy Jo Lara65 gave opportunity for the ‘Duro
Fix’ to be argued. According to Metropoulos, when Congress enacted these amendments to the
ICRA, it was because a small number of Congressmen wanted to “‘recognize and affirm’ preconstitutional inherent sovereign power in Indian tribes that the Court had ruled they do not
possess” (Brief for Amicus Curiae of TM. EM & RM 2003, 12). Metropoulos notes in his Lara
brief that the 2000 Census reported 4,119,301 “Indians” in the United States, of which 1,698,483
were enrolled in a tribe. The U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of “American Indian” includes
people who have native heritage and “maintain tribal affiliation or community attachment.”66
Metropoulos explains, “…this means 1.7 million U.S. citizens are subject to criminal prosecution
in tribal courts of which they are not members first and foremost because of their race.” He notes
further, however, that despite controlling federal law that says one can be an Indian without
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being a tribal member, “Petitioner’s analysis” as to who is an “Indian” for purposes of the ICRA
amendments consigns “in excess of 4 million U.S. citizens, because of their race, to nonconstitutional prosecution and punishment” (2003, 11).
Metropoulos further notes that the amendments are clearly based on a racial
classification, not a ‘political’ classification. Those who are being swept under the tribal court
are all those with racial heritage – not just those who are voluntary members of the tribe. “No
compelling federal interest justifies this, and the amendments are not narrowly tailored.”
Metropoulos points out there are viable alternatives that would not require racial profiling.
“Congress could either expressly empower states to prosecute misdemeanor crimes allegedly
committed by all nonmembers or require federal authorities to do so.” He then suggests that
although those remedies might seem “unpalatable to the politically powerful forces that pushed
for the ICRA amendments…the goal of prosecuting misdemeanor crimes cannot justify the
deprivation of rights… that results from subjecting certain citizens, solely because of their race,
to non-constitutional criminal tribunals” (2003, 12-13).
Attorney, Choctaw tribal member, and president of Native American Women for Justice,
Scott Kayla Morrison identified several constitutional and other rights infringed upon by tribal
governments, including freedom of speech and press, equal protection, parental rights, limited
right to dissolve "membership" or disenroll from political affiliation with the tribe, the right to a
fair trial, access to records, the ability to audit one’s council, and the ability to sue the tribal
government. She stated, “…[t]he only place in the industrialized world where immunity hasn’t
been waived is in tribal governments” (Morrison 2000).
"There is no U.S. Constitution on many reservations," declared Morrison. "We have no
free speech, no right to assemble. All of this is in the U.S. Bill of Rights, which we don’t have.”
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While the Indian Civil Rights Act was meant to secure basic rights for tribal members, it was not
enough. Morrison explained, “We have only a watered-down version of that bill of rights, but it
is not enforceable because, where do you go to enforce it? We have to go to the tribal courts,
which are in the pocket of the tribal councils, which are often the ones violating the rights”
(Morrison 2000). Allen contends in his statement concerning civil rights for tribal members that:
The problem aimed at by the “Duro-fix” did not originate with 1950s selfdetermination nor even the 1934 “Reorganization Act,” as the [Civil Rights
Commission] Report implies. Like so many other evils it originated in the
paternalism of the early 19th century. 1 Cohen 2-3 offers a compelling account of
its early origins. A primitive version of “self-government” policy was contained in
the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act: “That so much of the laws of the United States
as provides for the punishment of crimes committed within any place within the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall be in force in the Indian
Country: Provided, the same shall not extent to crimes committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian” [note omitted]. In short primitive
“self-government” was nothing but a federal license for Indians to abuse one
another, even if it did convey by implication a kind of racially construed “sole and
exclusive jurisdiction” to tribes themselves. Since U. S. jurisdiction must follow
the power to punish crimes by whites against Indians and crimes by Indians against
whites, clearly the tribes cannot have “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” within their
territory however construed. This comports with Cohen’s definition of “Indian
Country” at p. 5 as “country within which Indian laws and custom and federal laws
relating to Indians are generally applicable.” Thus, they receive the concession to
handle crimes of Indians against Indians, meaning that their jurisdiction is as to race
alone. That will remain true unless the proposed “Duro-fix” extends a truly general
jurisdiction (W. B. Allen 1990, 16).
Metropoulos agrees, adding that it is only in narrowly defined, extraordinary
circumstances that the United States may “prosecute citizens of the United States in tribunals not
required to accord the defendant all the protections of the Constitution and its amendments. (Reid
v. Covert).” 67 (2003, 23):
Yet, the ICRA amendments, leaving aside for the moment their racially
discriminatory aspect, clearly, knowingly subject U.S. citizens to the power of
sovereigns unconstrained by the Constitution. This power is real. Tribes may fine
a convicted defendant for up to $5000 and imprison him for up to a year in tribal
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jail for each offence. Even the power of Congress over Indians is limited by their
rights as U.S. citizens (2003, 23).
Metropoulos states that Congress simply cannot constitutionally authorize a domestic
political entity to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens without according them their
full constitutional rights. “First among these are the rights of political participation, i.e., consent,
from which all other government power flows. See Duro, 110 S.Ct. at 2064, citing Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)” (2003, 24).
L Scott Gould, Associate Professor of Law at Rutgers, agreed on the constitutionality,
concluding that the ‘Duro fix,’68 “although conceived by advocates of Indians and supported by
Indians themselves, is ill-suited to its purpose, is inherently racist, and should be held
unconstitutional” (Gould 1994).
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurrence69 in the Lara judgment,
stated that it was time to reexamine the “premise and logic” of the Court’s tribal sovereignty
cases. He suggests that much of the confusion arises from two “incompatible and doubtful
assumptions.” The first questionable assumption is that “Congress (rather than some other part of
the Federal Government) can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without rendering tribal
sovereignty a nullity.” Thomas cites United States v. Wheeler70 (1978) for reference. The second
assumption is that “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty to enforce their criminal laws
against their own members” (id., at 326). Based on these two assumptions, which are precedent
at the moment, Thomas states he is forced to concur in the Lara judgment.
However, he states he wrote separately primarily because “the Court fails to confront
these tensions, a result that flows from the Court’s inadequate constitutional analysis:”
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I cannot agree with the Court, for instance, that the Constitution grants to Congress
plenary power to calibrate the “metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.” Ante, at 8;
see also ante, at 15 (holding that “the Constitution authorizes Congress” to regulate
tribal sovereignty). Unlike the Court, ante, at 5– 6, I cannot locate such
congressional authority in the Treaty Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, §2, cl. 2, or the
Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Additionally, I would ascribe much more
significance to legislation such as the Act of Mar. 3, 1871, Rev. Stat. §2079, 16
Stat. 566, codified at 25 U. S. C. §71, that purports to terminate the practice of
dealing with Indian tribes by treaty. The making of treaties, after all, is the one
mechanism that the Constitution clearly provides for the Federal Government to
interact with sovereigns other than the States. Yet, if I accept that Congress does
have this authority, I believe that the result in Wheeler is questionable. In my view,
the tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns, and our federal Indian law cases
untenably hold both positions simultaneously (United States v. Billy Jo Lara 2003).
Thomas notes that in response to Duro v. Reina, Congress amended the ICRA. The ‘Duro
fix’ “amended ICRA’s definition of the tribes’ ‘powers of self-government’ to ‘recogniz[e] and
affir[m]’ the existence of ‘inherent power … to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians’”
25 U. S. C. §1301(2). Yet, Thomas explains, there is “no way to interpret a recognition and
affirmation of inherent power as a delegation of federal power, as the Court explains…
Delegated power is the very antithesis of inherent power.” He elaborates:
But even if the statute were less clear, I would not interpret it as a delegation of
federal power. The power to bring federal prosecutions, which is part of the putative
delegated power, is manifestly and quintessentially executive power. Morrison v.
Olson,71 (1988). Congress cannot transfer federal executive power to individuals
who are beyond “meaningful Presidential control.” Printz v. United States,72
(1997). And this means that, at a minimum, the President must have some measure
of “the power to appoint and remove” those exercising that power. Id., at 922; see
also Morrison73 (United States v. Billy Jo Lara 2003).
Thomas, citing a Brief for National Congress of American Indians74, observed that the
President does not appear to have control over tribal officials:
Thus, at least until we are prepared to recognize absolutely independent agencies
entirely outside of the Executive Branch with the power to bind the Executive
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Branch (for a tribal prosecution would then bar a subsequent federal prosecution),
the tribes cannot be analogized to administrative agencies, as the dissent suggests,
post, at 2 (opinion of Souter, J.). That is, reading the “Duro fix” as a delegation of
federal power (without also divining some adequate method of Presidential control)
would create grave constitutional difficulties (United States v. Billy Jo Lara 2003).
In addition, citing two cases,75 Thomas stated the Court “has only two options: Either the
“Duro fix” changed the result in Duro or it did nothing at all.” He explained:
… I find it difficult to reconcile the result in Wheeler with Congress’ 1871
prospective prohibition on the making of treaties with the Indian tribes. The Federal
Government cannot simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every aspect
of the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and also maintain that the tribes
possess anything resembling “sovereignty” …The Court should admit that it has
failed in its quest to find a source of congressional power to adjust tribal
sovereignty. Such an acknowledgement might allow the Court to ask the logically
antecedent question whether Congress (as opposed to the President) has this power.
A cogent answer would serve as the foundation for the analysis of the sovereignty
issues posed by this case. We might find that the Federal Government cannot
regulate the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and simultaneously
maintain that the tribes are sovereigns in any meaningful sense. But until we begin
to analyze these questions honestly and rigorously, the confusion that I have
identified will continue to haunt our cases (United States v. Billy Jo Lara 2003).
Finally, Thomas concluded that the very enactment of ICRA by Congress was proof that
inherent sovereignty did not exist. The “enactment of ICRA through normal legislation conflicts
with the notion that tribes possess inherent sovereignty.” An example of the conflict is Title 25
U. S. C. §1302, which requires tribes “in exercising powers of self-government” to afford
defendants ‘most’ of their protections of the Bill of Rights. “I doubt whether Congress could,
through ordinary legislation, require States (let alone foreign nations) to use grand juries”
(United States v. Billy Jo Lara 2003).
In Morris v Tanner, Metropoulos argued that by these amendments, Congress subjected
nonmembers who have tribal heritage, but no others, “to trial and punishment, which includes
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imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of up to $5,000 for each offense, 25 U.S.C. §
1302(7).” Further, tribal governments “are only limited, to some extent, by ICRA, 25 U.S.C. §§
1301, et seq” (Metropoulos, Morris v. Tanner 2006, 12), and:
‘…the only federal remedy is habeas corpus.’ Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 65-66 (1978). Congress explicitly specified only members of one race,
American Indians, for such treatment. It left nonmembers of any other race but who
are no less or more authorized to be on an Indian reservation free from the threat of
criminal prosecution by Indian tribes (2006, 12).
Congress justified the racial favoritism by citing historical distinction by federal
government concerning tribal members and calling the former bias “precedence.” The language
of the 1990 Duro Amendments referred to “all Indians,” and the House Reports with it76 confirm
Congress’ intent to make the distinctions racial. The Report noted that in U.S. v. Rogers (1846)77
“The status of non-member Indians…was clarified…where the Supreme Court held that the
statute applied to Indians as a class, not as members of a tribe, but as part of the family of
Indians”78 (Metropoulos, Morris v. Tanner 2006, 11). The legislative history also notes:
Courts have repeatedly held that the term ‘Indian’ includes any Indian in Indian
Country, without regard to tribal membership. (Citations omitted.) [T]he
Committee intends to clarify precisely that the inherent powers of Indian tribes
include the authority to exercise criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over all Indians
in Indian country.” (The rationale provided by Congress for doing this is,
essentially, that there was a purported “gap” in jurisdiction after Duro to prosecute
crimes allegedly committed by nonmember Indians on reservations and that these
crimes “are the most tedious crimes with which law enforcement officers deal.” Id.
at 373) (Metropoulos, Morris v. Tanner 2006, 11-12).
Metropolous wrote that “if consent to be a member of one Indian tribe is consent to the inherent
sovereign power of all Indian tribes – including their power to imprison,” then 4.1 million
Americans with Tribal heritage – and their non-tribal relatives – are due an explanation from the
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Court about what makes the designation of “Indian” just a “political” and not a racial
classification, “even though only American citizens of the Indian race are adversely impacted”
(2006, 16).
He maintains that if Congress has the constitutional power to “relegate American citizens
to criminal trial and punishment, including potentially imprisonment, by an extraconstitutional
tribunal, unconstrained by the Constitution, for mere misdemeanors” Americans of all heritages
should know the source, reason, location and limit of such power. (Metropoulos, Morris v.
Tanner 2006, 16)

Attempts to Amend the ICWA
On April 23, 1996, Representative Susan Molinari (R-NY) and Representatives Archer,
Bunning, Pryce, Solomon, Shaw and Tiahrt introduced the "Adoption Promotion and Stability
Act of 1996" to the Ways and Means Committee, attaching it to the Small Business Protection
and Minimum Wage Increase Act. The purpose of H.R. 3286 was to help families defray
adoption costs and promote adoption of minority children and had four Titles. Title I and II dealt
with the Adoption Tax Credit and removal of racial barriers to adoption. Title III responded to
the number of families who had been unwillingly subjected to tribal jurisdiction through the
ICWA.
The House Ways and Means Committee and the Committee on Economic and
Educational Opportunities considered Titles I, II, AND IV. The House Resource Committee’s
subcommittee on Indian Affairs considered Title III, which Chairman Young summarized,
stating Title III would:
…amend the Indian Child Welfare Act to exempt from its coverage Indian child
custody proceedings involving Indian children whose parents do not maintain
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significant social, cultural, or political affiliation with the tribe of which the parents
are members…Title III of H.R. 3286 also adds a new, universal requirement to each
tribe’s existing requirements for membership by requiring that “a person who
attains the age of 18 years before becoming a member of an Indian tribe may
become a member of an Indian tribe only upon the person’s written consent (US
Congress. House 1996, 2).
No hearings were held, and the bill was not referred to the Subcommittee on Indian
Affairs. However, the Resource Committee received testimony. It reported:
…letters from twenty-two individual tribes, as well as the Intertribal Council of
Arizona (representing nineteen Indian tribes), the Bureau of Catholic Missions, the
National Congress of American Indians (representing 201 tribes), the Association
on American Indian Affairs, the Native American Rights Fund, the National Indian
Child Welfare Association, the Indian Child Welfare Law Center, and the United
Indians of All Tribes Foundation, all strongly opposing the bill (US Congress.
House 1996, 6).
There is no record of testimony from individuals and families negatively affected by the
ICWA, nor indication that they, as citizens not represented by an organized group, were given
notice or opportunity to testify.
On April 25, 1996, the full Resources Committee met to consider title III of H.R. The
Committee, by voice vote, struck title III from the bill and then, with that amendment, “favorably
reported to the House of Representatives, in the presence of a quorum” ” (US Congress. House
1996, 3). The Act then passed in the House, without Tittle III, on May 10, 1996 (US Congress.
House 1996).
The Senate received the bill on May 13th. Titles I, II AND IV of the bill were heard in the
Senate Committee on Finance, and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs received title III on
May 23, 1996 (US Congress. Senate 1996, 7). In response to Title III of H.R. 3286, Secretary of
Interior Bruce Babbitt sent a letter to the Chairman John McCain on June 18, 1996, stating:
Dear Mr. Chairman: In a letter to the Speaker, the President has stated his strong
support for H.R. 3286 and its purpose of encouraging the adoption of children.
However, in our role as trustee for Indians and Indian tribal governments, we would
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have serious concerns if an amendment were offered to H.R. 3286 for the purpose
of amending the Indian Child Welfare Act … The United States has a governmentto-government relationship with Indian tribal governments. Protection of their
sovereign status, including preservation of tribal identity and the determination of
Indian tribal membership, is fundamental to this relationship. The Congress, after
ten years of study, passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978 (P.L. 95608) as a means to remedy the many years of widespread separation of Indian
children and families. The ICWA established a successful dual system that
establishes exclusive tribal jurisdiction over Indian Child Welfare cases arising in
Indian country, and presumes tribal jurisdiction in other cases involving Indian
children…This system, which authorizes tribal involvement and referral to tribal
courts, has been successful in protecting the interests of Indian tribal governments,
Indian children, and Indian families. The ICWA amendments proposed in Title III
of H.R. 3286, as introduced, would effectively dismantle this carefully crafted
system by allowing state courts, instead of tribal courts with their specialized
expertise, to make final judgments on behalf of tribal members. Such decisions
would adversely affect tribal sovereignty over tribal members as envisioned by the
ICWA and successfully implemented for the past 18 years. We therefore urge the
committee to disallow the reintroduction of Title III into this bill. …Sincerely,
BRUCE BABBITT (US Congress. Senate 1996, 8-9).
Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois of the Office of Legislative Affairs wrote a
letter to the Chairman the same day. In it, he states the Justice Department strongly supports
H.R. 3286 “without the inclusion of title III” for two primary reasons: The Title interfered with
tribal sovereignty, required children to be factually enrolled before the ICWA could take effect,
and required that an adult give permission before they can be enrolled. There is no mention of
concerning Constitutional rights of individuals within Fois’ letter (US Congress. Senate 1996).
The Assistant Attorney General states:
The proposed amendments interfere with tribal sovereignty and the right of tribal
self-government. Among the attributes of Indian tribal sovereignty recognized by
the Supreme Court, is the right to determine tribal membership…Section 302 of
H.R. 3286 provides that membership in a tribe is effective from the actual date of
admission and that it shall not be given retroactive effect. For persons over 18 years
of age, section 302 requires written consent for tribal membership. Many tribes do
not regard tribal enrollment as coterminous with membership and the Department
of Interior, in its guidelines on Indian child custody proceedings, has recognized
that `[e]nrollment is the common evidentiary means of establishing Indian status,
but is not the only means nor is it necessarily determinative.'…[and] H.R. 3286
would amend the ICWA to require a factural determination of whether an Indian
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parent maintains the requisite `significant social, cultural, or political affiliation'
with a tribe to warrant the application of the Act. Title III fails to indicate which
courts would have jurisdiction to conduct a factual determination into tribal
affiliation. To the extent that State courts would make these determinations, H.R.
3286 would undercut tribal court jurisdiction, and essential aspect of tribal
sovereignty. …Reducing tribal court jurisdiction over Indian Child Welfare Act
proceedings would conflict directly with the objectives of the ICWA and with
prevailing law and policy regarding tribal courts.
The President, in his Memorandum on Government-to-Government
Relations with Native American Tribal Governments (April 29, 1994), directed that
tribal sovereignty be respected and tribal governments consulted to the greatest
extent possible. Congress has found that `tribal justice systems are an essential part
of tribal governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public health and
safety and the political integrity of tribal governments, …Retaining ICWA's regime
of presumptive tribal jurisdiction crucial to maintaining harmonious relations with
tribal governments, to ensuring that the tribes retain essential features of
sovereignty and to guarding against the dangers that Congress identified when it
enacted ICWA in 1978. …Sincerely, Ann M. Harkiss for Andrew Fois, Assistant
Attorney General (US Congress. Senate 1996, 9-10).
On June 19, 1996 the Committee on Indian Affairs recommended the bill be passed with
one amendment – that amendment being that all of provisions of Title III being struck from H.R.
3286 (US Congress. Senate 1996, 7).
As H.R. 3286 was making its way through Congress, another bill, H.R 3828, was also
attempting to rectify the law for families such as those involved in Bridget R.. The House report
on H.R. 3828 states that the purpose of the bill was to amend the ICWA “to promote stability in
Native American custody proceedings and for other purposes.” Representative Deborah Pryce
had originally introduced it a year earlier, on April 6, 1995, as H.R. 1448, which Molinari’s H.R.
3286 had partially incorporated. Hearings were held in 1995 that made clear the multitude of
problems and the conflicting views on how to fix them. The Chairman then requested that
opposing groups, including the National Indian Child Welfare Association and the American
Academy of Adoption Attorneys get together and discuss a workable solution. However, no one
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involved in the negotiation represented eligible families and children who consciously and
purposefully distanced themselves from the reservation system.
The result of those discussions was H.R. 3828 (US Congress. House 1996, 2-3).
Again, this bill – on the grounds that many individuals affected by ICWA are US citizens
who do not want tribal governments to be involved in their family affairs – ceded some decision
making to the states. However, at the same time, the bill, introduced by Rep. Don Young,
provided “criminal sanctions for fraudulent representation with respect to any proceeding
involving an Indian child” (US Congress. House 1996). Although the wording of this provision
could have caused grandparents who chose to keep their heritage private to be charged for fraud,
the Committee on Resources approved the bill without amendment. Fortunately, it was never
considered by the floor prior to Congress’ adjournment.
The companion bill in the Senate for H.R. 3828 was S. 1962. Sponsored by Senator John
McCain, the draft language for the bill had its first hearing before the Senate Indian Affairs
Committee on June 26th, 1996 (US Congress. Senate 1996). On that day, the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs held a hearing to discuss the proposed amendments to the ICWA. While
Senator McCain had the support of Senator Daniel Inouye, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
most of the witnesses, it is important to note the testimony of those who disagreed. In a
statement to the committee, Representative Peter Green from Texas expressed his concerns
about the law. While acknowledging the original need for the ICWA, he stated that “the remedy
that has been created by the Indian Child Welfare Act has led to its own abuses and, I believe,
injustices” (US Congress. Senate 1996, 8). He testified:
The act, as currently enforced, has created uncertainty and, in many cases,
heartbreak in the adoption community. It is unreasonable for the adoption of a
child, a child with no cultural ties and with remote Indian ancestry, an adoption that
is consented to by the birth parents, approved by lawful State authorities chosen by
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the birth parents who are U.S. citizens to be interrupted by any third party, even a
sovereign nation such as a Native American or a European nation (US Congress.
Senate 1996, 8).
Senator Inouye remarked that “every sovereign country, whether it be South Africa or
China or England, France, or Ireland, has very clear and distinct laws affecting membership or
citizenship.” He reasoned that if he wanted to adopt a child in France, Chana, or any other
country, “it would have to be done subject to the laws of that country” (US Congress. Senate
1996, 13). To this, Representative Peter Geren responded that the difference is that when a
Chinese citizen “forsakes Chinese citizenship, moves to the United States, and gets American
citizenship, no matter what China tries to dictate to that person who is now an American citizen,
we ignore those dictates from China” (US Congress. Senate 1996, 15). He explained:
Once that person becomes a U.S. citizen, he or she has all the protections and the
rights of any American citizen. That in no way denigrates the sovereignty of China;
it just respects the sovereignty of the United States and the choice of that individual
to assume all the responsibilities, privileges and rights of American citizenship (US
Congress. Senate 1996, 15).
Representative Deborah Pryce, who had introduced alternative amendments in the House,
stated that the current interpretation of ICWA has gone far beyond the original intent. She
spoke of children who faced removal from the only homes they had ever known, simply because
of their parent’s heritage – including parents who had never been enrolled, never lived on a
reservation, and had never had any type of connection to Indian Country. Further, she testified:
I would urge the committee to give due consideration to European Americans,
African Americans, Asian Americans, Spanish Americans, Hispanic American
heritages, all different heritages of children in addition to their Native American
heritage rather than ignoring all other ethnic and racial backgrounds in determining
when ICWA should apply, particularly under circumstances where there’s no
affiliation with a tribe and in situations where the child’s blood relationship is
attenuated. I think a continued disregard for all these other heritages, in my mind,
will no doubt lead to the eventual demise of ICWA and with it, all the good things
that ICWA is doing (US Congress. Senate 1996, 19).
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Nevertheless, W. Ron Allen, President of the National Congress of American Indians,
testified that he and the NCAI “absolutely object to any legislation that erodes our sovereignty
and our governmental jurisdiction. Our member tribes, 210 to date, are firmly holding that
position (US Congress. Senate 1996, 40).
Professor Frank Pommersheim, of the University of South Dakota School of Law, in a
letter to Senator McCain, took issue with title III within Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of
1996. In a letter submitted to the committee Pommersheim noted:
…problematical is the attempt in proposed Sec. 302 to limit and set restrictions on
a tribe's ability to determine membership requirements (e.g., children 18 or older
must consent, tribal membership is strictly prospective in nature). The right to
determine membership is essential to tribal sovereignty and ought not be displaced
by Congress. As noted by the U. S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978): "A tribe's right to define its own membership for
tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an
independent political community." These proposed amendments, whether
advertently or inadvertently, seek to improperly invade tribal sovereignty (US
Congress. Senate 1996, 432).
S. 1962 was then introduced on July 16, 1996. Although primarily written by the
National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and containing language including a provision
to criminally charge anyone who hid the fact a child had tribal heritage, S. 1962 did not have
full support of many tribal governments because it lacked language prohibiting the Existing
Indian Family Doctrine (US Congress. House 1996).
In a letter to Senator John McCain on July 23, 1996, Robert Joe, Sr., Chair of the
Swinomish Tribal Community of Washington, addressed the EIF, stating, “Tribal families and
ultimately Tribal cultures are facing a serious threat of extinction. The "existing Indian family"
doctrine being used by certain state courts in adoption proceedings of Indian children will undo
the excellent work you and the Committee have done thus far” (US Congress. Senate 1996, 399).
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Minneapolis Attorney Mark Fiddler, eight years later, agreed. In 2004, he was the
founder and Executive Director of the Indian Child Welfare Law Center in Minneapolis and
assisting tribal governments in support of the ICWA. Fiddler wrote in a letter to supporters:
…This legal doctrine, called the "existing Indian family" doctrine, will be tested in
Georgia in this case. This doctrine is the most effective means of attacking Indian
families and tribes ever dreamed up by adoption attorneys. There is a national
campaign of adoption attorneys to push this phony doctrine. It has been adopted in
at least four states so far. It must be stopped (Fiddler, Existing Indian Family
Doctrine 2004).
The bill passed the Senate by unanimous consent on September 26, 1996 – meaning there
was no floor vote. It was decided there was no controversy in passing this bill. However, no
action was taken on the bill in the House in the 104th Congress. Congress had opportunity to
prohibit application of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine - but did not.
In 1997, Senator McCain tried again. In the 105th Congress, S. 569 and H. 1082, which
were nearly identical to S. 1962, were introduced. According to their supporters, the companion
bills strengthened ICWA “making it harder for children to slip through the cracks” by making it
a crime for anyone other than the parents to ‘hide’ a child’s tribal heritage. With this
amendment, grandparents could be charged for wanting to keep their heritage private. Senator
Slade Gorton and the National Council for Adoption strongly opposed the bills “out of concern
for children and families who did not choose to be part of the reservation system” (US Congress.
Senate 1997). H.R. 1082 was introduced March 13, 1997, and S. 569 was introduced on April
14, 1997. The Committees held a joint hearing on both simultaneously on June 18, 1997.
Representative Pryce was one of the initial witnesses. She explained her interest in the
issue by sharing the emotional story of an Ohio couple who had adopted twins after the father of
the children purposefully withheld his heritage from the adoption paperwork. She testified:
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This case is not an anomaly. Since I became involved in this issue, I have heard
numerous horror stories from people all over the country who are victims of the
ICWA. Much of this stems from a broad and inconstant application of this very
well-intentioned law. I won’t dwell on these horror stories today or I won’t have
time to continue on with my testimony and we would be here all day. Let me begin
by saying that our Constitution protects the rights of individuals against
classification based on race, and it protects the rights of parents to control their
children’s upbringing. These are fundamental liberties and they are privacy issues.
The ICWA excludes all other circumstances to the dole factor of race and denies
these basic Constitutional rights to parents who have a child with any Indian blood.
…As a former judge and an adoptive mother, I am sorry to testify today that S. 569
and H.R. 1082 do not address the fundamental issues. Instead, these bills take a
procedural approach that, in my view, is cumbersome enough to significantly
discourage the adoption of Indian children and to make many lawyers rich. The
complexity of these requirements almost guarantees an inability to comply (US
Congress. Senate 1997, 37).
Thomas Atcitty, Vice President of the Navajo Nation testified that it is “important to
remember that ICWA was not only enacted to preserve American Indian tribes’ most precious
resources, its members, but also to prevent the type of alienation experienced by Indian children
who were adopted by non-Indian families…” (US Congress. Senate 1997, 59). He also requested
language added to the bills that would “provide direct title 4-E funding” to tribal governments
for foster care and adoption programs. Currently, he stated, tribal governments must enter into
agreements with the states in order to obtain the funding. If this is not possible, Atcitty stated,
then states should be required by federal legislation to “serve tribes rather than stipulating a
tribal-State agreement” with penalties “should discrimination occur” (1997, 59).
Based on the hearing testimony and strong support by tribal governments, an amendment
was prepared as a substitute by Senator Campbell, Chair of the committee. On July 30, 1997, by
voice vote in an open business session, the Committee adopted the amendment and ordered S.
569 reported to the Senate with the recommendation that it be passed (US Congress. Senate
1997). These bills did not make it out of Committee (US Congress. Senate 1997, 105-156).
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Failing to get stronger versions of ICWA through Congress, the National Indian Child
Welfare Association, NCAI and other organizations have turned to state legislatures as well as
state executive branches to get stronger legislation passed. For example, on February 22, 2007,
the State of Minnesota signed a tribal/state agreement with representatives of the seven
Minnesota reservations, giving them increased jurisdiction over children of heritage who come
before Minnesota courts (MN Dept Human Serv. 2007).

Split-feather Syndrome
In the late 1990’s, in effort to prove the need for children of tribal heritage to stay within tribal
communities, Training Director Carol Locust, of the Native American Research and Training
Center at the University of Arizona, conducted a pilot study concerning children of tribal
heritage who had experienced foster care or adoption in a non-tribal home. After interviewing 20
young adults, Locust concluded that "there are unique factors of Indian children being placed in
non-Indian homes that create damaging effects in the later lives of the children." According to
Locust, “[E]very Indian child placed in a non-Indian home for either foster care or adoption is
placed at great risk of long-term psychological damage as an adult” (Locust 1998).
Sandy White Hawk, a woman of Sioux heritage who was adopted by a non-tribal family
in the 1950s, voiced a commonly accepted belief when she said, “We know that the children who
grow up outside of their culture suffer greatly… Non-native homes cannot give an adopted
Indian child their culture” (Kaplan 2015).
While Locust’s pilot study has not explained whether this inability is physical, emotional
or spiritual, the affliction – assumed by many to be present in children of even the smallest
heritage - has become known as the “Split-feather Syndrome.”
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“Unfortunately,” according to Bonnie Cleaveland, PhD ABPP, the study “was
implemented so poorly that we cannot draw conclusions from it.” Despite this, the concept of
Split-feather has been used as justification for tribal involvement in the lives of children of
primarily non-native heritage who have never had connection to Indian Country. A significant
percentage of enrollable children are raised by non-native birth parents and non-native extended
family. Broad sweeping claims of inherent psychological connection to Indian Country, based on
interviews with twenty young adults, beg the question of motive.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
In the summer of 2010, a woman emailed the Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare to ask
for help. The Cherokee Tribe was assisting a man of about 3% tribal heritage to gain custody of
his daughter - their adoptive daughter - who was 75% Caucasian, 25% Latina, and only a little
over 1% Cherokee. The child had never lived anywhere but the adoptive home. The adoptive
couple had, in fact, been present at her birth, cut the cord, and took her home soon after. Baby
girl and her birth mother had never lived in Indian Country or had any connection to the tribe.
There was also contention that the birth father had never had strong connection to the tribe prior
to the court battle (CAICW 2014).
CAICW referred the mother to Minneapolis ICWA attorney Mark Fiddler, and the rest,
as they say, is history. On October 28 that same year, CAICW held an ICWA Teach-in79 in the
chambers for the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. The adoptive mother was one of the
speakers. In January 2011, a family court judge in South Carolina awarded the birth father
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Dr. William Allen was the keynote speaker at the Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare’s ICWA Teach-In,
titled ‘Indian Children: Citizens, not Cultural Artifacts,’ on October 28, 2011 in the chambers of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs.
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custody based on the ICWA, and the adoptive family had only a couple days in which to say
good-bye. The toddler was sent, crying, with a man she had never before met (CAICW 2014).
According to Fiddler, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 80 was a landmark ICWA case
involving a 2-yr-old girl and her father, who had made no attempt to support her during her
mother’s pregnancy or in the first few months following Baby Girl’s birth in 2009. It was only
after he learned of the adoption months after the birth that he decided to become involved and
invoked his 3% Cherokee Nation ancestry. Baby Girl’s heritage was 1.12%. In January 2011,
the South Carolina Supreme Court, believing it was an ICWA case, gave custody to the father,
whom she had never met. She was handed over to him with only a two-hour transition period.
Two and a half years later, on June 25, 2013, the United States Supreme Court made the decision
that ICWA did not apply. This resulted in Baby Girl being returned to her adoptive parents in
September 2014 following a month of family visits. This case had the potential to reshape
adoption practice and cast “new doubt on the constitutionality of states’ laws which attempt to
expand ICWA beyond its original reach” (Fiddler, Adoptive Couple V. Baby Girl, State ICWA
Laws, and Constitutional Avoidance 2014).
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito noted in the case Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
“This case is about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian because she is 1.2%
(3/256) Cherokee. Because Baby Girl is classified in this way, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that certain provisions of [ICWA] required her to be taken, at the age of 27 months, from
the only parents she had ever known.” He also wrote, “It is undisputed that, had Baby Girl not
been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would have had no right to object to her adoption under
South Carolina law,” and “[U]nder the State Supreme Court’s reading, [ICWA] would put
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570 U.S. (2013)
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certain vulnerable children at a great disadvantage solely because an ancestor— even a remote
one—was an Indian” and “raise equal protection concerns” (Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
2013).
Nevertheless, Terry Cross, founder of the National Indian Child Welfare Association in
Portland, Ore., had called the 2009 lower court decisions in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl a
victory for the tribe. He remarked, "Tribes cannot continue to exist if children are removed at
such rates as were being done in the past." Cross adds, "When you lose someone in that network,
it is a trauma to the entire network. Protecting our children and being able to bring them home is
part of our healing and recovery” (Bird 2012). Many tribal leaders and their supporters perceived
the final 2013 Supreme Court ruling in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl to be an attack on tribal
sovereignty. Following the Court’s affirmation that a non-Indian, unwed mother has a right to
decide the best interest of her child without interference from tribal governments, former Senator
James Abourezk responded, “It’s an attack on tribal sovereignty through the children. I can’t
believe they did this.” AIM Leader Clyde Bellecourt agreed, saying the Supreme Court decision
“is legalizing the kidnapping, theft of children and division of Indian families once again by
states and churches” (Harriman, 2013).
The National Indian Child Welfare Association and the Association on American Indian
Affairs reiterated the need for “Analysis of the potential for state law to address the issues raised
by the United States Supreme Court decision [Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl], and minimize its
negative impact upon tribes and Indian families and children,” and “Information about tribalstate ICWA agreements and the role of such agreements in mitigating the effects of the Court’s
decision.’ (NICWA/AAIA 2013).
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Tribal governments and organizations have worked with all three branches of
Government on both state and federal levels to ensure their jurisdiction over every child a tribal
government deems eligible for membership. The BIA reported in 2015 “Last year Cherokee
Nation was involved in cases in all 50 states and we saw firsthand the (disproportionate)
treatment from state-to-state involving Indian children (BIA 2015, 52). With disproportionate
treatment from state-to-state in mind, tribal governments have begun lobbying state governments
for increased jurisdiction. However, that’s not the only reason they have begun lobbying state
legislatures and Governor’s offices. According to Nimmo:
Because of [Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl] and because the ICWA is enforced with
such erraticism, there has been talk of amending the act … The big legislative fix
would be for Congress to amend the ICWA, [but] Tribes are really opposed to that,
because if we open it up for amendment, the opposition will come in and demand
their changes be addressed as well (Rowley 2015).
But Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, in his Adoptive Couple concurrence, cited
Professor Rob Natelson’s white paper concerning the Commerce Clause and the
unconstitutionality of the ICWA. Justice Thomas explained he was construing the statute
narrowly to avoid opening the door to rule the ICWA unconstitutional. But he noted, “In light of
the original understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, the constitutional problems that
would be created by application of the ICWA here are evident. First, the statute deals with “child
custody proceedings,” §1903(1), not ‘commerce’” (Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 2013).
Indeed, according to Fiddler, the court invoked the ‘doctrine of constitutional avoidance,’
and looked for approaches to the ICWA statute that would allow them to avoid the question of
equal protection and due process. The attorneys for the birth father and Cherokee Nation had
argued that the constitutional issues did not apply and cited Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974), in which the Supreme Court had construed that preferential treatment for Native
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Americans was based on their unique political status, not on their heritage. Attorneys for
Adoptive Couple, however, argued that “differential treatment predicated solely on “ancestral”
classification violates equal protection principles” and cited Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 at
514, 517 (2000). When unequal treatment is predicated on a status unrelated to social, cultural,
or political ties, but rather blood lineage, the ancestry underpinning membership is “a proxy for
race.” Rice, 528 U.S. at 514. While the court did not address the constitutional issues, Fiddler
believes that “…at a minimum, Adoptive Couple stands as a clear signal from the Court that the
application of ICWA, and perhaps other Indian preference statutes, cannot be based merely upon
a person’s lineal or blood connection with a tribe. Something more is required. In Adoptive
Couple, it was the requirement of parental custody” (Fiddler, Adoptive Couple V. Baby Girl,
State ICWA Laws, and Constitutional Avoidance 2014, 7-8)
Families and children are not ‘commerce’ with Indian tribes and thus are not legitimately
dealt with under the Indian Commerce Clause, yet tribal attorneys continue to claim ICWA is
constitutional, and some assert a right to claim any child they choose as a member. In reference
to Baby Girl, Chrissi Nimmo, Attorney General for the Cherokee Nation stated, “… we
repeatedly explained that… tribes can choose members who don’t have any Indian blood”
(Rowley 2015).
According to Nimmo, in 2012 the Cherokee Nation alone had over 100 attorneys
targeting about 1,100 active ICWA cases involving some 1,500 children across the nation. Most
of those children were primarily another heritage and had never lived in Oklahoma, let alone
within Indian Country. Nimmo clarified at another point that she had 14 Indian Child Welfare
cases assigned to her alone, and “to say one tribe has 1,100 of these cases means there is a lot
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more going on. In Oklahoma, we are one of 38 tribes. I think the reason people don't know about
the ICWA or hear about child welfare cases is because they are private” (Bird 2012).

Federal Funding Based on Head Counts
Colonial treaties, President George Washington and the first Congress all recognized indigenous
tribes as sovereign entities. Tragically, those controlling federal government a few short decades
later ignored the Constitution and used both manipulation and horrific abuse to achieve selfseeking ends. But while federal government orchestrated subsequent events, there are various
aspects some tribal governments participated in willingly.
As Banner notes, “All human activity is performed under constraints…In deciding
whether to enter into employment contracts, for instance, workers are constrained by their need
to earn money to obtain food, by the range of jobs within commuting distance… by the
educational opportunities they had when they were young, by the state of the economy, and so
on. Their decision to sign the contract is voluntary in some sense and involuntary in others”
(Banner 2007, 3). But they are decisions we all make – sometimes daily.
For example, tribal governments have repeatedly gone to Washington DC requesting
federal funding as well as legislation or executive action for matters unrelated to commerce. For
the purpose of obtaining federal funding, various tribal officials, together with various federal
officials, have promoted the concept of plenary authority and wardship. As years have gone by,
the assumption of “trust relationship” has grown in scale and purpose as much through the
request of tribal leaders as through the self-interest of federal government.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, “The Federal government uses census data to
allocate funds to tribal, state, and local governments for a wide range of programs” (US Census
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Bureau 2001) Examples of federal funding tied to population statistics from either tribal
membership rolls or the United States census include: “Johnson O’Malley, Headstart, Home
Energy Assistance, and Housing and Urban Development programs.” In order to encourage
participation in the census, the Census Bureau advises government entities to “Develop separate
flyers on the benefits those programs provide to tribal residents. Explain how funding allocations
are based, in part, on census information” (US Census Bureau 2001).
Jack C. Jackson, Jr., Director of Governmental Affairs, National Congress of American
Indians, submitted a statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights on February 12, 1999
concerning the importance of an accurate census to American Indians and Alaska Natives. He
stated:
American Indians and Alaska Natives have a significant stake in the outcome of the
2000 census…A range of programs now exists to help Tribes address and overcome
barriers to economic advancement and self-sufficiency. A significant portion of this
federal aid is based on the information collected in the census. Federal programs
that distribute aid to American Indians and Alaska Natives based in whole or in part
on census data include the Job Training Partnership Act, Grants to Local Education
Agencies for Indian Education, Special Programs for the Aging, and Family
Violence Prevention and Services (J. C. Jackson 1999).
The Child Care Bureau, Office of Family Assistance of the Administration For Children
and Families (ACF), an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
stated in a publication on May 9, 2007 that grant awards that would become available in FY
2008 for tribal governments would be calculated based on the number of children under age 13.
The agency advised tribal officials to “submit a self-certified Child Count Declaration for
children under age 13 (not age 13 and under), in order to receive FY 2008 CCDF funds” (ACF
2007).
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Child Abuse
“In Indian Country children are considered sacred beings—gifts from the
Creator and carriers of the tribe’s future” (NICWA 2015, 2).
Responding to increasing pressure concerning the constitutionality of the ICWA, the Native
American Rights Foundation published an article by tribal attorney and author Albert Bender
which again touched on the perception of harm to the tribal community if state officials continue
to enforce the same child protection laws on the reservation as they do off the reservation
(Schumacher-Matos 2013):
Genocide is not too strong a term for what is now happening in South Dakota. The
huge, shocking violation of legal and human rights being carried out by the state is
tantamount to genocide against the Native American nations… It is the abduction
and kidnapping by state officials, under the cover of law, of American Indian
children…. (Bender 2015).
Others see the opposite occurring. Dr. Michael R. Tilus, Director of Behavior Health at
the Spirit Lake Health Center in 2012, reported in a letter to Ms. Sue Settle, Division Chief of the
Department of Human Services within the BIA:
•

•

•

Over the past five years, the BHD has witnessed dozens of cases where TSS
[Tribal Social Services] did not follow tribal law: …BHD is aware of parents
who have had their children illegally removed for upwards of 12 months or
more without filing for tribal temporary legal guardianship.
TSS has presented many of these cases to BHD, representing themselves as the
new temporary legal guardian, requesting BHD services therapy, evaluation, or
psychopharmacotherapy. After multiple cases in which the BHD discovered
that in fact, no legal documents had been filed with tribal court authorizing TSS
as legal guardians… it is clear to me that TSS intentionally misrepresented
themselves and lied regarding proper legal and regulatory violations. As these
cases involved minors, the ongoing dangerous malpractice violations of TSS
directly jeopardized the BHD’s practice guidelines, legal mandates, and
professional liability…
TSS “Child Protection Services” (CPS) investigator, representing herself as the
current temporary legal guardian of a minor, attempted to maneuver and then
intimidate me into prescribing atypical antipsychotics for a child she had
determined needed something to control his “anger.” When I refused…she
brought the child to the walk-in at SLHC, again attempting to get this child
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medicated without the parents present; without it being a true psychiatric or
medical emergency.
• …I feared TSS behavior could, or would, expose them, and by complicity BHD,
to possible FBI investigation for child abduction, child endangerment, and
potentially felony neglect.
• …Since June of 2007, I have yet to receive one paper document from TSS on a
formal CPI investigation finding…
• Over the past five years, unfortunately, the majority of TSS staff who has been
hired, fired or left have not been licensed or credentialed by any state or national
professional behavioral health agency or board…
• …BIA Superintendent Mr. Rod Cavanaugh failed in his federal BIA
administrative and #638 fiscal accountability oversight of the TSS program.
• TSS Director Kevin Daughinais malfeasance is inexcusable with ongoing tragic
consequences to many Spirit Lake children…
• As the Director of the BHD, I have no confidence or trust in filing a #960 with
TSS that they will operate ethically, legally or with the best interests of all the
various parties…
• The #960 document is potentially the most confidential and revealing with
allegations of possible child abuse or neglect of a minor. To release #960’s to
this department may in fact violate good practice standards for the BHD.
• …untold #960’s have apparently never been investigated. Child abuse is
epidemic in our society and is unfortunately a public health disaster in Indian
country. During on fairly recent three-week time period the BHD filed
approximately ten #960’s. Shortly after this time, the TSS CPI staff member
was fired… After calling TSS to get an update on these #960’s we were told
they had no record of them, and no paper trail to refer any new TSS staff too.
• Patients have reported to BHD that TSS have on occasion use them (a minor),
while under TSS temporary legal guardianship, to “babysit” TSS children while
TSS staff attended a social event-rodeo.
• BHD has several cases where minor children were autonomously removed from
successfully placed foster care off the reservation and brought back to an
unsafe, substance abusing, violent environment because “the director said all
the kids need is here on the rez” (patient’s parents’ words). Subsequent to this
forced return, one minor child was raped without legal/police investigator or
involvement due to obscure reasons. Minor was previously already a sexual
victim and was removed from this environment due to that sexual abuse.
Minor’s depression and substance abuse increased, resulting in 2 more
substance involved date-rape incidents. Within about six months minor ran
away to another state. TSS remained uninvolved.
• The children, elderly and vulnerable populations on Spirit Lake Reservation are
at great risk of increased abuse, neglect and harm due to unchecked
incompetence.
I would encourage the BIA to conduct a decisive leadership review of
previous Director Mr. Kevin Dauphinais and current BIA Superintendent Mr. Rod
Cavanaugh for their gross dereliction of duty and professional misconduct of the
TSS program (Michael R. Tilus, 2012). [See Appendix for full text]
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The review Tilus requested was never done. Instead, Dr. Tilus was transferred to another
state.
Thomas Sullivan, former Regional Administrator of the Administration of Children and
Families in Denver, wrote his initial mandated report concerning the child abuse at Spirit Lake
on June 14, 2012. While much of the focus in this section of the paper concerns Spirit Lake in
North Dakota, Sullivan oversaw Region 8 of the ACF and worked with several tribal
governments. While Spirit Lake members had begun contacting him directly concerning child
abuse, he was concerned with similar issues on other reservations as well. Spirit Lake was a
microcosm of the domestic violence and crime occurring on several reservations.
Concerning Spirit Lake, Sullivan later stated, “…TSS was in disarray then and has not
improved its capacity to respond to the child welfare needs of its youngest citizens in the interim
despite claims to the contrary by the state, BIA, DOJ and the leadership of ACF” (T. F. Sullivan
2014). In his initial report, he quoted former tribal judge Molly McDonald stating:
I grew up on this reservation and witnessed many acts of violence and abuse. This
is normal to us. Our tribe has adopted this as a way of life, violence and
hopelessness. When does the cycle end? …The abuse is reported but nothing is
done by Social Services or Law Enforcement. Where do we go from there?
…Please consider that if an investigation had been done, many children could have
been saved from further abuse, and possibly, they would have been alive
today…our tribe is attempting to cover up these issues that plagued our reservation
for many years…Whatever picture our tribal council or chairman want to paint, it
simply is not the case. There is a dire need for professionals …that know their
boundaries and will not overlook issues at the request of Tribal Council... (T. F.
Sullivan 2014).
In September 2012, following the rape and murder of two children under ten years old,
the Spirit Lake tribal government signed a retrocession agreement allowing the BIA, FBI and
U.S. Attorney to oversee tribal law enforcement and social services. This was not done by
instigation of the agencies, but because anguished tribal members drew media attention to the
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unprosecuted and brutal murder of the two children. Yet, despite the retrocession, the abuse of
children continued. Sullivan stated in his February 2013, 12th Mandated Report to the ACF office
in DC, “In these 8 months I have filed detailed reports concerning all of the following:”
•

•

•

The almost 40 children returned to on-reservation placements in abusive homes,
many headed by known sex offenders, at the direction of the Tribal Chair. These
children remain in the full-time care and custody of sexual predators available
to be raped on a daily basis. Since I filed my first report noting this situation,
nothing has been done by any of you to remove these children to safe
placements.
The 45 children who were placed, at the direction of Tribal Social Services
(TSS), BIA social workers, BIA supervised TSS social workers and the BIA
funded Tribal Court, in homes where parents were addicted to drugs and/or
where they had been credibly accused of abuse or neglect. Since I filed my first
report noting these placements, nothing has been done to remove these children
to safe placements. I trust the Tribal Court, with the recent resignation of a judge
who failed a drug test, will begin to be responsive to the children whose
placements they oversee.
The 25 cases of children most of whom were removed from physically and
sexually abusive homes based on confirmed reports of abuse as well as some
who still remain in those homes. Neither the BIA nor the FBI have taken any
action to investigate or charge the adults in these homes for their criminally
abusive acts. Many, of the adults in these homes are related to, or are close
associates of, the Tribal Chair or other Council members.

Since I filed my first report detailing these failures to investigate, charge, indict,
prosecute those adults, my sources and I have observed nothing to suggest this has
changed. Those adults remain protected by the law enforcement which by its
inaction is encouraging the predators to keep on hunting for and raping children at
Spirit Lake. (Sullivan, 12th Mandated Report 2013)
Two weeks later, on February 27, a tribal town hall meeting was held at the Spirit Lake
Casino. One member after another stood up to tell the panel, which consisted of the tribal
council, BIA officials, ND Congressional staff, the FBI and U.S. attorney Tim Purdon, tragic
stories of violence and abuse, and how they have tried to get tribal police, the BIA, the FBI, and
the U.S Attorney to pay attention and do something. For over two hours, one member after
another got up and reported horrific child abuse as well as official mismanagement and
corruption. Not one tribal member said U.S. agencies were helping children. As they told their
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stories of continuing abuse of children, tribal and federal officials on the panel claimed that
everything that can be done, has been done. “Investigations take time” Purdon repeated over and
over (E. Morris 2013).
Concerning the reports of abuse Sullivan had written to his superiors, U.S. Attorney
Purdon, ignoring that it was the very people in front of him who had informed Sullivan of the
abuse, told those gathered at the town hall meeting that Sullivan had “misrepresented” the facts
(E. Morris 2013). Yet, former Spirit Lake Tribal Judge Molly McDonald had once said of
Sullivan:
…he is the only fed we trust. After more than five years of complaining about
conditions at Spirit Lake to tribal, state and federal government officials who did
nothing in response to our complaints, he is the only one who returned our calls.
What is in his reports are our stories told to him by us, faithfully recorded and
reported by him. Tom Sullivan is the only one we trust in government at any level
(Sullivan, Summary of Correspondence, 2013).
At the very end, an elderly woman got up and, having difficulty walking, struggled to get
to the mike to report something she had witnessed. "I am an elder,” she finally said, “fullblooded. I have lived here all my life.” She attempted to tell her story but was continually
interrupted by someone on the panel, who loudly and repeatedly spoke over her, shushing her
and telling her to sit down because they wanted to close the meeting. Intermittently, her words
could be heard, “This summer...I looked outside and saw...I called Police...nobody has ever come
and asked me about it. Nobody came.” The interrupting voice told her that everyone already
knows her story, and she can tell someone from the panel about it after the meeting. He closed
the meeting, shutting her testimony down (E. Morris 2013).
She was not allowed to tell the Senate staff what she saw or the number of attempts she
had made to get law enforcement to listen. But many in the audience did already know her story,
and a woman said, while gathering her jacket, that the elderly woman had told this to the media
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for almost a year. The story is printed in the NY Times. The elderly woman had looked out her
window and seen a 6-year old boy and 8-year old boy having anal sex on her front lawn. She
called the police and they never came to take her story. This report is known, but not officially
filed. The women holding a jacket pointed to a man up on the dais and said the police would not
take the elder’s statement because the children are nephews of a tribal councilman (Morris,
2013).
This event had occurred while Spirit Lake was under oversight of the BIA, FBI, and
Purdon in 2012 and 2013. According to Sullivan, the US Attorney had promised publicly to
speak to the elderly woman after the hearing, but he did not. “Nor did anyone from his office
take her statement” (Sullivan, 13th Mandate Report, 2013, p. 3). Sullivan also noted that the
very next day, on February 28, 2013, “these same two boys were observed by two little girls
engaging in oral sex on a Spirit Lake school bus. The little girls reported this to the bus driver,
their teachers and the school principal” (2013, 3).and later, on March 14, 2013, “law
enforcement went to the home of these two boys because one of them tried to sexually assault a
three year old female neighbor who is developmentally delayed” (2013, 3).
In his 13th report, Sullivan castigated those who discredited his reports, noting that tribal
Chair Roger Yankton had said on November 5, 2012 at a General Assembly meeting that he
knows of no lies in Sullivan’s reports (T. F. Sullivan 2013, 1) and that he had not personally
witnessed the abuses, “they have been witnessed by Tribal Elders, a Nun, a former Tribal Judge,
foster parents, parents, all enrolled members of the Spirit Lake Nation…All of my sources have
been threatened by the supporters of the Tribal Council with loss of employment, jail, as well as
physical harm to themselves or their families. While I have not been directly threatened, I have
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been told my persistence in this matter places me at the same risk as my sources (T. F. Sullivan
2013, 1).
Had the ACF, BIA and FBI heeded the tribal members at the town hall meeting or
Sullivan’s reports, the outcome for toddler Laurynn might have been different. Three months
after this 12th report, three-year-old Laurynn Carmen Clarah Whiteshield and her twin sister were
taken from a safe and loving home in Bismarck and placed with family members at Spirit Lake
in May 2013. At least one of the persons with whom the little girls were placed had been in tribal
court previously for child abuse. Sullivan notes that “Despite knowing their own biological
children had been removed from their care and custody, that they both had been charged with
and convicted of child abuse of their own children, the BIA authorized the placement of these
children in their full-time, unsupervised care and custody (Sullivan, Response, 2014).
On June 13, 2013, less than a month after the girls were placed, Laurynn died. This
murder occurred during a period when both the BIA and US Attorney’s office had taken over
law enforcement and social services on the Spirit Lake Reservation due to a rash of
uninvestigated child homicides and were supposedly monitoring placements to prevent further
murders (E. Morris 2016).
This case did get media attention in North Dakota because it so closely followed the rape
and throat slashing of two other young children at Spirit Lake. As a result, the perpetrator was
quickly arrested, tried, convicted and imprisoned all within five months. However, none of the
officials who were responsible for placing her in the home were held accountable. The nonnative foster mom the girls were taken from read a victim’s impact statement for the sentencing
of the murderer of Laurynn. She asked the judge to hold the perpetrator accountable, but also
hold the broken system accountable. The federal government, she said, allowed it to happen, and
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“ICWA can be an evil law when twisted to fit the tribes wants or needs” (CAICW 2014). From
the Goldwater Institute concerning Laurynn:
The forced transfer from a safe, loving foster family to a home that posed great and
obvious danger to the girls did not happen in a third-world country but in the United
States. It did not happen 40 or 60 years ago but in 2013. And it did not happen
because the court ignored the law but because it followed it. Had any of the child
custody laws of the 50 states been applied, in all likelihood Laurynn would be alive
today. That is because state laws require consideration of the “best interests of the
child” in determining termination of parental rights, foster placements, and
adoptions. That bedrock rule protects all American children—except children of
tribal ancestry, like Laurynn. Although she had never lived on a reservation,
because of Laurynn’s ancestry, she was made subject to the Indian tribe’s
jurisdiction, which determined it was better to “reunify” her with a grandfather with
whom she had never lived instead of the non-Indian foster family who had raised
her from infancy and wanted to adopt her (Bolick 2015).
To understand why the violence and abuse persists so easily despite the claim by all
officials that it needs to be stopped, one needs to understand the complicated politics engulfing
tribal members. In the spring of 2013, due to the prevalence of crime and corruption, tribal elders
first attempted to oust the entire tribal council. When they were told they could not do that, they
battled to oust the tribal chair. On July 26, 2013, elders and the Spirt Lake tribal council filed a
restraining order against Yankton to keep him out of tribal offices (E. Morris 2013).
Sullivan believed the DC agencies did not know what to do about the violence in Indian
Country. In a February 2014 letter to McMullen, Sullivan reported:
…I recall when you stormed out of my conference room on the morning of Friday,
June 14, 2013 abruptly breaking off a conversation about how best to address the
issues I had been raising at Spirit Lake. You were clearly dis-satisfied with my
response to the effect that such an effort would not be easy but was doable, would
require the active participation of a broad coalition of Tribal, state, federal and local
organizations to begin to effectively address these issues and was consistent with
the kind of efforts I had lead in the past. At a minimum I told you that every one of
ACF program components had to be involved, not just Child Welfare, and that we
had to partner with the Indian Health Service, the Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Health, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
Health Resources and Services Administration, Departments of Justice, Interior,
Education, Labor, HUD and the Small Business Administration. These agencies
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and departments represented only the federal; side of the collaboration which would
be necessary…You had a far more negative perspective, apparently frustrated in
your efforts to convince me that the problems were unsolvable and were quite
displeased to hear my positive recommendations on how to proceed (T. F. Sullivan
2014).
In August 2013, Casey Family Services, a non-government non-profit that works in
support of tribal sovereignty and the ICWA, offered to “fund a position that will work half time
with DOI and half-time with HHS/ACF on major tribal human services areas” (Kennerson,
2013). Under the “Intergovernmental Personnel Act” the Casey Family Services employee was
to be “embedded 1/2 time under Assistant Secretary Kevin Washburn, Department of the
Interior, Indian Affairs and 1/2 time under Acting Assistant Secretary George Sheldon,
Administration for Children and Families.” According to ACF official Jerry Gardner, this was
“an opportunity which will allow her to bring two large federal agencies together” and
“strengthen communication, cooperation, and collaboration with a focus on Native children and
families” (Jerry Gardner, 2013) (Kennerson, 2013).
In early November 2013, many of Sullivan’s job responsibilities were transferred to the
ACF’s Children’s Bureau. According to the ACF’s Marrianne Mcmullen, the Children’s Bureau
was to be “the principal liaison with the state of North Dakota, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
the Dept. of Justice to address child protective issues at Spirit Lake” because “it has become
clear that Region 8 IORA [Sullivan’s] involvement has damaged some of the most critical
relationships needed for achieving progress for the children and families of Spirit Lake. It is our
full intention to rebuild these relationships and move forward in a collegial and productive
direction” (Mcmullen, 2013).
Yet, just six weeks earlier, domestic and sexual violence in North Dakota - outside of
reservation boundaries – received an entirely different reaction from ACF officials and exactly
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the type of attention Sullivan had suggested was necessary for within Indian Country. Just 100
miles west of Spirit Lake, local citizens were reporting out-of-control violence and sexual abuse
related to the oil boom, and offices across the DC spectrum seemed eager to get involved.
Agencies and departments invited to a meeting to discuss sexual exploitation in the Baaken oil
fields included the ACF, DOJ, DOL, DOL/ODEP, OVW, HRSA, SAMHSA/CMHS, and
HHS/OASH (Allison Randall, 2013) (Kelley, 2013). According to Allison Randall, Chief of
Staff in the DOJ’s Office on Violence Against Women, “the meetings will feature briefings from
people on the ground…service providers, tribal leaders, law enforcement… sharing information
between agencies so we can coordinate our responses…The crying need for trauma-related
interventions is something we can't handle alone” (Allison Randall, 2013). Mark Greenberg and
Marylouise Kelley of the ACF both responded, with Kelley stating, “The stories are horrendous,
as you have heard, and Tribal populations are extremely vulnerable…We will be glad to work
with you going forward. I've copied Angela and Ken in case you want to reach out to them for
more information from their site visit” (Kelley, 2013).
On November 21, 2013 Sullivan’s eventual termination from the ACF was
foreshadowed. However, the implication did not come from the ACF and it was not received by
Sullivan. The sudden and heated remarks came from a Senate office and was said to the Chair of
a North Dakota non-profit (CAICW 2014). The following day, Kenneth Martin, senior aide to
Senator Cantwell, Chair of the Indian Affairs Committee, apologized by email to the listener he
had made the disparaging remarks to, stating, “I apologize as I must have misspoke, as I have no
information on the issues surrounding Mr. Sullivan and did not intend to insinuate otherwise.
Thank you for the opportunity to clarify” (Martin, 2013).
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In his February 2014 letter to McMullen, Sullivan defended himself to the agency, stating
that each one of his 13 reports along with its supporting documentation was filed with “the US
Attorney for the District of North Dakota.” He added, “When Acting Assistant Secretary
Sheldon prohibited me from filing those Mandated Reports, I had no choice but to file
information I received from my sources with him or his designee. That is exactly what I have
done” (T. F. Sullivan, Response 2014).
In a May 2014 letter to his Superiors, Sullivan noted what he saw as ongoing criminal
corruption, and noted these three additional events:
•

•

•

… One of those former foster parents, a twice-convicted rapist, was overheard
outside the Council chambers telling the BIA Spirit Lake Superintendent how
to handle the paperwork returning the two pre-teen girls back into his full time
care and custody by placing only his wife’s name on those documents and
keeping his name off of them. How does the placement of these pre-teen girls
back into the home of a twice-convicted rapist contribute to their safety and
welfare?
Both BIA law enforcement and FBI were on hand at the GFAC when the rapes
and sodomy were confirmed. In the intervening several years there has been no
investigation of these sexual assaults on these two little children. There has been
no prosecution of these monsters who sexually assaulted these two children.
…the father who was found by the local police in a Devils Lake motel naked in
bed with his then 10 year old daughter who was also naked. The Ramsey County
Attorney investigated that allegation in my Report and brought an indictment
against the father for a class two felony of Gross Sexual Imposition. I find it
fascinating that a county attorney receiving a single report from me is able, with
only limited resources as compared to those available to the FBI, US Attorney
and the BIA, to investigate and indict on facts made available in one of my
Reports. There are hundreds of comparable allegations made in my thirteen
Mandated Reports which fall into the jurisdiction of the FBI, US Attorney and
the BIA. How odd that not one of those resulted in an arrest, indictment or tribal
warrant… (T. F. Sullivan, Criminal Corruption continues at Spirit Lake 2014).

Six weeks later, an Oversight Hearing was held in Washington DC concerning the abuse
of children on the Spirit Lake reservation – including murder. On Tuesday, June 24, 2014,
Representative Kevin Cramer (R–ND), the member who had requested the hearing, opened it
with quotes from Dr. Tilus and Tom Sullivan concerning the rampant child abuse at Spirit Lake,
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which Dr. Tilus had described as epidemic. Of particular concern to Cramer was what led up to
the loss of the tribe’s 628 contract in 2011 – giving oversight of law enforcement and social
services to the BIA – and what the BIA planned to do long-term concerning management of
tribal social services, law enforcement and the tribal court on the Spirit Lake Reservation.
Representative Tony Cárdenas, (D–CA) then gave his rebuttal, stating that while
protection of children is paramount, no one will be allowed to suggest tribal government should
not be sovereign. He said the tribe is inherently sovereign. Anything to erode sovereignty is an
“anathema” to federal Indian policy, and no one should suggest tribal governments cannot
manage their own. Cardenas reiterated the need to build on current policy - not bend to the
wishes of "fringe" groups. Rep. Cárdenas stated that Spirit Lake is making the changes needed
and he looks forward to efforts to help tribes build up state of the art social services (US
Congress, House 2014).
The first witness for the first seated panel, BIA Director Michael Black, said funds are
constrained and the new budget President Obama had announced at Standing Rock, North
Dakota, will help. Social services and job training will be expanded. Black assured the
committee that the BIA will stand shoulder to shoulder with the Spirit Lake tribe and that Casey
family programs and the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) will assist in
expanding the tribe’s programs. He said the tribe is a good partner with strong desire to improve,
but unsubstantiated accusations are hindering efforts to hire new social workers, despite offers of
bonuses for signing on (US Congress, House 2014).
ACF associate Commissioner, Ms. Joo Yeun Chang was next. Chang told the panel of the
various actions the ACF has taken to help the tribe to regain full control of the child Welfare
system (US Congress, House 2014). Chairman Young then asked why "sequestration" – referring
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to the BIA taking over services – was said to be part of the current problem when these problems
were present before sequestration. Young stated in strong words that children are important –
and there is no reason for a child who cannot protect himself to be abused (US Congress, House
2014).
Chairman Young went on to say that if he hears of “one more child hurt in the next six
months,” there will be a much longer hearing. Young roared that the BIA has fussed with fee to
trust, "and yet we have this going on in Spirit Lake" (US Congress, House 2014). He reiterated
that the fee to trust proposal in Alaska was supposed to be about protecting the membership,
"Yet this is going on" (US Congress, House 2014). The panel responded that the BIA is reaching
out to other tribes and the Casey Foundation to fix the problems at Spirit Lake. Chang said that
there needs to be creative solutions for staffing issues. (US Congress, House 2014).
Cramer then asked if anyone had investigated the reports by Tom Sullivan. After the
BIA reassured that everything has been investigated, Cramer asked for the Reports from the
investigations. When told there are confidentiality issues, Cramer asked them to simply redact
names. Rep. Cramer then asked for the details concerning a baby who had died from
methamphetamine a couple months earlier, but the representatives of the BIA stated they did not
know about the death (US Congress, House 2014).
Cramer rebuked the lack of transparency, citing as an example the media being left out or
even physically attacked. Chang claimed the attack on a camera man was the fault of the
reporters, as their reporting of child abuse was unwelcomed by the tribe. Rep. Cramer then asked
Chang why ACF Administrator Tom Sullivan wasn't allowed to testify that day, although he had
been invited by the committee. Chang responded that Sullivan had been told to report things
differently but had refused. Cramer informed the committee that he is submitting Sullivan's
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mandated Reports into the record. Chang added that Sullivan is inadequate because he has never
been to Spirit Lake (US Congress, House 2014).
In the second panel, the new Spirit Lake tribal Chairman McDonald gave an overview of
the current child abuse issue and what the tribe has been doing about it - but admitted problems
remain. McDonald said he made child protection a priority within his administration and wants
more social workers for a short-term fix. McDonald reported that they need 3.5 workers but are
funded for only two - and have none currently. He also reported that there are only 8 law
enforcement personnel - 2 on each shift. He would like public defenders and Guardian ad
litem’s. Finally, McDonald stated that alcohol is a big problem and they need help from
Congress to implement their plans.
In contrast to the testimony of the Chairman, her brother, former Spirit Lake tribal judge
Molly McDonald told of a report they once tried to make for a child locked in a home. No one
helped and tragedy resulted. McDonald shared additional stories, including details of court and
law enforcement cover ups and documents being altered. The BIA had promised to help but BIA
law enforcement hadn't been reporting on issues presented to them, former Judge McDonald
stated that she was told someone didn't want toes stepped on (US Congress, House 2014). When
Rep. Cramer asked about the shredding of documents, Chairman McDonald said these were only
rumors. Former Judge McDonald then gave accurate details of the shredding of social service
documents (US Congress, House 2014).
Anita Fineday of the Casey Foundation testified about tribal sovereignty and Casey
Family programs in general. She assured the committee they are also working with the state of
ND and had a "shared vision of the work" (US Congress, House 2014). Foster care is an
inappropriate old model, she claimed, but culturally relevant programs are the new model.
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According to Fineday, ICWA works well and is essential. She claimed most tribes receive state
and federal funds but a new model for funding was needed. She encouraged the issues with Spirit
Lake and other reservations to be addressed by Congress. No one on the committee asked
Fineday any questions (US Congress, House 2014).
Chairman Young asked both Chairman McDonald and former Judge McDonald if there is
lack of money or personnel. He also asked Judge McDonald about lack of assistance from BIA
police and wondered if local tribal police officers were reticent to arrest their relatives. Judge
McDonald agreed there is no accountability. Young then asked Chairman McDonald why people
aren't being fired and stated, “Fire the bunch” (US Congress, House 2014). Citing burn-out,
Chairman McDonald requested grace for the police officers. Young responded, “Work with us,
get the job done.”
Cárdenas asked what part "cultural sensitivity" plays in hiring staff but was told it’s not a
part of the problem. Cárdenas also asked more about Tom Sullivan, questioning his character.
Chairman McDonald initially defended Sullivan, then said he had written Sullivan and asked for
help but never got a response. Rep. Cárdenas then turned to question the capacity of former
Judge McDonald.
After asking about a number of child abuse cases, Cramer asked about a tribal Judge who
had been removed from the bench – and the hiring of that judge in the first place, as no
background check appears to have been done and the judge had a long list of problems as an
attorney (US Congress, House 2014). Judge McDonald responded that there is no requirement
that a judge be law trained. Rep. Cárdenas stated it has to do with money, and it’s not about it
being right or wrong. “We can't criticize them because they don't have the resources. Americans
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don't understand that it’s not the tribe’s fault” (US Congress, House 2014). Chairman McDonald
mentioned that treaties are not being kept and sovereignty needs to be upheld.
Cramer asked Melissa Brady, the director of Tribal Social Services and Victims
Assistance, how many foster homes are on the reservation. Brady responded that there are nine,
but foster homes are used all over the state. She added that State practices are used in the tribal
foster homes. Rep. Cramer then asked about Sullivan’s report that of over 100 kids were at risk.
“What has happened with these kids?” Brady says they found 66 to be safe. Only a couple so far
-they found last week - are unsafe but they haven't been removed from the home yet. No
mention was made of the other 42 children (US Congress, House 2014)
Judge McDonald stated that accountability is paramount and tribal court needs to take
that seriously. Rep. Cárdenas asked if this is a lack of will – or lack of resources. Judge
McDonald responded that a lot of what is happening is because people are afraid of getting fired.
Everyone will do whatever the tribal council wants them to do. Cárdenas had no follow-up
question (US Congress, House 2014).
Chairman McDonald stated they are doing their best to build a positive plan and
atmosphere but need additional federal resources to do that. Rep. Cárdenas advised him to keep
asking for money, make the requests in writing, and do not get frustrated. He urged Chairman
McDonald to get the federal government to “recognize their responsibility” (US Congress,
House 2014).
On July 1, 2014, Sullivan wrote to McMullen and stated:
It is unfortunate that neither the leadership of my agency nor my department had
the courtesy to inform me that I had been invited by the House Subcommittee on
Indian and Alaska Native Affairs to testify about conditions on the Spirit Lake
Reservation at the Subcommittee’s Hearing on June 24, 2014…Ms. Chang’s claim
that BIA has addressed, “…most notably the safety checks prior to placement” is
simply false. If the BIA had addressed the safety checks prior to placement,
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Laurynn Whiteshield would be alive today, soon to celebrate her fourth birthday
with her twin sister… Instead she has been in the ground for more than a year, dead
at the hands of her step-grandmother, who, it was well-known by most families on
Spirit Lake, beat and abused her own children so badly they were removed from
her home.
… the BIA and Tribal leadership were presented a list of 137 children who
were in uncertain placements or unaccounted for at that time. At the Subcommittee
Hearing Ms. Merrick-Brady, the Acting Director of Spirit Lake’s Tribal Social
Services, explained that 66 children had been found and accounted for. That means
that after 13 Mandated Reports, numerous detailed, factual emails about continuing
abuse of children at Spirit Lake, 21 months after the BIA Strike Team arrived with
much fanfare and ten months after Chairman McDonald was elected Chair there
are still more kids unaccounted for than accounted for. How many of these
unaccounted for children have been trafficked into the man camps of the Bakken
oil fields, just a few hours down the road from Spirit Lake? (T. F. Sullivan 2014).
In response to Chang’s assertion that Sullivan had never been to Spirit Lake, Sullivan
stated, “I have been to Spirit Lake three or four times in the last four years. Prior to that time
each year I routinely met a couple of times a year in Bismarck with all of the child welfare
directors from the four North Dakota reservations” (T. F. Sullivan 2014).
On May 6, 2016, in a seven-page memorandum detailing charges of unacceptable
conduct and failure to follow instructions, McMullen stated “it is my conclusion that the
sustained charges and specifications fully warrant your removal as proposed” (McMullen 2016,
1). The charges and specifications did not include Sullivan’s reporting of child abuse, but his
conduct toward Spirit Lake tribal leaders was mentioned within the ‘Penalty Consideration’
section of the letter, where McMullen stated:
I considered your past disciplinary record. On April 26, 2015, you were issued a
Decision on Proposed Suspension for failure to follow proper leave procedures for
which you were suspended for fourteen (14) calendar days. On September 16,
2014, you were issued a 3-day suspension for improper conduct, which included a
letter to a tribal chairman accusing him of being in "the ranks of the criminally
corrupt." Your past disciplinary actions demonstrate a pattern of behavior that
compromises the agency's ability to perform its mission, compromising
relationships with both staff and external leaders (McMullen 2016, 5).
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McMullen concluded, “…it is my decision that, in order to promote the efficiency of the
service, your employment is terminated effective immediately” (McMullen 2016, 6).
Reports dating back years cite a high rate of violence against women and children in
Indian Country. The Center for Disease Control stated in 2004, “AI/AN women report more
domestic violence than men or women from any other race” and “One study found AI/AN
women were twice as likely to be abused (physically or sexually) by a partner than the average
woman” (University of Oklahoma 2013, 16). This statistic for women has relevance for children.
At the ‘First Hearing of the Advisory Committee of the Attorney General’s Task Force on
American Indian/Alaska Native Children Exposed to Violence,’ it was confirmed that studies
show “…batterers are more than four times more likely than other men to sexually abuse their
children or step-children” (DOJ 2013) (Hallie Bongar White 2014, 3). Lonna Hunter, Project
Coordinator for the Council on Crime and Justice, had stated:
Co-occurrence is looking at the issue of maltreatment, but it's also connecting this
to the rate of child sexual abuse. The rate of child sexual abuse by a batterer is four
to six times higher than a non-batterer. So, those dynamics of child sexual abuse
occur largely when there is domestic violence present in those families. When we
look at the high rate of child sexual abuse in Indian Country and violence against
Native women, it suggests that the rates could be even higher when considering the
correlation to under reporting (Hallie Bongar White 2014, 27-28).
According to White, Elsie Boudreau, “a Yup'ik survivor and child advocate from
Alaska,” agreed. Boudreau is quoted saying “in 2010, 40 percent of children seen at Child
Advocacy Centers for child sexual abuse were Alaska Native, even though we only represent 15
percent of the entire population in the state of Alaska” (Hallie Bongar White 2014, 27-28).
Ms. Hunter reported,
I traveled to Rosebud with the Tribal Law and Policy Institute to look at the cooccurrence of domestic violence and child maltreatment to do a site visit there and
what I understood from interviewing child welfare workers, domestic violence
advocates, survivors, and law enforcement, was that every child had witnessed
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violence or it was believed that every child had witnessed violence on the Rosebud
Reservation…There were 25,000 calls to law enforcement in one year and there
were 25,000 folks who live in Rosebud, and at least two children a day were victims
of crime. That is astronomical. That is off of the charts compared to the cooccurrence of child maltreatment and domestic violence in the mainstream (Hallie
Bongar White 2014, 26).
Darla Thiele, Director of a diversionary project within the Spirit Lake Juvenile Court
System, had also reported:
We have many youth on our reservation who have stories to tell. We have young
ladies who on weekends are at home taking turns with their siblings holding the
door shut while the party is going on in the living room. And they take turns holding
the door shut to make nobody comes in to bother any of the siblings (Hallie Bongar
White 2014, 55).
The documentation of violence by tribal entities themselves abounds. One reporter
noted, types of crimes that Native Americans are likely to be victimized by include: murder,
assault, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and gang violence” (Tighe, 2014) (Hyland 2014, 4).
In 2014, the Center for Native American Youth had reported, “Violence, including intentional
injuries, homicide and suicide, account for 75% of deaths for AI/AN youth age 12 to 20”
(SAMHSA). (Center for Native American Youth 2014). The CNAY also stated, “Adolescent
AI/ANs have death rates 2 to 5 times the rate of whites in the same age group (SAMHSA),
resulting from higher levels of suicide and a variety of risky behaviors” (Center for Native
American Youth 2014). The CNAY also cited statistics:
Recent research shows that while the US child mortality rate for children ages 1 to
14 has decreased by 9% since 2000, it has increased by 15% among AI/AN children
(National Court Appointed Special Advocate Association) ….Alcoholism
mortality rates are 514% higher than the general population” (Center for Native
American Youth 2014).
The statistics are overwhelming:
•

“According to the Youth Risk Behavior Survey, 16 percent of students at Bureau
of Indian Affairs schools in 2001 reported having attempted suicide in the
preceding 12 months” (Center for Native American Youth 2011).
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•
•
•
•
•

“Subjects with a history of any type of maltreatment were 3 x more likely to become
depressed or suicidal than those with normal treatment history” (University of
Oklahoma 2013, 15).
“Young Native Americans taking their own lives — more than three times the
national average, and up to 10 times the average on some reservations” (Horwitz
2014).
“Suicide is the 2nd leading cause of death - 2.5 times the national rate – for AI/AN
youth in the 15 to 24 age group (SAMHSA).
In the US, between 1 in 9 and 1 in 5 AI/AN youth report attempting suicide each
year (Suicide Prevention Resource Center)” (Center for Native American Youth
2014).
“Indians have the highest child suicide rate in the nation, according to the CDC.
The suicide rate for Indians 15-34 years old is 2.5 times higher than the national
average. Suicide is the second-leading cause of death for that age group” (Flatten
2015).
The Obama administration reiterated the same information: “Suicide is the second

leading cause of death—2.5 times the national rate—for Native youth in the 15 to 24 year old
age group” (Executive Office of the President 2014, 5), while NICWA, that same year, shared a
different rate, “Native teens experience the highest rates of suicide of any population in the
U.S.—at least 3.5 times higher than the national average.11 (NICWA, SAMHSA 2014). Some
areas have declared states of emergency. The Fort Belknap Indian Community Council is the
latest, having declared a state of emergency on July 18, 2019 due to a “dramatic uptick in youth
and adult suicides over the last year and a half” (KRTV 2019).
“Suicide among Native American youth is 9 to 19 times as frequent as among other
youths and rising. From Arizona to Alaska, tribes are declaring states of emergency and setting
up crisis-intervention teams” (Woodward 2012).
While abuse and neglect are the most likely cause of the engulfing despair, most reporters
of the abuse blame ‘historical trauma’ and the federal and state government for what is happening
to the children. NICWA maintains there are at least four “distinct forms of trauma” that have
been identified in Indian Country, “which can be experienced in a single event, as a prolonged
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experience, through interpersonal violence, from a historical event, or via a personal event that
occurs over time through several generations” (NICWA, SAMHSA 2014).
•
•
•
•

Cultural Trauma
Historical Trauma
Intergenerational Trauma
Current Trauma

According to the CNAY, “As a result of historical trauma, chronically underfunded
federal programs, and broken promises on the part of the US government, American Indians and
Alaska Natives experience many health, educational and economic disparities compared to the
general population. (Center for Native American Youth 2011) (2014).
“We need vital resources that allow us to be at the forefront, special demonstration
funding that addresses the co-occurrence of domestic violence and child maltreatment,” said Ms.
Hunter. Requests for money are repeated in most if not all hearing testimony, along with the
references to historical trauma. (Hallie Bongar White 2014, 35). Lonna Hunter stated in
testimony to the Justice Department:
The issues of domestic violence, child sexual abuse, and child maltreatment must
be addressed through understanding of the complexity of historical and
intergenerational trauma…This is about a political relationship to the United States
government. And when we see these astronomical numbers, we understand the full
extent of the historical trauma and realize the full frontal crisis we find ourselves in
Indian Country with our women and children. It is imperative to understand the
context of historical colonization, battering, dominance, and oppression in our
villages, communities, and tribal nations in Indian Country. It is imperative because
it removes the lens of "victim blaming” (Hallie Bongar White 2014, 30).
The media parrots this line of reason as well, as an NBC station reported, “Native
youngsters are particularly affected by community-wide grief stemming from the loss of land,
language and more, researchers reported in 2011. As many as 20 percent of adolescents said they
thought daily about certain sorrows—even more frequently than adults in some cases...
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(Woodward 2012). It could be that some children in tribal communities are being taught they
should grieve events that happened before they were born.
According to the Indian Health Service TeleBehavior Health Center at the University of
Oklahoma, “Factors that Affect Children’s Responses to Violence” include a child’s immediacy
to the violence; age of child at time of exposure; availability of adults to emotionally protect the
child; the child’s disposition; and the severity and continual nature of the violence” (University
of Oklahoma 2013, 17). Historical trauma is not included in the list (E. Morris 2016).
Very few media outlets have reported on children such as 18-month-old Jastin Ian Blue
Coat, who, after having been removed from his mother in 2013 due to neglect and abuse, was
murdered by her in October 2014, following the decision by Standing Rock officials to return
him to her. Very few outside of North Dakota heard about the 2013 murder of Laurynn at Spirit
Lake or the Oversight Hearing that took place a year later. Far less heard about the murder of a
3-year-old twin that occurred on the Cheyenne River Reservation around the same time of
Laurynn’s death. Very few outside of Minnesota heard about the 2016 murder of 2-year-old
Kira Friedman, who Leech Lake social services placed with a known felon and meth user. On
June 5, 2016, he beat her, put her in a big plastic container, put it in the tub, turned the shower
on, and walked away. When he finally returned, she had drowned.
It is sadly common for those witnessing abuse to say nothing, as demonstrated by seven
people who faced federal charges after Pine Ridge law enforcement found two toddlers in
November 2016, each weighing 13 pounds. The girls were so severely malnourished that a
pediatrician compared them to World War II concentration camp prisoners. It appears many were
aware of the girls’ condition but said nothing (Cano 2016). There are varied reasons for the lack
of reporting. There is a culture of silence on many reservations. Some residents will not turn
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family members into authorities for any reason, others are afraid of retaliation if they say
something. Some witnesses may be afraid to come forward because they had been complicit or
even participatory. Others say abuse must be kept quiet to prevent challenge to and weakening of
tribal sovereignty and the Indian Child Welfare Act.
Krakoff states, “ICWA’s provisions include… heightened standards for the removal of
Indian children, their foster care placement, and the termination of parental rights” (Krakoff 2017,
507). While ICWA supporters claim to be ‘raising the standard’ for children of heritage by
allowing them to stay in documented, dangerous environments, return to dangerous family
settings prematurely, or to be taken from a known, safe setting and deliberately placed in danger
– they are in fact lowering the standard. Many children of tribal heritage are, in fact, not being
given protection equal to what other children are legally mandated to receive.
In the words of Dr. Allen, “... We are talking about our brothers and our sisters. We’re
talking about what happens to people who share with us an extremely important identity. And
that identity is the identity of free citizens in a Republic…" (2010).

Statistics – 1960’s Through the New Century
Between the early 1900s and late 1970s, the percentage of tribal members remaining on many
reservations shrank. The population of those identified as citizens with tribal heritage in the 1960
census was 524,000. In a census sample of males identified as “Indians” by the census, about
half had moved between 1955 and 1960 – 111,268 out of 227,600. 39,233 had moved to a
different county and 19,753 had moved to a different state. In 1960, 67,435 lived in an urban
setting, 126,871 lived in a rural, non-farm setting, and 33,294 lived in a rural farm setting (US
Census Bureau 1960). The life expectancy of male tribal members in 1960 was 60, compared to
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Caucasian men, which was 67.6 (Stuart 1987, 104).81 Of women, the numbers were very similar.
111,832 out of 227,341 had moved in the five-year period. 35,609 had moved to a different
county, and 16,728 had moved to a different state. In 1960, 71,540 lived in an urban setting,
123,373 lived in a rural, non-farm setting, and 32,428 lived in a rural farm setting (US Census
Bureau 1960). The life expectancy of female tribal members in 1960 was 65.7, compared to that
of Caucasian women, which was 74.2 (Stuart 1987, 104). In other words, at this point in time
about a third of the tribal population lived in an urban setting. These statistics, however, do not
make it clear how many remained within reservation boundaries.
Globally for all heritages, child mortality for tribal members fell from 18.2% in 1960 to
4.3% in 2015 (Roser 2019). In Indian Country, the leading causes of death in the early 1950’s
was both heart diseases and accidents. Diseases of infancy were the 5th most common cause and
homicide was the 10th leading cause of death. Other causes in the top 10 were common infectious
and age-related diseases (Stuart 1987, 108).
By the early 1970’s, diseases of infancy had fallen to 7th, but homicide had moved up to
8th. Cirrhosis of the liver was now not only in the top 10, but 4th on the list. Cerebrovascular
diseases and diabetes were also now on the list, at 6th and 9th. Further, suicide was now in the top
10 leading causes of death in Indian Country (Stuart 1987, 109).
By the early 80’s, diseases of the heart and accidents remained the top two leading causes
of death in Indian Country, with liver disease still at 4th, and homicide and suicide at 8th and 9th.
Diseases in infancy had dropped to 10 in leading causes of mortality in Indian Country (Stuart
1987, 111). The life expectancy of male tribal members in 1980 was 67.1, compared to

Stuart’s source: Indian Health Service (IHS). (Stuart 1987, 95). Note: Data from the IHS might be unreliable as it
includes only those of tribal heritage who live on the reservation or use urban IHS facilities. There has been no
attempt to include or assess persons of Native American heritage who have distanced themselves from the
reservation system
81
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Caucasian men, which was 70.7 (Stuart 1987, 104). The life expectancy of female tribal
members in 1980 was 75.1, compared to Caucasian women, which was 78.1 (Stuart 1987, 104).
In the early 1990’s, heart disease and accidents remained the top two causes of death for
male tribal members, but malignant neoplasms, while always a part of the top ten causes of
death, replaced accidents as one of the top two causes of death in Native American women.
Further, tribal members died from alcoholism at a rate 579% greater than those of all heritages
combined. They also died of suicide at rates 70% greater and homicide at rates 41% greater
(DHHS/IHS 1997, 6).82
The life expectancy of tribal members in 1992-1994 was 71.1, compared to Caucasians,
which was 76.3 (DHHS/IHS 1997, 134). Drug related deaths rose from 3.4 deaths per 100,000
in 1979-1982 to 5.3 in 1992-1994. This is 18% higher than that for all races in the U.S., which
was 5.3 in 1993 (DHHS/IHS 1997, 177). The age at which drug related deaths is highest for
tribal members is between 35 and 44 for males and between 45 and 54 for women (DHHS/IHS
1997, 179).
Children aged 1 to 4 years old who died from drug related causes in 1993 were 0.8 per
100,000 for tribal members, compared to 0.2 for all U.S. heritages total. For ages 5 to 14 years,
the rates were 0.4 for tribal members and 0.1 for all U.S. heritages. For ages 15 to 24, the rates
were 2.9 for tribal members, and 3.0 for all U.S. heritages (DHHS/IHS 1997, 179).
With the turn of the new century, there were 562 federally funded Tribes in the United
States. With that, 4,119,301 people claimed in the 2000 census to have American Indian or
Alaska Native ancestry in the United States. This number includes individuals who may not be
members or eligible for membership in a tribe, as well as individuals who are members of state

“Limitations of Data: The IHS service population comprises approximately 60% of all Indians residing in the U.S.
These people may or may not use IHS services (DHHS/IHS 1997, 9).
82
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recognized tribes. Approximately 75% live outside the reservation, with about 55% living in
metropolitan areas. Only about 25% live on the reservations (US Census Bureau 2000).
Further, about 45% of reservation residents have no tribal heritage or are members of the
tribe. On 30% of the reservations, the number of non-members is equal to or greater than the
number of tribal members (US Census Bureau 2000). The Montana Supreme Court, in Skillen v.
Menz (1998), admitted that “interracial marriages are a fact of life, and, as with other marriages,
so are interracial divorces and custody disputes over the children of those marriages” (Skillen v.
Menz 1998).
Patrice Kunesh, in a report published in the South Dakota Law Review, noted there was
“a steady and substantial increase in the American Indian population in the past century, from a
low of 250,000 in 1900 to 524,000 in 1960, to 1.96 million in 1990, and over 4 million in the
year 2000. (Kunesh 2007, 7) The largest tribal government in the year 2000 was the Cherokee
Nation with 729,533 members, and the Cree Nation was the smallest, with 7,734 members. The
States with the heaviest AI/AN populations are Alaska, Oklahoma, Arizona, New Mexico, North
& South Dakota, and Montana” (Indian Country Child Trauma Center 2005).
But are there over 4 million tribal members today? “According to the 2010 Census, there
are approximately 5.2 million self-identified American Indian/Alaska Natives (AI/ANs) living in
the US, of whom 2 million qualify for federal services” (Center for Native American Youth
2014). This statement indicates that while many tribal entities use the larger, ‘self-identified’
census number when wanting Indian Country to appear as large as possible, the enrolled,
federally recognized AI/AN population is not 5.2 million, but only “an estimated 2 million” –
those being the ones eligible for federal services. The balance may self-identify as Native
American but are not enrolled in a federally recognized reservation. This could be for any
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number of reasons, including that they have heritage, but do not meet the qualifications for
enrollment; that they have heritage, but consciously choose not to enroll; or they have no actual
heritage, but have been told they do, believe they do, or wish they did.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs confirms the smaller numbers with a set of consistent but
older statistic: “According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the estimated population of
American Indians and Alaska Natives, including those of more than one race, as of July 1, 2007,
was 4.5 million, or 1.5 per cent of the total U.S. population. In the BIA’s 2005 American Indian
Population and Labor Force Report, the latest available, the total number of enrolled members of
the (then) 561 federally recognized tribes was shown to be less than half the Census number, or
1,978,099 (BIA 2016).
Still, most tribal entities currently quote the larger number (now 5.2 million) when
discussing the size of the tribal population nationwide, and use comparable numbers when
discussing the number of children under the authority of the ICWA: “Currently, 5.2 million
American Indians and Alaskan Natives reside within the United States a number constituting 2%
of the American population (US Census Bureau, 2011) (Hyland 2014, 4). The CNAY, although
having confirmed there are only about 2 million enrolled tribal members in all the nation, goes
on to claim “There are currently over 2.1 million American Indians and Alaska Natives (AI/AN)
under the age of 24 living in the United States” (Center for Native American Youth 2014). The
ICWA only pertains to children eligible for enrollment.
According to the 2003 DOI-BIA Indian Population and Labor Force Report,83 the “total
number of enrolled tribal members and members from other tribes who live on or near the
reservation and are eligible to use the tribe’s Bureau of Indian Affairs funded services” in 2003
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Public law 102-477 ‘The Indian Employment, Training, and Related Services Demonstration Act of 1992’
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was 1,923,650. This was a 5.9% increase from the 2001 labor force report and 34.7% from
1995. The actual number of tribal members served – as opposed to merely being eligible - in
2003 was 1,587,519. This was a 4.2% increase from the 2001 labor force report, and 26.0%
from 1995. It is also a 216% increase over the Total Service Population reported in 1982. The
2003 increase numbers in both the eligible and the served tribal members is attributed to updated
tribal rolls, improved record keeping, improved data collection methods, revisions to tribal
enrollment criteria, and tribal members returning to the reservation to “benefit from opportunities
and services unavailable to them in off-reservation communities” (DOI-BIA 2003).
While the number of reservation residents has gone up in recent years, so has the number
of tribal members living off-reservation – some to avoid the high rate of reservation crime and
drug abuse. The Center for Native Youth reported, “Violence, including intentional injuries,
homicide and suicide, account for 75% of deaths for AI/AN youth age 12 to 20”
(SAMHSA)(Center for Native American Youth 2014). “Types of crimes that Native Americans
are likely to be victimized by include: murder, assault, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and
gang violence” (Tighe, 2014).(Hyland 2014, 4).
Further, a 2014 report from the White House stated, “Suicide is the second leading cause
of death—2.5 times the national rate—for Native youth in the 15 to 24 year old age group”
(Executive Office of the President 2014, 5), while NICWA reported, “Native teens experience
the highest rates of suicide of any population in the U.S.—at least 3.5 times higher than the
national average.11 (NICWA, SAMHSA 2014).
In 2014, the National Court Appointed Special Advocate Association reported, “…
research shows that while the US child mortality rate for children ages 1 to 14 has decreased by
9% since 2000, it has increased by 15% among AI/AN children.” A 2005 Government
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Accountability Office report “notes that insufficient recordkeeping and data collection hamper
assessments of ICWA compliance and outcomes” (Krakoff 2017, 508).

The ‘Adoptive Couple Fix’ (2016)
Late Tuesday night, January 1st, 2013, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed S. Res. 628,
expressing disappointment over a Russian law banning adoption of children by American
citizens. Senator Inhofe, one of the two Senate Co-chairs of the Congressional Coalition on
Adoption, stated:
It is extremely unfortunate and disheartening that the Russian Duma and President
Putin would choose to deprive the children, the very children that they are entrusted
to care for, the ability to find a safe and caring family that every child deserves…It
is nothing more than a political play…that ultimately leads to greater hardships and
more suffering for Russian children who will now be denied a loving family
(CAICW 2014).
In addition, the Congressional Coalition on Adoption Members sent a bi-partisan letter to
President Putin urging him to veto the legislation, stating, “We fear that this overly broad law
would have dire consequences for Russian children...Nothing is more important to the future of
our world than doing our best to give as many children the chance to grow up in a family as we
possibly can” (CAICW 2014).
On June 30, 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama stated in a letter to Speaker John
Boehner that children crossing our southern border are in an urgent humanitarian situation and
the U.S. has a legal and moral obligation to make sure they are appropriately cared for (CAICW
2014). Child refugees and their families, some in dire need and choosing to live apart from their
home nations, were to be accepted and assisted. Americans who urged that the children be
returned to their home nations for the protection and culturally sensitive care they needed were
said to be cruel.
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The federal government, which has simultaneously claimed children and families with
tribal heritage as both U.S. citizens and wards, has an even greater legal and moral obligation to
alleviate the humanitarian crisis within our reservation system. After all, “...there is no resource
that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and
that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are
members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe…” (United States 1978)
Yet, on December 3, 2014, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, despite evidence
gathered by his department showing the severity of abuse and neglect within the reservation
system, vowed to give permanent jurisdiction of multi-racial children across the nation to tribal
governments - with no regard for a child’s wishes, a family’s wishes, or any physical or
emotional conditions a child would be placed in. In reference to the ICWA, he stated:
…We are partnering with the Departments of the Interior and Health and Human
Services to make sure that all the tools available to the federal government are used
to promote compliance with this important law.” And “…because of the foundation
we've built – no matter who sits in the Oval Office, or who serves as Attorney
General of the United States, America’s renewed and reinforced commitment to
upholding these promises will be unwavering and unchangeable; powerful
and permanent (emphasis in the original) (Holder 2014).
Later, in the spring of 2015, “non-binding guidelines” were published by the BIA stating
that the courts “should not consider the best interests of the child in determining foster care or
adoptive placements. Placement in an Indian home is presumed to be in the child’s best interests”
(BIA 2015). On June 8, 2016, the federal government took the final step and published the
guidelines in the federal register, mandating them as rules for all courts. Every child in the nation
who presents to a court in need of care must now be vetted for tribal heritage, and if heritage is
found, the relevant tribal government must be notified and given the option to intervene and take
over jurisdiction of the child (BIA 2016). The BIA states that Congress has “a presumption that
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ICWA's placement preferences are in the best interests of Indian children; therefore, an
independent analysis of "best interest" would undermine Congress's findings.”(BIA 2016). Thus,
the rules were written to prevent children and families from ducking the ICWA and avoiding
tribal jurisdiction. As noted by the Indigenous Law and Policy Center Blog Michigan State
University College of Law (Fort 2016), the new ICWA rules stipulate,
•
•
•

•

•

State courts must ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or
involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has
reason to know the child is an Indian child. 23.107(a).
A parental request for confidentiality in a voluntary proceeding does not relieve
the court, agency, or other party from any duty of compliance with ICWA,
including the obligation to verify whether the child is an Indian child. 23.107(d).
Only tribes can determine if a child is an Indian child under the law, that is a
final determination that cannot be substituted by the state, and the state can use
tribal enrollment documentation (for example) to make the judicial
determination a child is an Indian child. 23.108.
Evidence with no causal relationship of poverty, isolation, single parenthood,
custodian age, crowded or inadequate housing, substance abuse, or
nonconforming social behavior does not on its own constitute evidence that
continued custody is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
the child. 23.121
Good cause to not follow the placement preferences must be made on the
record, the party seeking to deviate bears the burden of proving good cause by
clear and convincing evidence, and may not be based “solely on ordinary
bonding or attachment that flowed from time spent in a non-preferred placement
that was made in violation of ICWA.” 23.132 (Fort 2016).

According to the new ICWA rules, if there is any uncertainty as to whether a child is an
Indian Child, courts are to “proceed in applying ICWA until they have confirmation that the
child is not an Indian child. The tribe believed to be the child’s tribe is the only entity that can
make a determination of whether a child is an Indian child or not” (BIA 2016) (Fort 2016).
In deciding whether good cause exists to decline transfer to a tribal court, courts cannot
consider:
1. Whether transfer could affect the placement of the Indian child.
2. The Indian child’s cultural connections to the tribe or reservation.

224

3. Socio-economic conditions or any negative perception of tribal or BIA social
services or judicial systems. (Fort 2016).
However, the new BIA rules (BIA 2016) stipulate the courts can consider for good cause,
1. The request of one or both of the Indian child’s parents after they have reviewed
the ICWA preferred placement options, if any, that are available
2. The request of the child if the child is of sufficient age and has the capacity to
understand the decision
3. The presence of a sibling attachment that can only be maintained through a
particular placement
4. The extraordinary physical, mental, or emotional needs of the Indian child
5. The unavailability of a suitable placement after a determination by the court
that a diligent search was conducted to find suitable placements that meet the
placement preferences, but none has been located. The standards for
determining if a suitable placement is unavailable must conform to the
prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community of the Indian
child’s parents (Fort 2016).
Under the new rules, application of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine is blocked:
…the final rule imposes a mandatory prohibition on consideration of certain listed
factors, because they are not relevant to the inquiry of whether the statute applies.
If a child-custody proceeding concerns a child who meets the statutory definition
of “Indian child,” then the court may not determine that ICWA does not apply to
the case based on factors such as the participation of the parents or the Indian child
in Tribal cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship between
the Indian child and his or her Indian parents, whether the parent ever had custody
of the child, or the Indian child’s blood quantum. (BIA 2016, 90-94 ).
The new rules state a qualified expert witness should be qualified to testify to the
prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian child’s tribe, whether or not the child and
his family have practiced the prevailing social and cultural standards of the tribe. Further, an
Indian tribe is allowed to petition to invalidate a ruling based on violations of sections of the
ICWA law, whether or not the child or family wants the ruling to be invalidated (BIA 2016).
Some of the stipulations within the new rules resemble stipulations within “The Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1977,” one of the earliest versions of the ICWA, that after much debate and
input from the public, Congress had purposefully left out. [See Definitions: Sec. 4(H) in the Nov
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1, 1997 ‘Report to accompany S. 1214,’ and Sec. 4(1) of Public Law 95-608, ‘Indian Child
Welfare Act Proceedings’]. The ethics, if not the legality, of establishing rules in lieu of law after
wording similar to that within the rules had been rejected by Congress is debatable (Fiddler,
2016).
The increased push for jurisdiction over other people’s children has increased the push
back from those who hold the ICWA is unconstitutional. Swendsboe states in her amicus brief
concerning the 2018 ICWA case Brackeen v. Bernhardt:
Because adoption proceedings like this one involve neither “commerce” nor
“Indian tribes,” there is simply no constitutional basis for Congress’ assertion of
authority over such proceedings. Also, the notion that Congress can direct state
courts to apply different rules of evidence and procedure merely because a person
of Indian descent is involved raises absurd possibilities. Such plenary power would
allow Congress to dictate specific rules of criminal procedure for state-court
prosecutions against Indian defendants. Likewise, it would allow Congress to
substitute federal law for state law when contract disputes involve Indians. But the
Constitution does not grant Congress power to override state law whenever that law
happens to be applied to Indians. Accordingly, application of the ICWA to these
child custody proceedings would be unconstitutional (Swendsboe 2019).
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PART II
Analysis
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Chapter 5
ICWA Case Study

The stated purpose of this paper was to examine the physical, emotional, and economic
consequences of current federal Indian policy as well as the philosophical underpinnings that
guard the interests of corporate community over the life, liberty and property of individuals. The
ICWA has had a profoundly negative effect on the lives and liberty of a multitude of families
who have tribal heritage. It is necessary to examine ICWA-related statistics and case studies.

ICWA Statistics, 2015-2018
Kate Fort, Staff Attorney for the Indigenous Law and Policy Center at Michigan State University
College of Law, relates there were 201 appealed ICWA cases in 2015 which were “on Westlaw
and mentioned ICWA.” Of this, only 35 were reported (K. E. Fort 2016). Top states with cases
that year, according to Fort, were California with 156 cases, (146 unreported); Michigan, with 7,
(3 unreported); Alaska with 6, (3 unreported); and Arizona with 5, (4 unreported). Idaho,
Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington each had 2 reported (K. E. Fort 2016). Fort states the
top five issues as ‘not giving proper Notice,’ ‘Determination of an Indian Child,’ ‘Active
Efforts,’ ‘Qualified Expert Witness,’ and ‘Placement Preferences’ (K. E. Fort 2016). Fort states:
70 different tribes were represented in the cases, which include any time a parent
claims tribal affiliation of any sort (so Cherokee has 58 of the 203 total cases as
first tribe claimed, 21 as second tribe claimed and 5 as third, for a total of 84). In
31 cases, the tribe was unknown, in 4 the tribe was unnamed by the court. For those
31, 25 of the cases dealt with a lack of inquiry and/or notice. Finally, of the 35
reported cases, mother appealed 15, father 10, both parents 4, tribe 4, and GAL 1
(K. E. Fort 2016).
In 2016, Fort counted 175 appealed ICWA cases with 30 reported. She noted the cases
were retrieved from both Westlaw and/or Lexis Nexis, as opposed to just Westlaw the year
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before, and that ICWA or its state equivalent was litigated. She adds they were “standard state
court ICWA cases, and do not include ongoing federal litigation” (K. E. Fort 2017). Fort shared
that the top five states for ICWA cases in 2016 were California with 114 cases, (10 reported);
Michigan with 13, (2 reported); Texas had 7, (1 reported); Iowa had 6, (1 reported) and
Oklahoma reported 4 (K. E. Fort 2017). The top five issues for litigation were Notice (106),
Inquiry (21), Placement Preferences (10), Active Efforts (8), and Determination of Indian Child
(8) (K. E. Fort 2017).
There were 52 different tribes named as the primary in the cases. Fifty-six involved
“claims of Cherokee citizenship.” (K. E. Fort 2017). In 21 cases the parents did not know the
name of the tribe they had heritage in and the tribe was unnamed in 14 cases. The Cherokee
Nation, the Gila River Indian Community, and the Shoshone Bannock each appealed cases.
Other cases were appealed by family members or other entities, including 92 that were “appealed
by mom, 49 by dad, and 24 by both.” Other parties who appealed include one agency, one
child’s attorney, one by foster parents, one by a great aunt and uncle, one by an Indian custodian,
and one by a state and foster mother (K. E. Fort 2017). This is a dramatic increase in appeals by
family members in comparison to the prior year. Fort does not indicate how many of the appeals
were made with the support of the ICWA and which sought to oppose elements of the ICWA.
In early 2018, Fort reported “214 appealed ICWA cases this year” with only 34 reported
in 2017 (K. E. Fort 2018). Fort counts the top 5 as California with 152 cases, (5 reported);
Alaska with 6, (3 reported); Michigan 5, (2 reported); Texas 5, (2). Kansas 4, (2), Arizona 4, (3),
and Washington 4, (0) all had four cases (K. E. Fort 2018). The top five issues were “Notice
(132), Inquiry (29), Placement Preferences (7), Active Efforts (10), and Termination of Parental
Rights (9), Further, 73 Notice cases “were remanded for proper notice” (K. E. Fort 2018). There
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were 57 different tribes named as the primary tribe in a case. In 26 cases the parents did not
know the name of the tribe they had heritage in. “In 17, the tribe was unnamed (court did not
record name of tribe in the opinion)” (K. E. Fort 2018). Only three cases were appealed by
tribes – “the Navajo Nation, the Nenana Native Village and the Gila River Indian Community”
(K. E. Fort 2018). Fort did not mention how many were appealed by family members – or
whether those family members were using ICWA to their benefit or opposing it.
In early 2019, Fort reported there were “206 appealed ICWA cases” in 2018 with
50 reported cases. (K. E. Fort 2019). The top 5 states where ICWA cases were heard were
California with 125 cases, ( 9 reported); Alaska with 11, (3 reported); Montana had 10, (7); Both
Colorado and Michigan had 8, with Colorado reporting 7 and Michigan 2 (K. E. Fort 2019). The
top five issues litigated in these cases included: Notice (86), Inquiry (43), Termination of
Parental Rights (18), Active Efforts (13), and Placement Preferences (9). There were 59 different
tribes named as the primary tribe in a case. In 27 cases the parents did not know the name of the
tribe they had heritage in (K. E. Fort 2019).
The average number of ICWA appeals counted by Fort from 2015 through 2018 was
about 200 with around 37 reported. Certain tribes and states have been more focused on
compliance with the ICWA than others. The following case studies illustrate why many
families, courts and social service agencies across the nation, concerned for the best interest of
individual children, continue to rebel against the ICWA and avoid compliance.

Case Study Methodology
The Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare is a national, non-profit, Christian ministry that
has advocated for families hurt by ICWA since February 2004. Their advocacy is both judicial
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and educational, as well as a prayer resource for families. The following studies are a
representative sample of ICWA cases using CAICW files with family permission or information
from a variety of publicly available sources. Additional information can be obtained with
permission from individual families.

Case Studies of Rights Imperiled
In November 2014, an advisory committee, created by former Attorney General Eric Holder to
study violence against AI/AN children, reported, “Today, a vast majority of American Indian and
Alaska Native children live in communities with alarmingly high rates of poverty, homelessness,
drug abuse, alcoholism, suicide, and victimization,” and “’Domestic violence, sexual assault, and
child abuse are widespread” (Attorney General’s Advisory Committee 2014). Yet a month later,
in December 2014, Holder had assured tribal leaders that the White House would make certain
that compliance with the ICWA would be made consistent and unavoidable across all states, and
the changes his administration would make would be permanent (Holder 2014). By June 2016,
the Obama administration fulfilled that promise (BIA 2016) – publishing federal rules
mandating all children of eligible heritage be subject to the aforementioned “communities with
alarmingly high rates of poverty, homelessness, drug abuse, alcoholism, suicide, and
victimization.”
The ICWA was enacted with what was said to be safeguards to protect individual rights.
Unfortunately, in order to benefit from those safeguards, families must be able to afford an
attorney who is knowledgeable of the ICWA. Not only do abuses of the law occur, but in cases
where the ICWA was not legally applicable, such as in a custody battle between parents, some
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families have felt that ICWA’s inferences have propagated belief that tribal homes are best for
children of heritage no matter what the circumstances.
Family case studies reporting positive outcomes resulting from the Indian Child Welfare
Act are well-documented. To illustrate types of situations that are not always positive, this paper
examines cases of children and families who felt the Indian Child Welfare Act interfered with
the best interest of children. Names have been changed,

Case 1
Child’s Heritage
Tribal heritage
Caregiver Relationship
Birth Father, tribal heritage
History
On April 25, 2014, the father, a tribal police officer working under the BIA at the time, filed an
Emergency Order for Visitation with the Spirit Lake Tribal Court, requesting that any visitation
by his children’s mother be supervised. ‘Billy’ stated that he has provided documentation from
the hospital concerning treatment of scabies following the last visit with the mother, who was
also a tribal member, and that this was the second time this had happened. The first time had
been in February and documentation had been provided at that time as well.
In July 2014, Billy signed another affidavit concerning physical abuse and neglect
committed by his children’s mother, and the lack of response from tribal social services. His
complaints included lice, bruising, terrorizing, drug paraphernalia and guns within the children’s

232

reach. Billy obtained hospital documentation of the bruises. In August 2014, he filed another
affidavit, this time requesting supervised visits between the mother and his children.
In September 2014, Billy contacted the organization, CAICW, for help because he felt
the tribal court and tribal social services were doing nothing to protect children. Stating that
tribal social services had told him to stop coming in waving papers, he provided CAICW with
several audio tapes he had made while speaking to tribal social workers and a tribal judge. Billy
then spoke to CAICW over the phone, stating that no one is protecting any of the children at
Spirit Lake. He explained how, as a police officer, he saw child abuse ignored if the perpetrator
was someone connected to tribal government. Billy said he had been afraid to speak out about it
two months earlier because he was afraid the tribal courts and social services would take his
children from him. But at this point, he was willing to speak because “someone needs to do
something.”

Outcome
Billy died in a traffic accident about five hours after speaking to CAICW. His son also died in
the accident, and his daughter was placed with her mother.
Reason for Case Inclusion
Represents tribal members who oppose tribal government corruption or jurisdiction over their
children.

Case 2
Child’s Heritage
Tribal heritage, ineligible for tribal membership
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Caregiver Relationship
Father, tribal member; Mother, non-member. Divorcing.
History
A family of five had moved to a closed reservation after the husband had taken a job there. The
husband, ‘John,’ had not previously lived on the reservation. After a short time, he began seeing
other women as well as abusing drugs and alcohol, telling his wife, ‘Mary,’ “That’s the way they
did things on the res.”
Mary moved off the reservation and began divorce proceedings. She was unable to find
someone to serve him papers on the closed reservation, and a month later received a summons
from tribal court which stated, “Failure to appear at time and place stated above shall result in
judgement being entered in favor of the petitioner.” It was her impression that this was binding
and that she had no choice.
The divorce was granted by tribal courts a short time later. Custody was to be shared and
the three young children were to remain with Mary. A year later, Mary was accepted into
graduate school with a full tuition waiver but would need to relocate 80 miles away. The tribal
court initially said that as long as she stayed in the state it would be fine. Within a month after
the move, John’s cousin, who was his attorney, asked the judge to award full legal and physical
custody to John under the premise that the Mary was unstable. Mary then struggled to not only
get her children back, but to have visitation. She attempted to have the custody issue switched to
county court, but according to the local legal services, the tribal court “gained jurisdiction over
the custody status of the minor children” by virtue of the fact that Mary had submitted herself to
the jurisdiction of the tribal court when she responded to the original summons and appeared in
the court.
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Two years later, the oldest child was removed from John due to physical abuse.
Nevertheless, the case against John was dismissed. According to Mary, “This was so upsetting
that even the child protection worker broke down and cried in court.” The child was sent to an
out-of-state facility for counseling. The mother was not allowed to have contact with her for
several months.
The tribal court finally set a standard visitation schedule, but John refused to follow it.
Mary remembers:
Every attempt to get the visitation followed has been unsuccessful. The judge who
issued the order told me to quit coming up there waving my court papers. The only
way I’ve been able to even talk to them is if I catch them at home alone, and the
children tell me all the telephone conversations are recorded. The children have told
me their dad’s explanation for not letting them come down is that I went to school
to be a teacher and they train teachers to manipulate children’s minds and he doesn’t
want me to manipulate theirs.
A restraining order was issued to keep her off the reservation:
I was given a court date to try and resolve this, but neither the judge who signed it
nor my ex showed up. I was given another date and the judge who signed it still
wasn’t there, another judge admonished [John] for trying to keep me from seeing
my children, but [John] didn’t want her to hear the case, so the restraining order
was never actually dealt with.
At one point, after waiting for over an hour at the reservation boundary line to pick up the
kids for a visit, she drove to where she thought they lived to see what the holdup was. John
called the cops right away and “wanted me arrested then. Fortunately, they let me go, but without
my children. I am afraid to go back to court there, because I don’t want to go to jail for
something I didn’t do, but I am going to risk it for a chance to see my kids, even if that chance is
small.”
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The children had told their father and the court that they wanted to live with their mother.
They are convinced that their dad is right when he says he can do whatever he wants there, and
he tells them if they do not behave they will not be able to see her. Mary stated:
The tribe claims jurisdiction over my children and myself - who are not accepted
as members, we are not enrollable. What will happen to my children when they turn
18 and all their peers get payments and opportunities for college scholarships. They
will try, with my help, to make it in a world which they have been purposefully
kept out of by a tribe that won’t now accept them. I know that stories like this can
change things but not fast enough for me and my children.

Outcome
Mary regained custody of her oldest daughter when she was about 16. Mary never regained
custody of her two younger children.
Reason for Case Inclusion
Represents the plight of some non-member parents and children in tribal court. Illustrates the
preference some tribal courts have for parents who are tribal member over parents who are not,
in part due to family relationships and friendships the court or tribal council have within the
tribal community, as well as in part due to the underlying belief fostered by the Indian Child
Welfare Act that tribal birth parents are better for children than their non-tribal parents.

Case 3
Child’s Heritage
Tribal member, multi-heritage
Caregiver Relationship
Father, non-tribal member; Mother, tribal member
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History
A married couple were living on the reservation and had a young daughter when they decided to
go their separate ways. The wife, ‘Susan’ and her mother drove the husband, ‘Jack’ and
daughter, ‘Joy’ to the bus station and gave him written permission to leave with Joy. A few
months later, Susan traveled to the state where Jack had moved, and they attempted to reconcile.
They moved back to the reservation and spent another three months together again there, but
Jack once more decided to leave the reservation because of its culture of alcohol and drug abuse.
He and the Joy again left the state. During that time, Susan had sporadic contact with Jack and
Joy by phone.
Joy became very attached to her father’s extended family, especially her paternal
grandparents. Almost four years later, Susan, accompanied by police officers from the county
Jack was residing in, came to his home and took Joy. The police officers handed the father a
packet of pleadings from tribal court; but presented no valid order from his county. The
enclosed tribal Writ of Habeas Corpus had not been domesticated with his state.
Susan had filed for divorce and custody in tribal court months earlier. A hearing on the
Motion for Immediate Child Custody and Child Support was held, but Jack had never been
served notice of the tribal court hearing. For reasons unknown, the county police, having been
given the papers from tribal court, assumed the orders simply needed to be followed.
Following this, Jack hired an attorney with the little funds he could obtain from friends
and family and went to tribal court to regain custody but was unsuccessful.
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Outcome
The paternal grandfather never saw Joy again as he passed away a few months after she had been
taken from Jack. However, two years later, Susan again changed her mind and allowed Joy to
visit her father and stay with her paternal grandmother for extended periods. Joy told her father
and grandmother of her fears living on the reservation, including issues of neglect and drug
abuse. Still, custody was never returned to Jack.
Reason for Case Inclusion
Represents the plight of some non-tribal parents. Illustrates what some extended family
experience if a tribal court is hostile to non-members.

Case 4
Child’s Heritage
Tribal member
Caregiver Relationship
Non-tribal members, Foster/adoptive
History
‘Rose’ was an abused infant when first placed off the reservation in the mid-1970’s by social
services. The foster family had not been seeking a baby to foster, but when asked to take this
underweight infant who had been partially blinded by abuse, they did not hesitate. Within a few
years, the ICWA was enacted and Rose’s fight to remain with the family began. After a couple
of years, she was finally taken back to the reservation and placed again with her birth mother,
who again began beating her. Once, her mother took a cord and whipped her for playing opera
music in her bedroom. Rose asked her mother why she had even wanted her back. Her mother
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said she did not want her back; the tribal government did. Her mother said she, herself, wished
her attempted abortion had worked.
Rose reported the abuse to other adults on the reservation, but it was not until her case
received some national attention that the tribal government finally allowed Rose to quietly return
to her chosen home under the agreement that the media would not be told. Her mother was never
held accountable for her abuse.

Outcome
Rose is now in her 40’s and continues to live and identify with her foster/adoptive family. She
states she has never had a desire to return to the reservation.
Reason for Case Inclusion
Represents children of heritage who prefer to live off the reservation, outside of tribal
government jurisdiction, or who do not feel safe living with family members.

Case 5
Child’s Heritage
Tribal member
Caregiver Relationship
Non-tribal members, Foster/Adoption at request of birth mother.
History
The birth mother, ‘June,’ had been seeking a home for her son, ‘Matthew,’ from almost the time
he was born. June had already had several children who were placed with various people –
friends, family and foster homes. She had never felt able to maintain a home for them. She met
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the prospective foster parents, ‘Barb’ and ‘Steve,’ for Matthew at a church when he was about 20
months old. She had asked the congregation if there was anyone who would be able to adopt and
raise her little boy. After some thought and prayer, Barb and Steve contacted her and agreed to
a closed adoption with no more contact. The adoption process began.
Barb reports that the toddler loved to hug and had an infectious laugh with a sweet smile.
He bonded with the couple’s daughter, who was just 8 months younger. But two years later, the
family was still waiting for his adoption to finalize. It was then that they found out June’s
parental rights had not yet been terminated. Now June was telling them she wanted another
chance with him. Knowing Matthew wanted to stay with them and would feel grief if he had to
leave, they refused. The next year was an emotional roller coaster. The tribe fought hard and
attorneys told them to give up. They lost their original attorney and struggled to find a
knowledgeable replacement. They finally approached an attorney they had read about it. He
refused the case initially, but with prayer, they kept asking until he agreed.
Local media began to follow the case, and when the couple attended court hearings, they
were verbally assaulted by crowds of tribal members. Still, they did not give up.

Outcome
Barb and Steve were able to adopt Matthew – but not because they won in court or because the
tribe gave in. They were able to adopt because the birth mother changed her mind again. Barb
relates:
[June] decided it was best for [Matthew] if we finished the adoption. She said it
was through God’s grace and love that she could let him go a second time. We are
completing the paperwork for an open adoption. [June] and I are nurturing a new
friendship with visits, phone calls, cards, encouragement and most important, love.
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As of the writing of this paper, Matthew celebrated his 18th birthday in the adoptive
home. According to Barb and Steve, Matthew has been doing extremely well, although June did
not maintain close contact through the years – appearing only on occasion after extended
absences.
Reason for Case Inclusion
Represents plight of children faced with uncertainty and lack of permanency even in extended
placements that had the promise of adoption. The sense of stability and security for both the
child and adoptive family were dependent on the fluctuating will of the birth mother and tribe.

Case 6
Child’s Heritage
Tribal heritage, ineligible for tribal membership
Caregiver Relationship
Grandmother, no tribal heritage.
History
A Colorado grandmother, “Marie,’ had been raising her 7-year-old grandson, “Andrew,’ for a
few years when an Oregon tribe contacted her and said she could not have custody because she is
white. They told her they will be giving his maternal grandmother custody instead.
Marie sought help in Colorado, but the local social workers and district attorney told her
she might as well give up – because “the tribe always wins.” The tribe had also altered the
Andrew’s birth certificate to make it appear he was eligible for enrollment, when in fact he was
not. He did not have enough blood quantum to be enrollable, so the birth certificate was altered
to say his paternal grandmother was his mother.
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Unable to afford an attorney but unwilling to allow this to happen to Andrew, the family
contacted CAICW for assistance, and CAICW connected them with an attorney who could
advise them. He gave them information they needed to represent themselves in court. They were
able to stand in court, and armed with the tools given them, were able to inform the judge that
the birth certificate was not correct and the ICWA did not say a white grandparent is barred from
custody.

Outcome
Marie won custody and Andrew was able to remain with her. Marie reports it has been six years
now and he is doing very well. Andrew is on the student council in an advanced magnet school
and is constantly assisting others.
Reason for Case Inclusion
Represents non-tribal extended family subject to the arbitrary and at times deceitful actions of
some tribal governments.

Case 7
Child’s Heritage
Tribal member
Caregiver Relationship
Non-tribal Foster/adoptive
History
‘Annie’ was only 9 years old when she was taken from a non-tribal adoptive home she loved in
and placed in the home of an uncle who made her his bed partner from the first night on. The
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adoptive couple had fought very hard to keep her and her sisters safe, taking the case all the way
to the State Supreme Court.
Annie begged tribal officials to let her return home to the adoptive home, but to no avail.
She believed they would not let her go back to them because her case had become very public
when it was appealed to the highest state court. She tried running away several times - back to
where she felt safe - but was time and again caught and returned to her uncle. Her adoptive
mother remembers Annie made it all the way to their home one rainy night, arriving wet and
muddy due to hiding in ditches from the police. The tribe took her back to her uncle again.
Annie finally attempted suicide by hanging when she was 16, and it was only then that
the tribal government conceded and allowed her to return to the adoptive home.
Nevertheless, after years of being raped, Annie had a large amount of emotional trauma
to work through and it took a few years of genuine love for Annie to find herself again.

Outcome
The couple adopted her after it was legal to do so – after she turned 18 - and she continues to
identify as their daughter today.
Reason for Case Inclusion
Represents those children who do not feel safe in the homes of relatives and have gone through
tremendous abuse following a tribal government’s decision to place them in the extremely
dangerous home of a relative.
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Case 8
Child’s Heritage
Tribal heritage, ineligible for tribal membership
Caregiver Relationship
Grandparents, no tribal heritage
History
A young couple had one daughter together, a 10-month-old who, at 1/16 Indian, was 94% nonIndian. ‘Nnacy’ did not meet the Tribe's blood quantum of 1/8. The mother, ‘Donna,’ also had a
9-year old son, ‘Mikey,’ who was low functioning and, according to the paternal grandfather,
“Ed,’ who was a retired public school principal, counselor and district school administrator,
Mikey possibly suffered undiagnosed Asperger’s Syndrome. Ed relates that the boy threw “very
loud and long temper tantrums when told to bathe or brush his teeth and soiled his clothes and
the furniture daily.” The boy also fell often; hurt himself several times; and had a very high pain
tolerance. He was accidentally hurt by the father, ‘Joe,’ during one episode. Mikey showed no
pain when injured, so the Joe, who was a paramedic, didn't take him to the doctor right
away. The tribe subsequently made allegations of child abuse to the Department of Human
Services. According to Ed, two half-sisters and the maternal Grandmother told Joe and Donna
that they were going to take both children away “and you will never see them again.”
“Unfortunately,” the grandfather reported, “and beyond our wildest thoughts, that is exactly what
they did!”
Joe was charged with child abuse of his stepson, and Donna was accused of allowing
child abuse. The tribe placed the Mikey with his biological father, who had previously been
found unfit. The tribal government then placed Nancy with Donna’s half-sister, who had
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previously lost custody of her own teenage stepdaughters. According to Donna, she had left her
birth family and married off of the reservation because of her family’s sexual, emotional,
physical and drug abuses.
Although the paternal grandparents were approved by the county for foster care Nancy
had lived in their home for several months, the tribal social services said they were "too old” at
age 59 to be foster parents. The family did not see Mikey again after the tribal government
removed him, but the parents had visitation with Nancy for one hour twice a month for years.
After Mikey had “seizures and behavioral problems under DHS' care,” Juvenile Court
and DHS ordered a medical evaluation. Ed states that the evaluation affirmed to the court that the
boy did “have a high pain threshold, that he fell without being able to catch himself, and that he
had learning difficulties.” After three and a half years, the court finally decided “there wasn't
enough evidence” to sentence either parent.
There was no money left to pursue child custody and their attorney urged them to
relinquish their parental rights to both children. According to the grandfather, the judge never
made a decision or judgment; the tribe made the decision to keep Nancy, and the judge simply
acquiesced. Ed stated:
In visiting with others in similar situations, the courts don't want to mess with the
sovereign nations because they don't understand ICWA, and the defense attorneys
typically have never heard of ICWA--and so the system of legalized kidnapping
goes on. She is gone from our son and daughter-in-law and from us forever. We
believe that they might not even tell her that she is adopted (she was much too
young to remember what went on, nor the 'people who used to come to visit her at
DHS'). It is our prayer that she will one day find out and that she will find her
parents and us, her grandparents; that we might get to be part of her life in some
way in the future. But it will only be because of her own fortitude and in spite of
the Tribe, if it happens at all.
After having mortgaged his home to pay for the couple’s legal battle, Ed, who once
served as “an advisor to the local Department of Human Services Child Protection Team and an
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advisor to the Crime Commission,” later signed his name, “former grandfather of Mickey and
Nancy.” He added, “We pray some of the laws and practices can be changed so that families in
the future won't have to go through the hurt, the betrayal by the Tribe for their own member(s),”

Outcome
The children were never reunited with their family.
Reason for Case Inclusion
Represents the plight of many non-tribal grandparents who do not have the funds to fight a tribal
government for custody of their grandchildren.

Case 9
Child’s Heritage
Tribal member
Caregiver Relationship
Non-tribal foster/adoption
History
A home study was done prior to placement of twin toddlers ‘Abbey’ and ‘Beth’ and the home of
her grandfather was found by Spirit Lake Tribal social workers to be “very satisfactory.” The
stated goal of tribal social services was reunification with the parents after they had been
released from incarceration and completed case plans which included evaluations and classes.
Abbey was murdered at the home of her grandfather just a little over a month after her arrival, in
June 2013.

246

The twins were born on July 19, 2010, and had been living in an admittedly safe, loving
foster home in Bismarck since April 2011, when they were nine months old. The girls were onefourth Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe blood quantum and one-eighth Standing Rock Sioux Tribe blood
quantum, but were born in Bismarck and had not lived on either reservation. Around March 1,
2013, when they were two and a half years old, they were enrolled in the Spirit Lake Tribe for
purposes of jurisdiction. On April 9, 2013, the tribe filed a petition to transfer their case to Spirit
Lake Tribal Court, pursuant to ICWA. The tribal court then ordered their transfer from their
Bismarck home on May 13, 2013 and placement with their grandfather and his wife, ‘Fay,’ a
woman known by Spirit Lake tribal social services and court to have been abusive to children in
the past.
Fay is alleged to have beaten the twins several times. On June 13, 2013, Abbey was
thrown down an embankment and Beth was pushed to the ground. Fay then told her own
children to beat the twins. They did. Sometime later that night, lying on the bed next to her twin,
Abbey died. Beth, just three, remembers waking up and finding her sister (in her words) “blue,
and gray.” It was later found she died of severe head injuries that her caregivers did not seek
medical attention for. Beth and other children in the home were removed by tribal social
services that day.
By June 25, 2013, the FBI had begun an investigation and the U.S. Attorney’s office had
already filed federal criminal charges against Fay in connection to Abbey’s death and she was in
federal custody. She was charged with “child abuse and neglect.”
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Outcome
Abbey died at the hands of a family member a month after she placed in the home of a known
child abuser on the Spirit Lake Reservation. On June 21, 2013, Beth was transferred back to her
foster home she felt safe in.
Reason for Case Inclusion
What happened to Abbey represents the plight of young children placed in the homes of
relatives known to be dysfunctional or even abusive – for no other reason than to be “in
compliance” with ICWA.

Case 10
Child’s Heritage
Tribal member
Caregiver Relationship
Non-tribal foster/adoption
History
‘Jay’ was born in January 2005, positive for methamphetamine. Jay’s parents, who lost custody
immediately, wanted him to be adopted. Jay’s mother was non-tribal, and his father, ‘Tony,’ was
an enrolled tribal member. Jay was placed in the foster care system and moved from one home
to another. His mother reiterated her desire that he be adopted. When he was three months old,
parental rights were terminated and the state began to look for placement in a tribal home.
‘Clint,’ the father in the licensed foster home that was chosen, was of Cherokee descent.
Clint and ‘Harmony’ had also adopted two boys of Chippewa heritage. Clint is a police
detective and Harmony is a registered nurse. When they received Jay, he suffered with gastric
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reflux, upper respiratory infections, extreme vomiting, and allergies to dairy and soy.
Nevertheless, they were committed to caring for him and hoped to adopt him.
In June 2005, when Jay was 6 months old, the state reinstated Tony’s parental rights for
the purpose of enrolling Jay in the tribe. However, they were not able to physically locate Tony
until November 2005. He was allowed one day to meet Jay and sign enrollment papers. The
state also gave Tony a list of tasks to complete to regain custody. Tony declined custody and
stated he would like Jay to be adopted. The state then asked Tony for the name of a relative. He
gave them the name of a cousin, ‘Trudy.’
The state located Trudy, who agreed to take the child. A social worker that was a tribal
member was assigned to facilitate the process, and a hearing was scheduled for August 9, 2006.
Jay was now a year and a half old. On August 4, the social worker took Jay, Clint and Harmony
to meet Trudy for a transitional visit. When they arrived at Trudy’s home, no one answered the
door. After waiting and knocking for several minutes, the Social Worker called Trudy, who was
in the home. Trudy stated that she had sprained her ankle, was unable to care for the baby, and
asked that the visit be canceled. The worker agreed but asked to speak to Trudy inside first.
Inside, there was a strong smell of green marijuana, and drug paraphernalia was on the tables.
Harmony, who was an RN, examined Trudy’s ankle but could not detect an injury.
Nevertheless, Trudy declined to accept Jay for the visit.
After leaving the home, Clint and Harmony expressed their concerns about drug use, the
small size of the home, its lack of cleanliness, lack of preparation for the arrival of a small child,
and the general health of the cousin. As a detective familiar with signs of drug use, Clint was
concerned drugs were being dealt out of the home. The social worker denied smelling marijuana
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and warned the couple that if they “ruffle feathers” they will be denied the opportunity to serve
as a respit home for Jay and will never see him again.
Unable to simply look away and pretend the situation was okay, Clint and Harmony
wrote a letter to the judge outlining their concerns. Unfortunately, upon arriving for the hearing,
they were told it was canceled. When they asked how to give the judge a letter, they were told it
would have to come through the social worker. The foster parents then gave the letter to the state
attorney general, who assured them they had legitimate concerns and that he would deliver the
letter.
The social worker called later that day and reiterated that they should not upset the tribe
and that she will not go against what the tribe wants to do because they are colleagues and they
have “professional respect to honor.” The next day, Clint and Harmony were informed that they
are no longer welcome to accompany Jay to Trudy’s home. The tribal social worker took Jay for
a transitional visit and again warned them not to interfere with the transfer. The worker stated
she had her “Indian ethics” to uphold. She assured the couple that if they cooperate, they will
have the opportunity to visit Jay and serve as respite care.
Jay returned from the weekend very ill. The social worker, before delivering him home,
called and told them to make an appointment with their doctor. Harmony met the social worker
at a local store and brought Jay to the doctor, where he was diagnosed with asthma and given
breathing treatments and steroid treatments. He was also given a referral for a gastro-intestinal
evaluation.
After the next transitional visit just a week later, the social worker again called and said
Jay needed to see the doctor, this time for a head injury. She said she had been changing him at
a roadside rest area when he fell out of the car and hit his head on the door. However, the social
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worker said she would be bringing him to the doctor this time, not the foster family. Harmony
made the appointment with their doctor but went over to the clinic anyway, despite protest of the
social worker. The social worker would not allow her in the examination room, but due to the
baby’s wheezing, the doctor told her he would examine the breathing and intestinal issues again
as well.
Over the next couple weeks, Jay’s breathing did not improve, despite medication.
Transitional visits were halted for a few weeks. On October 19, 2006, the judge ruled that the
foster parents were not De Facto parents and had no standing. On October 23, 2006, Jay was
removed from their home and transferred to the care of the cousin.

Outcome
Their two older boys, grieving the loss, were found sleeping on the floor of Jay’s room the next
morning, next to his empty crib. The foster/adoptive family has not seen Jay since. They were
told at one point that he had been moved out of Trudy’s home in the spring of 2007 but , six
months after he was placed, but have had no information since.
Reason for Case Inclusion
Illustrates the difficulties and obstructions some families have experience when advocating for
the best interest of a child.
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Chapter 6
American Family Dynamics Study: Data Analysis

Research Question and Study
One area of federal Indian policy that has profound effect on the physical, emotional and
economic outcomes of persons of tribal heritage is the Indian Child Welfare Act. The
question asked in the late 1990’s by researcher Carol Locust while doing what came to be
known as the ‘Split-feather Study’ was, “Are you a Native American who is adopted?” She
further explained, “We are seeking subjects for an academic study of adoption.”
Locust has not reported the exact steps taken to obtain participants, so it is unclear
whether only those who were adopted into non-tribal homes responded to her survey and this
was a reflection of the percentage of those adopted into non-tribal homes, or whether the
focus was altered after the survey had begun, but Locust reports 20 participants, all of whom
were adopted into non-tribal homes. From this study of 20 adoptees, Locust concluded that
children who had tribal heritage and were placed in non-Indian foster or adoptive homes had
greater problems with self-identity, self-esteem, and inter-personal relationships than their
peers. However, her primary research did not include tribal members who were not fostered
or adopted, tribal members who were foster or adopted into tribal homes, or non-tribal youth
adopted into the homes of tribal or non-tribal Americans, including youth and homes of
other, non-white heritages. Without control groups, causality cannot be determined.
With this in mind, the American Family Dynamics Survey was designed to expand on the
Locust research by gathering data from several control groups as well as seek out the overall
health and perspective of persons of even minimal Tribal heritage or connection to Indian
Country who do not normally identify themselves as ‘Native American.’ This mixed-method
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study queried the general U.S. population. Along with the general assessment of varied
aspects of the family lives of individual participants, this study was designed to answer
several questions left unanswered by the Split-feather Study:
•

•
•
•

Does placing children who have tribal heritage into foster/adoptive non-Indian
homes put them at greater risk for experiencing psychological trauma leading
to the development of long-term emotional and psychological problems in later
life?
Do tribal members who were adopted into non-tribal families as children show
greater problems with self-identity, self-esteem, and inter-personal
relationships than do their peers?
Are the ties between children with tribal heritage and their birth families and
culture stronger than that of their non-tribal peers, no matter the age at
adoption?"
Regardless of age at placement, do adoptees with tribal heritage list identity
with their family and their tribe as their first priority, and the sorrow of not
knowing their culture, language, heritage and family as a life-long, often
emotionally debilitating anguish?

Addition questions of interest include:
•
•
•

How does the physical, emotional and financial health of members of federally
recognized tribes compare with the physical, emotional and financial health of
non-federally recognized tribes or those unconnected to Indian Country?
How do tribal members feel about federal policies that mandate their cases be
heard only in tribal courts?
Do persons of tribal heritage believe federal Indian policy infringes on their life,
liberty and property?

Methods
This research will identify some correlations that suggest causation, using primary sources as
well as data from the very sources that support and promote the Indian Child Welfare Act.
Primary sources include historical documents, peer-reviewed articles, court rulings,
congressional testimony, and reports from tribal, federal agencies, and non-profit organizations.
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Research Design
Other than the U.S. census, tribal governments are the sole aggregators and distributors of
statistics concerning Indian Country. When Congress or the executive branch survey persons of
tribal heritage, they inquire to tribal leaders, send pollsters to homes on the reservation, and
conduct surveys through Indian Health Services or other tribal programs. However, none of
those methods ever reach a vast percentage of those with heritage. Many of those who have
distanced themselves from the reservation system have mainstreamed into the larger culture and
do not use Indian Health Services or other tribal services.
Further, tribal officials represent tribal members who have the option of voting in reservation
elections, but they do not represent people of heritage who are not enrolled members. This is not
a problem when an issue is focused totally within reservation boundaries – but it is a critical
issue when Congress passes legislation concerning children who are eligible for membership but
have never had any connection to Indian Country. Many of those who have distanced themselves
from the reservation system have done so purposefully, but they are not organized as a group or
have any common point of access. Therefore, there is no easy way to survey these stakeholders
other than surveying America’s general population and asking if the survey participant is a tribal
member or has tribal heritage.
The reasons for a comprehensive study surveying the entire range of population:
•
•
•
•

Ethics: A comprehensive survey of autonomous adults does not single out one
people group over another
Validity and Reliability: A comprehensive survey provides control groups
Meets a goal: A comprehensive survey is necessary to identify and clarify a
previously un-measured, un-surveyed target group.
Justice: It is important to include non-tribal entities in the study in order to
ensure a comprehensive balance, as many individuals affected by federal Indian
policy have never lived in Indian Country and come from multi-heritage
families.
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•

•

Justice: A comprehensive survey, with equitable selection and distribution, will
benefit society - as well as the hidden target group - with new information
concerning American family dynamics. Leaving a segment of population out
could be detrimental to an understanding of current family dynamics throughout
the U.S. as well as the target group.
Beneficence: This comprehensive survey has potential to benefit and is unlikely
to harm

Research Purpose
The purpose of this causal comparative study is to assess the health, worldviews and
dynamics of diverse families across the nation, and test whether children who have
experienced homelife outside the traditional model are prone to greater problems with
behavioral, mental health, self-identity or self-esteem issues than their peers. This study
could affect Federal and State legislation and assist in the physical and emotional protection
of children.
Other goals included identifying conclusively that there are different subsets of tribal
members and persons of heritage – urban, suburban, rural, and reservation – some
deliberately disconnected from the reservation system and tribal governments. This is a
significant detail – as despite assertions that federal Indian law is not discriminatory because
it is based on “political distinctions” rather than racial distinctions (Morton v. Mancari 1974,
551), federal, state and tribal governments have included individuals and their children under
legislation and administrative rules based on heritage, not political affiliation.

Research Approach
The operational hypothesis posed for this survey is that children with tribal heritage and a
history abuse, neglect, or Fetal Alcohol Effects, who have experienced long-term placement
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in homes other than a tribal or ICWA compliant home, are prone to greater problems with
behavioral, mental health, self-identity or self-esteem issues than their peers.
Because displacement from the traditional family structure could occur for a variety of
reasons, the question framed in the invitation was, “Our nation is undergoing many changes
in family structure and dynamics. How have these changes affected children?” This
approach was chosen for its potential to draw the greatest diversity of participants.
•
•
•
•
•
•

The number of children raised in single parent homes, homes of extended
family, or foster homes has increased. Comprehensive research and empirical
data on the outcome of foster care is incomplete.
More children are reported to have behavioral and mental health concerns.
Reports dating back decades cite a high rate of mental health issues and violence
for children in foster care.
Being a comparative study, data gathered can be used to address issues specific
to comparison groups.
There is a lack of sufficient research studies comparing outcomes of foster
children of tribal heritage with those of other heritages
This is the first study to compare quantitatively and qualitatively the effect
foster care and adoption have had on children of tribal heritage.

Research Strategy
To obtain primary research concerning the experiences of American citizens, this study tested the
hypothesis through a large quantitative, anonymous, online survey allowing for the comparison
of diverse groups of adults who were raised outside of the traditional nuclear family with diverse
adults who were raised within the traditional nuclear family. There were 50 questions in the
survey. Invitations to participate were promoted on social media as well as newspaper ads in
three regions of America.
The study also involved a smaller qualitative interview study of volunteers from the larger
group. Participants in the qualitative interviews were invited to contact the researcher following
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their participation in the quantitative online survey. The questions were similar to those of the
quantitative survey. Results from the qualitative survey will be presented in a future paper.
The chosen research design for this research proposal is Causal Comparative, also referred to
as ‘post facto’ or ‘non-equivalent control group’ studies. This design was chosen because the
independent variable ‘placement history’ cannot be manipulated. Variables included independent
variable(s) generally defined as ‘placement history,’ dependent variable(s) generally defined as
‘damaging effects,’ controls and intervening variables(s) included adults who were children from
traditional nuclear homes and adults who were children placed in the homes of relatives, as well
as alternate sources of damaging effects.
A child’s placement history is an independent variable because it is historical data that cannot
be manipulated. Outcomes of children of varied backgrounds, worldviews, heritages and
placement history were compared: for example, children who were placed in foster homes vs.
children who remained in their birth home or were placed in kinship homes.

Population and Sampling Design
Both the quantitative and qualitative studies were open to any U.S. citizen over the age of 18.

Population
According to the 2010 U.S. census, there were almost 250,000,000 adults living in the United
States. Of that, 6.8 million (2.74%) identify as having American Indian or Alaska Native
heritage. This number includes those who are multi-heritage. Of these, 2.2 million are members
of one of the 573 federally recognized tribes (IHS 2019).
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On September 30, 2016, it was estimated that 437,465 children from all heritages were in
foster care and more than a quarter of those in care (32 %) were in relative homes, and nearly
half (45%) were in nonrelative foster family homes (GWIF 2018). Almost half of these children,
44%, were Caucasian. About 23% identified as Black or African-American, 21% Hispanic and
10% were listed as “other races or multiracial.” This included children with tribal heritage,
children of various other heritages, and children who were multi-heritage. About 2% were
unknown or unable to be determined (GWIF 2018).
There is no government database tracking domestic adoptions, but in 2012, the University of
Oregon reported that approximately “5 million Americans alive today are adoptees, 2-4 percent
of all families have adopted, and 2.5 percent of all children under 18 are adopted” (Herman
2012).
Almost 1100 participants were necessary from these varied sub-groups of the American
population to ensure statistical significance when comparing them. While this survey garnered
1351 participants, the number of tribally enrolled respondents who had experienced adoption or
foster care was 139.

Sampling Method
Using the website tool ‘SurveyMonkey,’ the quantitative survey was posted online at the end of
July 2018. Invitations to participate in the online survey were posted on Social media, including
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, and Linkedin were used to invite participants to respond
to the survey. Sporadically, the social media posts were promoted as paid ads. Email invitations
were also sent to about 30 people, asking them to share the survey with friends and family of all
heritages and political leanings. In January 2019, newspaper ads were placed in three select
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cities: Bemidji, MN, Kalispell, MT, and Oklahoma City, OK. Invitations were also placed in the
forum of Adoption.com. In March 2019, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk was employed to increase
participation, and particularly, respondents with Tribal heritage. Most participants over the eightmonth period responded through Facebook ads and Mechanical Turk. On June 17, 2019 there
were 1351 participants with 534 identifying Tribal heritage.
The flyer for the qualitative interview was added to the end of the quantitative survey. Upon
finishing the survey, all participants viewed the flyer for an interview portion of the survey and
had the option to volunteer for the qualitative Interview. If they chose to, they were asked to send
a separate email directly to the researcher.

Data Collection Administration
SurveyMonkey is an online survey host with a dedicated Trust & Security program focusing on
application, network, and system security. Identifying information was not required for this
online survey and anonymous options were set.
Quantitative Survey participants were not required to sign the consent form, which was the
first page of information that participants saw after clicking on the survey link. Qualitative
Interviews volunteers signed consent forms that were sent to them by email prior to the
interview. Participants in the follow-up qualitative research were given private, confidential
interviews: These interviews were recorded to ensure accurate documentation of responses and
assist with keeping the interview streamlined and as brief as possible. The audio recordings were
kept confidential in a password protected computer with limited access and following data
analysis will be transferred to an external hard-drive and placed in a bank safe deposit box. The
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consent forms for interview participants will be kept separate from respondent data. Password
locked computers were used during analysis and writing of the report.
Data for the interviews is aggregated and will not be connected to names on Informed
Consent forms other than through a codebook, which will be kept separate from the data in a
secured environment. If a participant chooses to withdraw from the research, audio recording
will be destroyed

Data Analysis Techniques
Analysis of the final, finished study will begin with a ‘Test of Statistical Significance’ to
determine if the null hypothesis is probably true in the population.
Analyzing the nominal and ordinal variables of the quantitative results will begin with varied
‘Contingency Tables.’ There will then be an analysis of ratio variables using ‘Linear Regression’
and ‘Correlation.’ ‘Multiple Regression’ and ‘Correlation’ methods allow for efficient
summarization of data that has many variables.

Limitations of Methodology and Ethical Considerations
Limitations: Restricted funds limited the number of people the study was able to reach.
Conflicts of Interest: The student researcher is a volunteer Chairwoman and Administrator of the
Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare and a Congressional appointee on the Alyce Spotted
Bear and Walter Soboleff Commission on Native Children. There is no financial conflict of
interest. These relationships were noted on information and consent forms respondents were
offered prior to participation. Direct interviews were recorded for accuracy, reliability and
accountability.
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Quantitative Survey

Data Analysis
Out of 1351 participants, 366 responded that they had a great-grandparent who was “Native
American.” 136 were enrolled in a federal tribe, or 37%, and 60 in a state tribe, or 16%. 141
were born on a reservation, and 114 said they were born totally disconnected from Indian
Country, with the remainder in towns close by a reservation or in an inner-city tribal community.
Over a quarter, 28%, 104 of the 366 never visited a reservation or tribal community. Further,
almost a third of those with heritage who experienced foster care or adoption, 30.56%, said they
were raised outside of and unconnected to any Native American community or reservation, and
never visited a reservation or relatives.
Of those confirming heritage, 47% had experienced foster care or adoption. 53% had
not. Further, 66% of those who experienced foster care or adoption state that ICWA was
involved in their placement. Of these fostered respondents with heritage, over half, 52.02%,
reported they are enrolled in a federally recognized tribe, 28.32% are enrolled in a state, not
federally, recognized tribe, and 4.05% are eligible for enrollment but have chosen not to enroll.

Questions
This study will determine whether children with tribal heritage and a history abuse, neglect, or
Fetal Alcohol Effects, who have experienced long-term placement in homes other than a tribal or
ICWA compliant home, are prone to greater problems with behavioral, mental health, selfidentity or self-esteem issues than their peers.
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According to the CDC, “Child abuse and neglect are serious public health issues with farreaching consequences for the youngest and most vulnerable members of society. Every child is
better when he/she and his/her peers have safe, stable, nurturing relationships and environments”
(CDC 2019). Does placing children of tribal heritage in non-Indian foster homes increase their
risk for experiencing psychological trauma and long-term emotional and psychological
problems? To measure the current well-being of participants, several questions were asked
pertaining to their physical, emotional, and economic health. The following is one example:
1. At this present time in your life – do you feel or experience a. An adult in your household who often or very often supports you, nurtures,
lifts you up, or praises you? Is there an adult you live with who makes you
feel safe and loved?
b. A friend with whom you feel strong ties and bonding.
c. Safety
d. A difference in learning style from other adults in receiving, processing,
integrating, and applying new information.
e. Depression
f. Loss of self-esteem
g. Personal grief from the loss of
i. Family
ii. Heritage
1. Language
2. Culture
3. Spiritual beliefs
(American Family Dynamics Survey 2019)
Interestingly, non-foster/adoptees of tribal heritage felt a statistically significant higher
“sense of loss of family” and “personal identity/growing up feeling different” than
foster/adoptees of heritage did. The foster/adoptees, on the other hand, felt a statistically
significant higher sense of loss of “culture/specific community” and “personal identity/biological
relatedness to others with same skin” than non-foster/adoptees. Foster/adoptees had better
education outcomes, but equal financial outcomes.
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Further, preliminary results showed that 80% of adults of heritage who experienced foster
care or adoption as a child currently feel emotionally connected to one or more other adults and
67.67% feel loved. While 30.56% of these respondents were raised “outside of and unconnected
to any Native American community or reservation, and never visited a reservation or relatives,”
over 60% did not feel grief from the loss of “cultural practices they never had a chance to
experience” and a full two thirds of these respondents state that they have not felt
“discrimination from the white community.”
Participants in the American Family Dynamics survey also took the Adverse Childhood
Experiences test, which was generated from the Adverse Childhood Experience Study (1997).
The ACE is a widely accepted screening tool and indicator for future physical and emotional
difficulties. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention now hosts the official website for
the 1995 to 1997 ACE study.
To find one’s ACE score, a respondent answers ten questions, each worth one point. The
sum of points at the end of the questionnaire is the respondents ACE score, with a higher number
increasing the risk for risky health behaviors, chronic health conditions, low life potential, and
early death (CDC 2019). According to the CDC:
The presence of ACEs does not mean that a child will experience poor outcomes.
However, children’s positive experiences or protective factors can prevent
children from experiencing adversity and can protect against many of the negative
health and life outcomes even after adversity has occurred (CDC 2019).
To find a respondents ACE score, we asked participants the following questions:
While you were growing up, during your first 18 years of life:
1. Did a parent or other adult in the household often or very often…Swear at
you, insult you, put you down, or humiliate you? or Act in a way that made
you afraid that you might be physically hurt?
2. Did a parent or other adult in the household often or very often…Push, grab,
slap, or throw something at you? or Ever hit you so hard that you had marks or
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were injured?
3. Did an adult person at least 5 years older than you ever…Touch or fondle
you or have you touch their body in a sexual way? or Attempt or actually have
oral, anal, or vaginal intercourse with you?
4. Did you often or very often feel that …No one in your family loved you or
thought you were important or special? or Your family didn’t look out for
each other, feel close to each other, or support each other?
5. Did you often or very often feel that … You didn’t have enough to eat, had
to wear dirty clothes, and had no one to protect you? or Your parents were too
drunk or high to take care of you or take you to the doctor if you needed it?
6. Were your parents ever separated or divorced?
7. Was your mother or stepmother: Often or very often pushed, grabbed,
slapped, or had something thrown at her? or Sometimes, often, or very often
kicked, bitten, hit with a fist, or hit with something hard? or Ever repeatedly hit
at least a few minutes or threatened with a gun or knife?
8. Did you live with anyone who was a problem drinker or alcoholic or who
used street drugs?
9. Was a household member depressed or mentally ill, or did a household
member attempt suicide?
10. Did a household member go to prison?
(CDC 2019)

ACE Scores
While the ACE test is intended for individual assessment, the Split-feather theory does not
construe tribal members as individuals, but as a class. Therefore, we will compare the results of
the some of the classes the Split-feather theory refers to when it uses the term “peers.” A total of
931 participants answered the ACE portion within the American Family Dynamic Survey. In
Graph 1.0, the median for persons of all heritages and family dynamics is 1 and the mean is 2.01.
This is one way of viewing peers of children of tribal heritage. The Response column indicates
the number of participants that answered positively to the question.
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Graph 1.0 shows their responses:

Graph 1.0. Full ACE results
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Graph 1.1 below shows preliminary results for 174 persons with tribal heritage who
experienced foster care or adoption:

Graph 1.1. ACE results: NA foster children
Preliminary results within Graph 1.1 show a median of experiences for this group of 1, and a
mean of 2.2, which is just slightly higher than the population at large.
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Graph 1.2 shows the preliminary results for 195 persons with tribal heritage who did not
experience foster care or adoption:

Graph 1.2. ACE results: NA - no foster care
These preliminary results show a median of 1, which is equal to that of children who experienced
foster care or adoption, and a slightly lower mean than in the general population, 1.49. Graph
267

1.3 shows results for persons with no tribal heritage who experienced foster care or adoption (69
participants):

Graph 1.3. ACE results: foster children, general population

The results for this group of non-tribal individuals who experienced foster care or
adoption show median points of 1 and a mean of 2.2, the same as that of tribal members who
experienced foster care or adoption.
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Multiple Heritages
Question 33 asked ‘Did you have a great-grandparent who was a member of a federal recognized
tribe? Do you have any Native American heritage?’ 897 within the survey responded, with 366
responding ‘Yes’ and 531 responding ‘No.’ Question 34 piped from 33, and asked, are you an
enrolled member? 369 responded. Graph 2.0 illustrates these results:

Graph 2.0. Enrolled members
10 respondents chose ‘other.’ Of the enrolled members who responded to the survey, most have
multiple heritages. Table 1.0 illustrates the multiple diverse heritages of the 196 survey
participants who are enrolled members of state and federally recognized tribes:
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Table 1.0. Multiple heritages
Trust in the Court Systems
This study also questioned the trust level diverse Americans had in the court systems.
Respondents marked each court system they felt safest with.

Graph 3.0: Overall trust in the Court systems
Graph 3.0 reflects the positive responses of 1001 U.S. citizens of all heritages and family
dynamics.
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Graph 3.1 shows the responses of from enrolled tribal members in regard to their trust in court
systems. There were 196 respondents:

Graph 3.1 Enrolled tribal members
Although the sampling was small, it was interesting to note that less than 10 percent of enrolled
tribal members trusted and felt safe in tribal court.
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Chapter 7
Discussion of Findings

This study was conducted to determine whether children with tribal heritage and a history of
abuse, neglect, or Fetal Alcohol Effects, who have experienced long-term placement in homes
other than a tribal or ICWA compliant home, are prone to greater problems with behavioral,
mental health, self-identity or self-esteem issues than their peers.
The American Family Dynamics Survey indicates that children of tribal heritage are
physically and emotionally diverse, with the majority of the children being multi-heritage and
living outside of the reservation system. About a third of those with tribal heritage and
potentially subject to the ICWA live totally disconnected from Indian Country.
A crucial point demonstrated by this survey is that relying on data solely from within the
reservation system, such as through Indian Health Services or from tribal government entities
alone, is inadequate if one is seeking data concerning citizens with tribal heritage in general.
Results are skewed toward those who depend on Indian Health Services and tribal government
services. The experiences of citizens whose families have mainstreamed into the larger culture
are left out of findings.
The case studies demonstrate the diverse problems created for children and families by
the Indian Child Welfare Act. Negative and even traumatic impact of the ICWA on the
emotional, psychological and physical health of many children as a consequence of the
application of ICWA is well documented.
The median ACE scores for the selected groups seem to indicate a relatively equal risk
for children who have experienced foster or adoptive homes, no matter the heritage. On the

273

other hand, results from other questions within the American Family Dynamics Survey have
indicated that some, but not all, children with tribal heritage who have experienced long-term
placement in foster or adoptive homes are prone to greater problems with behavioral, mental
health, self-identity or self-esteem issues than their peers. Nevertheless, multiple studies have
indicated adverse childhood experiences are the primary catalyst for behavioral and mental
health issues within foster children, not heritage. A fuller analysis of the American Family
Dynamics Survey will be done in a later paper. One variable that needs more study is alcoholrelated prenatal birth defects.
Preliminary results from the American Family Dynamics Survey do not support the
contention that children with tribal heritage who have experienced long-term placement in homes
other than a tribal or ICWA compliant home are prone to greater problems with behavioral,
mental health, self-identity or self-esteem issues than their peers as a direct result of their
physical or cultural heritage.
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Conclusion

The United States of America was founded with the natural premise that life, liberty and the
ability to pursue one’s happiness are unalienable rights, untouchable by government. Natural
law has affected this nation’s ideology and influenced public policy for centuries. That is not to
say perfection has ever been achieved or that it ever can be - but during the worst parts of
American history, those who respect the rule of natural law have made consistent effort to
overcome America’s failings by pushing against those who do not. American citizens have
historically had an exceptional desire for balanced justice and have consistently strived to
maintain or retrieve it.
Those who opposed slavery from the time of America’s inception to abolishment of
bondage 80 years later were just one example. When Congress changed the status of the tribes in
1871, it did not invalidate the treaties - although it could have taken that additional step. Treaties
signed over 150 years ago have won court battles for many tribes throughout this last century.
The treaties with tribal governments continue to exist today, including a handful that were signed
by the British before the United States was even a nation.
Treaties and international law go hand in hand. One cannot reasonably claim that
international law and the title of Discovery are not valid with respect to North American tribes,
while at the same time maintaining treaties are binding with respect to North American tribes. If
international law is irrelevant to tribal governments, so are treaties.
Additionally, if it is not self-evident that civil rights inherently apply to tribal members
just as they do to all men, then they are not inherent to all men. The truths that the Founding
Fathers knew to be self-evident – that all men are created equal; endowed by their Creator with
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certain unalienable rights; and among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness – were
apparently not self-evident to everyone. Sporadic attempts at justice aside, for almost two
centuries, our federal government has ignored the inherent humanity of tribal members.
Nevertheless, all men – no matter their heritage – are endowed by God with inalienable rights
that not even Congress, the Courts, tribal officials, or the President can destroy or legally ignore.
What we learned from this paper’s Literature Review was that not every historical
researcher, whether a tribal member or not, agrees with premises given by Cohen and Marshall,
and if these foundational premises are questionable, then the entirety of federal Indian policy is
as well. A growing body of work construes federal Indian law and policy from a constitutional
perspective and is finding current policy unconstitutional. Further, in relation to emotional and
psychological effects of foster care, the body of research from a multitude of studies
overwhelmingly points to present day causes shared by all heritages as opposed to racism or
vague historical trauma as the cause.
While some children and families faced with foster care, adoption or child custody
disputes have felt protection through the ICWA, others have felt forced into relationship with
tribal governments. The national dilemma has become whether an individual’s right to privacy,
Constitutional equal protection, and freedom of association are of less priority than tribal
sovereignty and the future of a tribe.
Too many within federal government choose to please political leaders and protect tribal
interests and sovereignty rather than save children’s lives. The federal government has reduced
children to the status of a ‘resource’ for tribal governments, just as the private property of
individual tribal members has been relegated to the control of the BIA as a resource for tribal
governments. Children are treated as material assets, and adults are treated as children.
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While federal government has focused on how the ‘child drain’ has affected tribal
governments and the future of the tribe as an entity, little attention has been paid the diversity of
individuals affected by federal Indian policy – many of whom have spiritual beliefs, political
views or parental practices unlike those promoted by the tribal government. Not only are the
views of individual tribal members diverse, it is unarguable that children of slight tribal heritage
have many more non-tribal relatives than they have tribal relatives.
The “best interest” that select federal agencies appear to be concerned with is that of the
tribal government. There is no acknowledgement that most eligible children are multi-racial or
live outside of Indian Country. The Obama administration’s 2016 rules prejudicially assume it is
always in the best interest of a child to be under jurisdiction of tribal government, even if parents
and grandparents have chosen to raise them in an alternative environment and worldview. The
2016 rules marginalize the rights of birth parents as well the reality of extended tribal and nontribal birth family.
While not protective of the rights of individuals, the 2016 ICWA rules have long been
called for by tribal leaders. Tribal officials, while requesting increasing amounts of money per
member, have simultaneously insisted on increased control over members. Tribal governments,
using ‘wardship’ and ‘trust relationship’ as revenue vehicles, requested Congress enact
legislation giving control over certain vulnerable children to tribal governments and have
repeatedly returned to DC to insist Congress make the resultant ICWA even more stringent –
covering more people and closing all “loopholes” for escape. When some members of Congress
recognized the overreach and constitutional implications of ICWA amendments and blocked
them from passage, tribal leaders went to the White House to insist on the strict regulation of

277

independent families – even going so far as to accuse some families of committing ‘fraud’ by not
admitting they had tribal heritage.
Tribal leaders have also asked federal and state governments to take responsibility for
ensuring larger numbers of children and families remain within the reservation system - even if
against the will of the children and families - and federal and state governments have acquiesced.
Ironically, in doing this, tribal leaders, under the premise of strengthening jurisdiction over
children of heritage, have essentially admitted their lack of it. In going to Congress with the
expectation and demand that Congress do something about grounding enrollable children to the
reservation system, tribal leaders have admitted they lack the authority and are willing to submit
to the sovereign authority of the United States of America. They have also admitted that the best
interest of children and families are second to the best interest of the tribe as a corporation.
Independent political communities have a legitimate right to determine their own
membership. However, basing that determination on an individual’s heritage and then forcing the
individual into political affiliation on the basis of that heritage is the epitome of racism. While
family and community are important to children of every culture, tribal government claims that
eligible children are lost without tribal culture infer there is something inherently different about
children of tribal heritage as opposed to other children. Recognition that children of every
heritage are individuals with their own wants, needs and goals is quashed. While it is unarguable
that a certain amount of strain occurs when traversing disparate cultures, children from around
the world are successfully and happily adopted into American homes on a regular basis. Yet, it
has become accepted belief that children of tribal heritage are, as a rule, unable to thrive outside
of Indian Country. The evidence is to the contrary. The vast majority of tribal members live
outside of reservation boundaries and many are living happy and successful lives. However,

278

according to statistics provided by numerous tribal organizations, the BIA, FBI, and ACF, crime
and physical, and sexual abuse have been steadily worsening on many reservations – even with
reservation crime and child abuse frequently underreported.
A concerned community does not wait for additional studies to act on an obvious and
immediately known danger. We do not wait for a study to rush a child out of a burning
building. When a child is bleeding to death, we know to immediately put pressure on the wound
and get the child to a hospital. Unwillingness to deal effectively with the immediate needs of
children suffering extreme physical or sexual abuse from extended family or community – no
matter where it is – casts doubt on tribal and federal government assertions that safety of the
children is of paramount importance. These ten statements are not absolute to all reservations
and individuals, but clarify the general reality witnessed:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Crime and child abuse are rampant on many reservations
Crime and child abuse are rampant because the U.S. Government has set up a
system that allows for extensive abuse and crime to occur unchecked and without
repercussion.
Because a certain amount of crime has been allowed to occur unchecked, many
families who desire a safer community for their children (not all) have moved
away from the reservation system.
At the same time, gang related tribal members remain or move to the reservation
because it is protected from state police. With the increase in gang activity there is
an increase in crime, drug abuse, alcoholism, child neglect, child abuse, and Fetal
Alcohol Spectrum Disorder.
As a result of the migration off the reservation, tribal governments experience a
drop in federal funds.
As an increasing percentage of healthier families leave the reservation system, an
increasing percentage who remain willingly participate in the crime and abuse.
As a result of increasing crime and child abuse, more children are in need of care.
Some tribal governments are reticent to admit they no longer have enough safe
homes to place children in, and not wanting to place the children off the
reservation, have placed children in questionable and even dangerous homes.
It appears more important to some in federal government as well as some in tribal
government to protect tribal sovereignty than it is to protect children.
In other words, there seems to be a protection of tribal sovereignty at all costs –
even at the cost of children’s lives.
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In contrast, the following five points clarify self-evident truths that policy makers need to
know:
•
•
•
•
•

International law and treaties are valid and relevant
Life, liberty, and the ability to pursue happiness are rights endowed by the Creator
to all men equally, no matter their heritage.
The vast majority of tribal members live outside of reservation boundaries and
many are living happy and successful lives.
A wide body of research confirms that foster care children of every heritage
experience higher levels of emotional and psychological trauma.
A growing body of work by legal and historical researchers is finding current
federal Indian policy unconstitutional
Although the ICWA has some statutory safeguards to prevent misuse, numerous families

continue to be hurt by the law. While the ICWA itself states it is not to be used in custody
battles between birth parents, parents can refuse tribal court jurisdiction, non-tribal grandparents
have the same rights as tribally enrolled grandparents, and courts can deviate from placement
preferences with “good cause,” what has played out in various state and tribal courts has not
always reflected the wording of the law. Further, wording in a law is of no help if one does not
have the money to hire an attorney who knows Indian law. Many times, families fighting ICWA
are low income. Further, many non-tribal courts do not understand the law and defer to the tribal
court. The ICWA has given some tribal leaders, social services and tribal courts a sense of
entitlement when it comes to children of heritage.
The era of the Indian Child Welfare Act will become one of the numerous shames in
American history. While many have been led to believe the ICWA is a righteous law, the reality
is that powerless citizens have again been placed under a subjugation. If the ICWA were to
remain law, it would require several amendments. Children of tribal heritage need protection
equal to that of any other child in the United States. State health and welfare requirements for
foster and adoptive children should apply equally to all. Importantly, those assigned to child
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protection, whether federal, state, county or tribal, need to be held accountable if a child is
knowingly left in unsafe conditions. (Title 42 USC 1983).
Further, fit parents, no matter their heritage, should have the right to choose healthy
guardians or adoptive parents for their children without concern for heritage or the overriding
wishes of tribal or federal government. US Supreme Court decisions upholding family autonomy
under 5th and 14th Amendment due process and equal protection include Meyer vs. Nebraska,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Brown v. Board of Education.
The ‘Existing Indian Family Doctrine’ should also be available to families and children
who choose not to live within the reservation system. Alexandria had held that “recognition of
the existing Indian family doctrine [was] necessary to avoid serious constitutional flaws in the
ICWA”. Thus, if the existing Indian family doctrine has already been ignored in current ICWA
cases, then serious constitutional flaws may have already occurred.
Next, United States citizens, no matter their heritage, are guaranteed civil rights which
include fair hearings. When summoned to a tribal court, parents and legal guardians, whether
enrolled or not, should be fully informed of their rights, including 25 USC Chapter 21§1911(b),
which states “Transfer of proceedings [to tribal jurisdiction]” will occur only “…in the absence
of good cause to the contrary, [or] objection by either parent….” Further, the rights of nonmember parents must be upheld. According to 25 USC Chapter 21§1903(1)(iv), ICWA
placement preferences “shall not include a placement based … upon an award, in a divorce
proceeding, of custody to one of the parents.” ICWA placement preferences also include all
grandparents - no matter the heritage. Finally, non-members must be able to serve county and
state summons to tribal members within reservation boundaries and must have access to appeal.

281

Additionally, a “qualified expert witness” must be someone who is able to advocate for the
well-being of the child, first and foremost, not a tribe. An expert witness needs to be a
professional person with substantial education and experience in the area of the professional
person’s specialty and significant knowledge of and experience with the child, his family - and
the culture, family structure, and child-rearing practices the child has been raised in. There is
nothing a tribal social worker inherently knows about a child based on nothing more than the
child’s ethnic heritage. This includes children of 100% heritage who have been raised apart from
the tribal community. A qualified expert witness needs to be someone who has not only met the
child, but has worked with the child, is familiar with and understands the environment the child
has thus far been raised in, and has professional experience with some aspect of the child’s
emotional, physical or academic health. This is far more important than understanding the
customs of a particular tribe.
Finally, if tribal membership is truly a political rather than racial designation, than the
definition of an “Indian” child is one who is “enrolled” in the tribe, not merely “eligible.”
Allowing tribal governments the right to determine their own membership at the expense of the
rights of any other heritage or culture as well as at the expense of individual rights is indeed
political. However, relatives being told these children are suddenly now members of an entity
with which the family has had no political, social or cultural relationship betrays the reality that
at least in the case of their child, “race” is determining membership.
Keeping children, no matter their blood quantum, in what a State would normally
determine to be an unfit home – solely on the basis of tribal government claims that European
values do not apply to and are not needed by children of tribal heritage – is racist in nature and a
denial of the child’s personal right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
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Tribal members are not just U.S. citizens; they are human beings. They are not chattel
owned by tribal governments or servants indentured to the success of tribal governments, nor are
they lab rats for Congress, pawns to be used at the negotiating table, or zoo exhibits for
patronizing tourists looking for entertainment.
Even if a child had significant relationship with tribal culture, forced application of
ICWA conflicts with the Constitution. There is nothing within the U.S. Constitution nor any
treaty that gives Congress the authority to mandate individuals stay connected to a tribe, support
a particular political viewpoint, or raise their children in a prescribed culture or religion.
For this reason, the ICWA cannot remain law. Natelson has shown that the ICWA goes
far beyond the limited scope of the Indian Commerce Clause. While some tribal members
appreciate that proper application of the Constitution means that Congress has no plenary power
over tribal affairs, it also means that Congress has no power to enact laws such as the ICWA.
In light of constitutional issues inherent to the foundational enactment of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, the ICWA must be repealed. The Commerce Clause does not give Congress
plenary authority over tribes or children of heritage, and tribal governments do not have the
authority to force membership onto individuals, no matter their age.
Allowing individuals to employ their full constitutional rights would preserve to citizens
their God-given right to individuality, liberty, and property, which is what the United States
government is tasked to do. In the words of Dr. William Allen, Emeritus Professor, Political
Science, MSU and former Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights:
“... We are talking about our brothers and our sisters. We’re talking about what
happens to people who share with us an extremely important identity. And that
identity is the identity of free citizens in a Republic…” (2010)84
Dr. William B. Allen’s keynote speech at the Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare’s ICWA Teach-In,
titled ‘Indian Children: Citizens, not Cultural Artifacts,’ on October 28, 2011 in the chambers of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs.
84
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Appendix

Appendix 1: Brothertown Survey Document

Official federal documents and all works published before 1923 are in the public domain..
Citation: Brothertown Digital Historical Library/
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Appendix 2: President Andrew Jackson’s Letter
to the 'Civilized' Indian Tribes, October 1829, (Raab 2019)
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Text of President Andrew Jackson’s original letter to the 'civilized' Indian tribes, October,
1829 (Raab 2019)
The Raab Collection, an auction house specializing in historical artifacts, stated:
The President dictated a letter he handed to Haley, and it was taken by Haley himself to
the seats of power in the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations, which were where this first
confrontation would take place. The letter was to be read aloud by Haley, who was to
assure them of its authenticity. It was carried by Haley throughout the southeastern
stretches of the U.S. and was read to hundreds of Native Americans and their leaders
(Raab 2019).
According to the Raab Collection, the original letter had been lost to time, though a draft
had been preserved, allowing most of the text to be known. The letter became famous and is
quoted in several books, including Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation
of the American Indian by Michael Paul Rogin. Although not all of the original text is clear, the
following is “the final letter, signed, likely in the hand of his nephew Andrew Jackson Donelson,
Washington City, October 15, 1829, to Haley, presented and not mailed, and carried throughout
the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations” (Raab 2019):
Having kindly offered to be the bearer…of any communications to the Indians [through
the] countries you will pass on your [way] home, which I might think proper to make to
[them, I], take the liberty of placing in your hands [copies] of a talk made by me last
Spring, to the [Creeks] which I wish you to show to the Chiefs of the…Choctaws. As far
as this talk relates to the present situation and future prospects, it is their white brothers
and my wishes for them to remove beyond the Mississippi, it [contains] the [best] advice
to both the Choctaws and Chickasaws, whose happiness and…will certainly be promoted
by removing [beyond] the Mississippi.
Say to them as friends and brothers to listen [to] the voice of their father, &
friend. Where [they] now are, they and my white children are too near each other to live
in harmony & peace. Their game is destroyed and many of their people will not work &
till the earth. Beyond the great river Mississippi, where a part of their nation has gone,
their father has provided a co[untry] large enough for them all, and he ad[vises] them to
go to it. There, their white…[will not trou]ble them, they will have no claim to [the l]and,
and they & their children can live upon [it as] long as grass grows or water runs, in peace
and plenty. It shall be theirs forever. For the improvements which they have made in the
country where they now live, and for the stock which they [can]not take with them, their
father will [sti]pulate, in a treaty to be held with them, [to] pay them a fair price.
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Say to my red Choctaw children, and my Chickasaw children to listen. My white
children of Mississippi have extended their laws over their country; and if they remain
where they now are…must be subject to those laws. If they will [remove] across the
Mississippi, they will be free [from] those laws, and subject only to their own, and the
care of their father the President. Where they now are, say to them, their father the
President cannot prevent the operation of the laws of Mississippi. They are within the
limits of that state, and I pray you to explain to them, that so far from the United States
having a right to question the authority of any State to regulate its affairs within its own
limits, they will be obliged to sustain the exercise of this right. Say to the chiefs &
warriors that I am their friend, that I wish to act as their friend, but they must, by
removing from the limits of the States of Mississippi and Alabama, and by being settled
on the lands I offer them, put it in my power to be such.
That the chiefs and warriors may fully understand this talk, you will please [go]
among them and explain it; and tell [them] it is from my own mouth you have…it and
that I never speak with a [forked] tongue.” Here a portion of a page is unclear. However,
using the text of the draft and extant final segments, it continues:
Whenever [they make up their] minds to exchange [their lands]…[for land] west
of the river Mississippi, [that I will direct] a treaty to be held with them, [and assure
them, that every] thing just & liberal shall [be extended to them in that treaty.] Their
improvements [will be paid for], stock if left will be paid [for, and all who] wish to
remain as citizens [shall have] reservations laid out to cover [their improv]ements; and
the justice due [from a] father to his red children will [be awarded to] them. [Again I] beg
you, tell them to listen. [The plan proposed] is the only one by which [they can be]
perpetuated as a nation….the only one by which they can expect to preserve their own
laws, & be benefitted by the care and humane attention of the United States. I am very
respectfully your friend, & the friend of my Choctaw and Chickasaw brethren. Andrew
Jackson” (Raab 2019).

Official federal documents and all works published before 1923 are in the public domain.
Citation: Raab Collection: Andrew Jackson (Raab 2019).
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Appendix 3: President Andrew Jackson's Speech to Congress
on 'Indian Removal'
December 6, 1830

"It gives me pleasure to announce to Congress that the benevolent policy of the Government,
steadily pursued for nearly thirty years, in relation to the removal of the Indians beyond the white
settlements is approaching to a happy consummation. Two important tribes have accepted the
provision made for their removal at the last session of Congress, and it is believed that their
example will induce the remaining tribes also to seek the same obvious advantages.
The consequences of a speedy removal will be important to the United States, to
individual States, and to the Indians themselves. The pecuniary advantages which it promises to
the Government are the least of its recommendations. It puts an end to all possible danger of
collision between the authorities of the General and State Governments on account of the
Indians. It will place a dense and civilized population in large tracts of country now occupied by
a few savage hunters. By opening the whole territory between Tennessee on the north and
Louisiana on the south to the settlement of the whites it will incalculably strengthen the
southwestern frontier and render the adjacent States strong enough to repel future invasions
without remote aid. It will relieve the whole State of Mississippi and the western part of
Alabama of Indian occupancy, and enable those States to advance rapidly in population, wealth,
and power. It will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; free
them from the power of the States; enable them to pursue happiness in their own way and under
their own rude institutions; will retard the progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers,
and perhaps cause them gradually, under the protection of the Government and through the
influence of good counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting, civilized,
and Christian community.
What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few
thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms
embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by
more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization and
religion?
The present policy of the Government is but a continuation of the same progressive
change by a milder process. The tribes which occupied the countries now constituting the
Eastern States were annihilated or have melted away to make room for the whites. The waves of
population and civilization are rolling to the westward, and we now propose to acquire the
countries occupied by the red men of the South and West by a fair exchange, and, at the expense
of the United States, to send them to land where their existence may be prolonged and perhaps
made perpetual. Doubtless it will be painful to leave the graves of their fathers; but what do they
more than our ancestors did or than our children are now doing? To better their condition in an
unknown land our forefathers left all that was dear in earthly objects. Our children by thousands
yearly leave the land of their birth to seek new homes in distant regions. Does Humanity weep at
these painful separations from everything, animate and inanimate, with which the young heart
has become entwined? Far from it. It is rather a source of joy that our country affords scope
where our young population may range unconstrained in body or in mind, developing the power
and facilities of man in their highest perfection. These remove hundreds and almost thousands of
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miles at their own expense, purchase the lands they occupy, and support themselves at their new
homes from the moment of their arrival. Can it be cruel in this Government when, by events
which it cannot control, the Indian is made discontented in his ancient home to purchase his
lands, to give him a new and extensive territory, to pay the expense of his removal, and support
him a year in his new abode? How many thousands of our own people would gladly embrace the
opportunity of removing to the West on such conditions! If the offers made to the Indians were
extended to them, they would be hailed with gratitude and joy.
And is it supposed that the wandering savage has a stronger attachment to his home than
the settled, civilized Christian? Is it more afflicting to him to leave the graves of his fathers than
it is to our brothers and children? Rightly considered, the policy of the General Government
toward the red man is not only liberal, but generous. He is unwilling to submit to the laws of the
States and mingle with their population. To save him from this alternative, or perhaps utter
annihilation, the General Government kindly offers him a new home, and proposes to pay the
whole expense of his removal and settlement (A. Jackson 1830).

Andrew Jackson's Speech to Congress on 'Indian Removal'" by President Andrew Jackson
(1830) is in the public domain. Citation: President Jackson's Message to Congress "On Indian
Removal", December 6, 1830; Records of the United States Senate, 1789 ‐ 1990; Record Group
46; Records of the United States Senate, 1789 ‐ 1990; National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA]
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Appendix 4: Chief Seattle - Speech
Cautioning Americans to Deal Justly with His People
January 12, 1854
Yonder sky that has wept tears of compassion upon my people for centuries untold, and which to
us appears changeless and eternal, may change. Today is fair. Tomorrow it may be overcast with
clouds. My words are like the stars that never change. Whatever Seattle says, the great chief at
Washington can rely upon with as much certainty as he can upon the return of the sun or the
seasons. The white chief says that Big Chief at Washington sends us greetings of friendship and
goodwill. This is kind of him for we know he has little need of our friendship in return. His
people are many. They are like the grass that covers vast prairies. My people are few. They
resemble the scattering trees of a storm–swept plain. The great, and I presume—good, White
Chief sends us word that he wishes to buy our land but is willing to allow us enough to live
comfortably. This indeed appears just, even generous, for the Red Man no longer has rights that
he need respect, and the offer may be wise, also, as we are no longer in need of an extensive
country.
There was a time when our people covered the land as the waves of a wind–ruffled sea
cover its shell–paved floor, but that time long since passed away with the greatness of tribes that
are now but a mournful memory. I will not dwell on, nor mourn over, our untimely decay, nor
reproach my paleface brothers with hastening it, as we too may have been somewhat to blame.
Youth is impulsive. When our young men grow angry at some real or imaginary wrong,
and disfigure their faces with black paint, it denotes that their hearts are black, and that they are
often cruel and relentless, and our old men and old women are unable to restrain them. Thus it
has ever been. Thus it was when the white man began to push our forefathers ever westward. But
let us hope that the hostilities between us may never return. We would have everything to lose
and nothing to gain. Revenge by young men is considered gain, even at the cost of their own
lives, but old men who stay at home in times of war, and mothers who have sons to lose, know
better.
Our good father in Washington––for I presume he is now our father as well as yours,
since King George has moved his boundaries further north––our great and good father, I say,
sends us word that if we do as he desires he will protect us. His brave warriors will be to us a
bristling wall of strength, and his wonderful ships of war will fill our harbors, so that our ancient
enemies far to the northward—the Haidas and Tsimshians—will cease to frighten our women,
children, and old men. Then in reality he will be our father and we his children. But can that ever
be? Your God is not our God! Your God loves your people and hates mine! He folds his strong
protecting arms lovingly about the paleface and leads him by the hand as a father leads an infant
son. But, He has forsaken His Red children, if they really are His. Our God, the Great Spirit,
seems also to have forsaken us.
Your God makes your people wax stronger every day. Soon they will fill all the land. Our
people are ebbing away like a rapidly receding tide that will never return. The white man's God
cannot love our people or He would protect them. They seem to be orphans who can look
nowhere for help. How then can we be brothers? How can your God become our God and renew
our prosperity and awaken in us dreams of returning greatness? If we have a common Heavenly
Father He must be partial, for He came to His paleface children.
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We never saw Him. He gave you laws but had no word for His red children whose
teeming multitudes once filled this vast continent as stars fill the firmament. No; we are two
distinct races with separate origins and separate destinies. There is little in common between us.
To us the ashes of our ancestors are sacred and their resting place is hallowed ground.
You wander far from the graves of your ancestors and seemingly without regret. Your religion
was written upon tablets of stone by the iron finger of your God so that you could not forget. The
Red Man could never comprehend or remember it. Our religion is the traditions of our
ancestors—the dreams of our old men, given them in solemn hours of the night by the Great
Spirit; and the visions of our sachems, and is written in the hearts of our people.
Your dead cease to love you and the land of their nativity as soon as they pass the portals
of the tomb and wander away beyond the stars. They are soon forgotten and never return. Our
dead never forget this beautiful world that gave them being. They still love its verdant valleys, its
murmuring rivers, its magnificent mountains, sequestered vales and verdant lined lakes and bays,
and ever yearn in tender fond affection over the lonely hearted living, and often return from the
happy hunting ground to visit, guide, console, and comfort them.
Day and night cannot dwell together. The Red Man has ever fled the approach of the
White Man, as the morning mist flees before the morning sun. However, your proposition seems
fair and I think that my people will accept it and will retire to the reservation you offer them.
Then we will dwell apart in peace, for the words of the Great White Chief seem to be the words
of nature speaking to my people out of dense darkness.
It matters little where we pass the remnant of our days. They will not be many. The
Indian's night promises to be dark. Not a single star of hope hovers above his horizon. Sad–
voiced winds moan in the distance. Grim fate seems to be on the Red Man's trail, and wherever
he will hear the approaching footsteps of his fell destroyer and prepare stolidly to meet his doom,
as does the wounded doe that hears the approaching footsteps of the hunter.
A few more moons, a few more winters, and not one of the descendants of the mighty
hosts that once moved over this broad land or lived in happy homes, protected by the Great
Spirit, will remain to mourn over the graves of a people once more powerful and hopeful than
yours. But why should I mourn at the untimely fate of my people? Tribe follows tribe, and nation
follows nation, like the waves of the sea. It is the order of nature, and regret is useless. Your time
of decay may be distant, but it will surely come, for even the White Man whose God walked and
talked with him as friend to friend, cannot be exempt from the common destiny. We may be
brothers after all. We will see.
We will ponder your proposition and when we decide we will let you know. But should
we accept it, I here and now make this condition that we will not be denied the privilege without
molestation of visiting at any time the tombs of our ancestors, friends, and children. Every part
of this soil is sacred in the estimation of my people. Every hillside, every valley, every plain and
grove, has been hallowed by some sad or happy event in days long vanished. Even the rocks,
which seem to be dumb and dead as the swelter in the sun along the silent shore, thrill with
memories of stirring events connected with the lives of my people, and the very dust upon which
you now stand responds more lovingly to their footsteps than yours, because it is rich with the
blood of our ancestors, and our bare feet are conscious of the sympathetic touch. Our departed
braves, fond mothers, glad, happy hearted maidens, and even the little children who lived here
and rejoiced here for a brief season, will love these somber solitudes and at eventide they greet
shadowy returning spirits. And when the last Red Man shall have perished, and the memory of
my tribe shall have become a myth among the White Men, these shores will swarm with the
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invisible dead of my tribe, and when your children's children think themselves alone in the field,
the store, the shop, upon the highway, or in the silence of the pathless woods, they will not be
alone. In all the earth there is no place dedicated to solitude.
At night when the streets of your cities and villages are silent and you think them
deserted, they will throng with the returning hosts that once filled them and still love this
beautiful land. The White Man will never be alone.
Let him be just and deal kindly with my people, for the dead are not powerless. Dead, did I
say? There is no death, only a change of worlds (Seattle 1854)

Official federal documents and all works published before 1923 are in the public domain.
Citation: Civil Rights and Conflict in the United States: Selected Speeches (Lit2Go Edition):
Speech Cautioning Americans To Deal Justly with His People January 12, 1854.
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Appendix 5: Senator Sam Houston Speech to Congress (1854)

Official federal documents and all works published before 1923 are in the public domain.
Citation: CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 33d Congress, 1st Session, App. 202 (1854)
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Appendix 6: Patent in Fee to Gideon Peon (1947)

Congressional approval:

Official federal documents are in the public domain. Citation: (NARA] Library of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: “…[M]onthly catalog of United States Government
publications" (Univ of Illinois 1947).
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Presidential veto of Patent in Fee for Gideon Peon and Joseph Pickett

Official federal documents are in the public domain. Citation: (NARA] Library of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: “…[M]onthly catalog of United States Government
publications" (Univ of Illinois 1947).
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Appendix 7: Department of Justice to Chairman John McCain Concerning H.R. 3286
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs
Washington, DC, June 18, 1996
Hon. JOHN MCCAIN,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter presents the views of the Justice Department on H.R.
3286, the `Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1996.' We strongly support H.R. 3286
without the inclusion of title III. …
Title III
A. Detrimental impact on tribal sovereignty
The proposed amendments interfere with tribal sovereignty and the right of tribal selfgovernment. Among the attributes of Indian tribal sovereignty recognized by the Supreme Court,
is the right to determine tribal membership. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Section 302 of H.R. 3286 provides that membership in a tribe is effective from the actual date of
admission and that it shall not be given retroactive effect. For persons over 18 years of age,
section 302 requires written consent for tribal membership. Many tribes do not regard tribal
enrollment as coterminous with membership and the Department of Interior, in its guidelines on
Indian child custody proceedings, has recognized that `[e]nrollment is the common evidentiary
means of establishing Indian status, but is not the only means nor is it necessarily determinative.'
1
[Footnote] Through its membership restrictions, H.R. 3286 may force some tribal governments
to alter enrollment and membership practices in order to preserve the application of the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., to their members.
[Footnote 1: Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67,586 (Nov. 6, 1979).]
B. Detrimental impact on tribal court jurisdiction
H.R. 3286 would amend the ICWA to require a factural determination of whether an Indian
parent maintains the requisite `significant social, cultural, or political affiliation' with a tribe to
warrant the application of the Act. Title III fails to indicate which courts would have jurisdiction
to conduct a factual determination into tribal affiliation. To the extent that State courts would
make these determinations, H.R. 3286 would undercut tribal court jurisdiction, and essential
aspect of tribal sovereignty. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
Reducing tribal court jurisdiction over Indian Child Welfare Act proceedings would conflict
directly with the objectives of the ICWA and with prevailing law and policy regarding tribal
courts.
The President, in his Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native
American Tribal Governments (April 29, 1994), directed that tribal sovereignty be respected and
tribal governments consulted to the greatest extent possible. Congress has found that `tribal
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justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve as important forums for
ensuring public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments, `See Indian
Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. 3601(5). Retaining ICWA's regime of presumptive tribal
jurisdiction crucial to maintaining harmonious relations with tribal governments, to ensuring that
the tribes retain essential features of sovereignty and to guarding against the dangers that
Congress identified when it enacted ICWA in 1978.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this matter. If we may be of additional assistance,
please do not hesitate to call upon us. The Office of Management and Budget has advised that
there is no objection to the submission of this letter from the standpoint of the Administration's
program.
Sincerely,
Ann M. Harkiss,
(For Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General). (US Congress. Senate 1996)

Official federal documents are in the public domain. Citation: Senate Report: H.R. 3286:
Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1996
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Appendix 8: Dr. Michael R. Tilus, Letter of Grave Concern, March 3, 2012
Reprinted with permission
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Reprinted with permission. Citation: Michael R. Tilus, PsyD, MP, July 29. 2019.
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